

**EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY: IDEAS AND PRACTICES OF ISLAMIC CIVIL
SOCIETY ASSOCIATION IN INDONESIA**

by

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Abstract

The central question addressed in this study is “How are the conceptualization and operationalization of education for democratic citizenship similar to or different within and across the two Islamic civil society associations.” Using qualitative methods, I explored the ideas and experiences (practices) of two large Islamic civil society associations: Muhammadiyah (M) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), in Indonesia.

Muhammadiyah and NU members have similar ideas about democracy, democratic society and educating for democracy. Within both organizations members argue Islam has tenets, such as *shura* and *adl* (justice), congruent with democratic ideas, but their responses to the Western conceptions of democracy vary. Accommodationists in both organizations state that Islamic tenets are congruent with the Western ideas of democracy, while rejectionists express that Islam has concept of happiness as the goal of democracy, sovereignty, and freedom differ from Western concepts of democracy. Moreover, although most informants from M and NU subscribe to democratic values, such as individual freedom, respect for differences or plurality, tolerance, open-mindedness, and criticism; some see the notions

individual sovereignty, accepting of other religious groups' beliefs, and gender equality as problematic for Muslims in Indonesia. Adopting these values in certain ways, they argue, can be seen to contravene core/fundamental Islamic beliefs.

Muhammadiyah and NU work to educate their members and the community at large by promoting democratic or civil values, political awareness, and participation. Both organizations have developed voter education and education for anti-corruption programs. In addition, NU organizes programs to transform orthodox understandings about the *fiqh* tradition, “citizen forums” to influence the provision of public services, and workshops to disseminate ideas of “inclusive, emancipatory or moderate Islam.” M’s programs focus on developing gender sensitivity among officials, candidates, and community members as well as on developing civil values for the students of its schools and colleges through civic education.

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FF

1. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1.1. Indonesia, Islam and Democracy

Indonesia is a diverse multi-ethnic and multi-religious country of 228,437,870 people. The majority of the Indonesian population (88.22 percent) identify themselves as Muslims. Minority religious groups of Christians (8.92 %), Buddhists (0.84 %) and Hindus (1.81 %) make up the Indonesian nation. This means that the Indonesian *umma* (community of believers) is by far the largest of any nation in the world (Fealy, 2003).

Indonesia is currently making a transition to democracy.¹ In examining the development of Indonesian democracy, we need to consider several issues related to its religious makeup. First, although Indonesia is neither a secular nor a religious (theocratic) state, its citizens have enjoyed freedom of religion (at least) since the adoption of the 1945 Constitution. Second, the concept of unity in diversity, which has constituted the philosophical basis in for the nation state, implies respect and tolerance for diverse religions

¹ Indonesia is still in a preliminary stage of transition to a democracy with the 1999 general election being seen as one of the necessary, minimal conditions of a democratic state. Clarke & Foweraker (2001) and Diamond & Kim (2000) explain that democracy or a democratic state, according to the concept of a 'minimalist' or 'thin' democracy, is characterized by such factors as having a secret ballot, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, participation, competition, associational recognition, and access and executive accountability.

and religious groups. Third, there is a debate among Muslim as well as non-Muslim scholars regarding whether Islam is compatible with democracy².

In regard to the third issue, non-Muslim scholars can be divided into two categories: a) *rejectionists*, who do not think that Islam and its culture, including the Islamic concept and practice of civil society, support democracy,³ and b) *accommodationists* who argue that Islam's fundamental values are compatible with democracy. Several factors are identified by the *rejectionists* who claim Arab culture and Islam are incompatible with democracy including lack of enthusiasm or support for political liberalization and the lack of a democratic tradition in the Middle East (Esposito, 1995) as well as the existence of tyrannies in (several) Muslim countries. Lewis (1996), for example, argues that of the 53 members of OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries), only Turkey can pass Huntington's test of

² The term "democracy" was not apparent in pre-modern Muslim literature. However, Muslim thinkers were concerned about issues like justice (*'adl*) and oppression (*zulm*) as stated in the holy Qur'an, which serves as an ethical guidance to set up a societal arrangement. While, the term "democracy" can be first found in the works of Al-Farabi and Ibnu Rusyd, Muslim scholars in the medieval ages. After that (al-Farabi and Ibnu Rusyd's), the word democracy, *dimuqratiyah*, was not commonly found in Arabic political writings until the end of nineteenth century (Rosenthal, 1960).

³ This standpoint was first advocated by Montesquieu more than two and half centuries ago when he said that "Islam had a violent streak that predisposed Muslim societies to authoritarianism [The] Mohammedan religion, which speaks only with a sword, continues to act on men with the destructive spirit that founded it" (Fish, 2002: 15-16). Some contemporary writers have opinions similar to Montesquieu's, saying that Islam offers the least prospects for liberal democracy (Lewis, 1993: 1); Islam cannot tolerate diversity (Trifkovic, 2000: 19); Islam is incompatible with democracy (Goddard, 2002). Moreover, according to rejectionists, the true agenda of the Islamic movement is to gain power, establish authoritarian rule, repress dissent, and suppress the freedom of speech (Kramer, 2000: 34; Pipes, 2000: 56).

democracy.⁴ Based on this fact, he and other rejectionists assert that there are no democratic values in Islam (Stepan, 2000).

Muslim scholars can also be divided into two categories: a) *Islamists* who argue that democracy is not compatible with Islam because democracy emphasizes the sovereignty of the people—a concept that contradicts a fundamental tenet of Islam, the concept of *hakimiyyat Allah* (the sovereignty of God) (Goddard, 2002; Maududi, 1997), and b) *Liberalists or Modernists or reformists*, who argue that democracy is neither a monolithic concept but rather a multi-faceted phenomenon, and thus various form of democracy may be developed in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies (Ahmad, 2003; Esposito, 2003).⁵

Both liberalist or reformist Muslim and accommodationist non-Muslim scholars argue that Islam contains fundamental doctrines such as *musawat* (equality); *hurriyah* (freedom, including freedom of religion); *shura* (consultation and deliberation); and *‘adl* (justice),⁶ all of which can be interpreted as supporting a democratic society (Ahmad, 2003;

⁴ The realization of democracy in the Muslim world is seen in terms of issues of government, governance, and human rights (Lewis, 1996)

⁵ Western democracy has taken many forms from Greece to modern France, Great Britain, and the United States. Therefore, historically democracy in the West has taken many forms, adapting itself to local condition (Esposito, 1995, 2003).

⁶ Ahmad (2003) and Zaidan (1982) refer to several verses of the Qur’an and other texts presenting the prophetic tradition in which are stated basic principles of Islam that are compatible with the (liberal) notion of democracy. These include equality. “O Mankind, We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you know each other. The most honorable in the sight of Allah is the one who excels in piety and heedfulness (Chapter 49:13);” (b) freedom (freedom of religion): “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error (Chapter II: 256); (c) commanding right and virtue: “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoying what is right, and forbidding what is wrong (Chapter III: 104);” (d) justice “Oh ye who believe stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God even as against

Amstrong, 2000; Esposito, 1995; Esposito, 2000, 2003; Khan, 2003; Wright, 2000). Islam is also seen as compatible with democracy because it provides a tradition that encourages people to promote freedom of mind and public debates in the forms of *ijtihad* (reinterpretation), *ijma* (consensus), and *ikhtilaf* (disagreement/difference of opinion), *istislah* (public interests), *tasamuh* (tolerance) and *hisba* (public accountability and ombudsmanship) (Ahmad, 2003, Esposito, 1997; Feldman, 2003 Wright, 1996).⁷ However, these Islamic values, which serve to promote democracy, have been interpreted in many historical and societal contexts in ways that have thwarted democratic development (Mousalli, 2001: 4).⁸

yourselves, or your parents, or your kin (Chapter IV: 135); and (e) freedom of speech “The best form of jihad is to utter a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler (*Hadith*).”

⁷ Esposito (2000) argues, furthermore, that Islam is not a dangerous ideology, but simply a religion not so different from Christianity and Judaism; it is not the source of violence. Esposito (2000) insists that there is no inherent clash between the values of Islam and those of Western civilization. In contrast to the popular view that equates Islam with “fundamentalism” and violence, only a small minority of Muslims advocate violence, oppression, and authoritarianism (Esposito, 2000). As Esposito (1995) comments: “At the heart of Western misinterpretation, stereotyping, and exaggerated fears of Islam is a clash of viewpoints. Older stereotype of “the Arab” and Islam in term of Bedouin, desert, camel, polygamy, harem, and rich oil shaykhs have been replaced by those of gun-toting mullahs or bearded, anti-Western fundamentalists. Western fears and antipathy are fed not only by media reports and headlines events but are also rooted in a secular outlook on life which is often antithetical to that of Islamic activities. Esposito (1995: 242), hence, states firmly that “contemporary Islam is more a challenge than a threat. It challenges the West to know and understand the diversity of the Muslim experience. It is a challenge to Muslim governments to be more responsive to popular demands for political liberalization and greater popular participation, to tolerate rather than repress nonviolent opposition movements, to build viable democratic institutions. At the same time, it challenges Western powers to stand by the democratic values they embody, distinguish between authentic populist movements and violent revolutionaries, and recognize the right of the people to determine the nature of their governments and leadership”.

⁸ Fish (2000: 16-17) similarly concludes that the Islamic world has not been the site of a grossly disproportionate amount of political violence. However, Esposito calls attentions to the fact that the majority of Muslim regimes are authoritarian (Esposito, 1996).

In order to create a more democratic society, the Indonesian state has engaged in a variety of educational initiatives to develop among its citizens fundamental democratic values, such as those identified by Cohen (2002) and Christopher (1989): respect for the rights of an individual, including liberty of thought and conscience; freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom from fear. These educational efforts were designed to promote the national cohesiveness and citizens' commitment to the building of Indonesia as a unified, democratic nation and state. However, political dynamics during previous orders (the Old and New Orders of Indonesia which will be discussed below) discouraged the process of democratization.

1.2. Democratization and Education for Democracy in Indonesia

Since declaring its independence (17 August 1945), Indonesia has experienced three eras: the Old Order, the New Order and the Era of *Reformasi*. Neither the Old Order of Sukarno (1945-1965) nor the New Order of Suharto (1965-1998) could manifest democracy in terms of political representation and individual freedoms in the political arena (Legge, 1965; Liddle, 1999, 1996; Uhlin, 1997), but some progress toward democratization has occurred during the Era of *Reformasi*.

1.2.1. The Old Order

At the onset of the Old Order, the Indonesian elite attempted to implement a multi-party democracy, but this project was aborted after Sukarno promulgated both a "Guided Democracy" and a "Guided Economy" as the basis for development of the country

(McCormack, 1999: 52).⁹ Guided Democracy was an attempt to stabilize the political system by adapting Western liberal democracy and its institutions to suit Indonesian “realities” (Vasil, 1997: 40) and to reflect the heritage, values and the spirit of the Indonesian people, including relying on a model of consensus based upon *musharawah* and *mufakat* (Vasil, 1997: 41). In this way, consensus was not defined by the open expression of differences but was, instead, marked by the degree of conformity to group norms, which are ultimately defined by those at the top of the power structure, especially President Sukarno (Kingsbury, 2002: 43). President Sukarno’s style was similar to Javanese rulers who avoided direct political criticisms, arbitrated conflict, and balanced political power in relation to a variety of social and political groups. He manipulated, negotiated and bargained, bestowed and withdrew approval and appointment, pre-empted the probable responses of his supporters and other leaders, and used his power to attack the opposition groups with his power (Kingsbury, 2002: 45-46).

⁹ Weatherbee (1966) argues that the framework of guided democracy was intended to provide the requisite apparatus and stability for the continuation of the revolution (Indonesian socialism) toward “the just and prosperous society.” An economic structure that was national and democratic had to be established in order to free Indonesia from imperialism and feudalism (guided economy). The basic principle of Guided Economy was to channel and reinforce the people’s potential so that it could develop as fully as possible on the basis of orderly planning and implementation and through calculation. Its underpinning ideology stressed mass participation within the context of guided economy (*gotong rojong* economy). Private ownership was to be limited, and was declared to be legitimate only to extent that it served a social function. The domestic economy was strengthened against capitalism and imperialism. A revolutionary people, however, had to learn to stand on their own feet (*berdikari*), to be independent of outside assistance and investment, ideas that were originally derived from North Korean efforts toward an “independent and self-reliant” economy. In guided democracy, Indonesia returned to patterns, and to a constitution, which grew out of the Indonesian revolutionary struggle, history, and way of life (Weatherbee, 1966: 41-45).

Under “Guided Democracy” President Sukarno sought to establish himself as the repository of all power, exercising control over the country, providing guidance and creating the ideological and institutional bases of the system (Vasil, 1997: 44). Sukarno soon became “President for Life,” banned political parties such as the *Masyumi* (Majlis Syuro Muslim Indonesia or Confederated Muslim Party) and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party), both of which opposed the President (Hefner, 2000: 44). He also issued a decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly (Vasil, 1997: 43), because its members were not able to reach an agreement on the state’s ideology and constitution.¹⁰ President Sukarno also sought to balance the powerful political forces of the army and the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) (Legge, 1965; Liddle, 1996: 58; Liddle, 1992).

Ideologically, Sukarno emphasized the notion of “diversity in unity” along with promoting a single national language (Bahasa Indonesian) and a spirit of anti-imperialism (Kingsbury, 2002; Vasil, 1997; Vatikiotis, 1998). The concept of “Bhineka Tunggal Ika”

¹⁰ During those first years within the cabinet remained the focus of heated political controversy (Hefner, 2000). Indonesia became Negara Serikat Indonesia (the Indonesian United States) and enacted a UUDS or Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara (a provisional constitution). After 1950 the state operated under a provisional constitution, which specified that an elected Constitutional Assembly, known as the Konstituante, would eventually approve a constitution. In late 1955, the Assembly was charged with drafting a constitution to replace the provisional one under which the country had been operating since 1950. To do so, the Assembly had to resolve the question of whether Indonesia was to be a nonreligious state or some kind of Islamic one. It deadlocked on this controversial issue of Islam’s relation to the state (Hefner, 2000: 42-43). On 5 July 1959, President Sukarno issued a decree which had three important effects: it abruptly ended both the country’s Western type of parliamentary democracy and its liberal economy; it dissolved the Indonesian Constituent Assembly; and it resurrected the original Constitution of 1945 (*Undang-Undang Dasar* or UUD 1945) as the nation’s organic law. Its preamble contained *Pantja Sila*, the five principles that formed the philosophical basis of an independent Indonesia (McCormack, 1999: 51-52). For Sukarno, Pancasila accommodated the principles of diverse religions, including Islam.

(diversity in unity) was laid down by the founding fathers on 28 October 1928, seventeen years before the 1945 Indonesian independence, as the ideological basis for building and sustaining Indonesia as a nation state of about 300 ethnic or tribal groups representing a variety of religions. However, because Indonesia's transition was unstable, both economically and politically¹¹, Sukarno's efforts did not succeed in building and sustaining unity within the country.

1.2.2. The New Order

In the New Order regime, which began with the September 1965 coup,¹² Suharto controlled all spheres of Indonesian society by means of the army as well as the government bureaucracy at all levels (village, sub-district, district, province and national). Suharto pursued "liberal" (free market) policies with respect to economic development, while limiting the role of civil society (Eklof, 1999). However, in the political arena, the government apparatus played a dominant role over "the people", leaving limited space for the development of civil society.

People's participation in local-national level, electoral politics was controlled by Suharto with the support of the military. This was accomplished through 'secret'

¹¹ Some factors were supposed to create such a condition are, for instance, the Dutch state stubbornly strove to recolonize Indonesia through Dutch military power and alliance. Indonesia experienced a frequent reshuffling of its cabinets since its independence (McCormack, 1999).

¹² Vasil (1997) argues that the coup, led by Lt. Colonel Untung of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guards, sought to eliminate the top leadership of the army, which supposedly organized themselves into a Council of Generals to seize power should President Sukarno die. In contrast, Kingsbury (2002) suggests that some junior pro-Sukarno officers, led by Untung, moved against the generals, believing that the generals to have been planning a coup against President Sukarno (Kingsbury, 2002: 49).

identification of members of a society who were not affiliated with the ruling party; intimidation during the general election campaign, especially of groups critical of the government/ruling party; and funding for communities that supported the ruling party. In order to maintain his position, Suharto sought to mobilize the people's support for the ruling party (Golkar or Functional Group)¹³ and to marginalize non-government political parties, such as PPP (United Development Party) and PDI (Indonesia Democratic Party). The New Order issued a regulation that any candidate seeking to be a member of Parliament had to be screened (known as *litsus*) by the Directorate General of Social Politics of the Ministry of Home Affairs.¹⁴ This process served as a means to ensure that all candidates from all parties would support the policies of the government, affirm President Suharto's position, and refrain from criticizing his family's business (Liddle, 1999).¹⁵ Any member of parliament

¹³ Reacting to the excessive support by the armed forces for the state political party (Golkar--Golongan Karya or Functional Groups), during the 1977 election campaign, army officers in the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad or Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat) wrote the Seskoad paper urging the armed forces to refrain in the future from taking sides in general elections. However, Suharto made a firm statement in Riau in March 1980 that ABRI (the Armed Forces) would, as a part of one big Golkar family, support Golkar and not stand above all political parties (Said, 1998: 538). In 1989 and 1990 some members the ABRI fraction in the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or Parliament) formed a group and pushed for *keterbukaan* (Openness). However, at the same time, senior ABRI commanders such as Try Sutrisno, Edy Sudrajat, and Harsudiyono Hartas continued to issue strong reminders of persistent threats to Pancasila, including threats from "liberalism" and Western-style democracy (Ramage, 1995: 149).

¹⁴ As an example of how tightly the government controlled the operation of the general election, Bird (1998) states that the 1997 campaign period (29 April to 23 May) was strictly regulated and the government's new rules seemed to guarantee a tepid celebration at best; all candidates had to be pre-cleared, all party symbols had to be standardized, all speeches had to be pre-approved, and outdoor rallies were banned.

¹⁵ There are at least two cases, involving Murdani and Wardoyo, indicating that Suharto was very sensitive to criticism. General Murdani was removed from his position as the High Commander of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense, because he gave unwelcome advice to Suharto on his

who did criticize Suharto was removed from office. The New Order also restricted individual freedoms, for example, via the Press Law and the Anti-Subversion Law, which was stipulated that, in order to hold a meeting attended by more than ten people, a civil society association had to request permission from the local government or military/police authority.

During the 1980s a civil society movement appeared, advocating for democracy and human rights. President Suharto gave the impression of sanctioning more openness, and, during the first half of the 1990s, the government of Indonesia launched the “Indonesian model of perestroika” (*Keterbukaan* or openness), instituting greater freedom of expression (Eklof, 1999: 17). In his August 1990 national address, President Suharto called on the people not to be afraid of expressing views that differed from the government’s, though in his 1991 national address he noted that openness required responsibility:

There have been people who ... have been influenced by other systems and who consider that political development here has not yielded anything... A political system based on another system must be viewed with caution lest our resolve be undermined by those who aim to use another system (quoted in Vatikiotis, 1998: 144)

children’s business affairs (Said, 1998: 540). Wardoyo was the Minister of Agriculture who in early 1992 promoted reform of a trade policy that affected private companies (e.g., those involved in producing/trading soy beans). Beginning in 1986, licenses for soybean importation had increasingly been restricted to Sarpindo, a company owned by Hutomo Mandala Putra (the youngest son of President Suharto), which eventually became the sole supplier of soy meal to the Indonesian market (monopoly). The government subsidized Sarpindo at the rate of (US) \$21 million annually. Wardoyo argued that the freeing of soy meal imports would lower the cost of processed agricultural goods and help boost Indonesia’s non-oil exports, one of the goals of the economic reform program. Suharto said “Kalau mau membunuh Sarpindo silakan (If you want to kill Sarpindo, go ahead)”, using the Javanese euphemism expression that meant that, in fact, he should not act abruptly to end Sarpindo’s monopoly. In July 1992, the trade reform bill was finally announced to the public, it had no provision affecting soybeans at all (Schwarz, 2000: 133-134).

President Suharto always stated that any criticism of the government had to be raised through formal channels such as the Constituent Assembly. Any other act or statement critical of the tenets of Pancasila,¹⁶ President Suharto, the government, its institutions or its policies would be interpreted as socially disruptive and in violation of the Anti-Subversion Law. As a consequence, individuals could be convicted of subversion, and face penalties up to and including death (Kingsbury, 2002: 193). Similarly, any publication that criticized the five tenets of the Pancasila, government policy, or the president and his family was banned under Article 11 of The Press Law (Kingsbury, 2002: 127).¹⁷ The notion of “responsibility” under Suharto was analogous to the concept of *mufakat* (consensus)

¹⁶ Pancasila is the Indonesian state ideology. The concept of Pancasila was first presented by Sukarno before the Investigating Committee for the Preparation for Independence (BPUPKI) on 1 July 1945. ‘Panca’ means five and ‘sila’ refers to principles or basis (Sukarno, 1945). These five principles were later incorporated in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. These five principles are: (1) belief in the one and only God; (2) a just and civilized humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy led by wisdom of deliberation among representatives; and (5) social justice for all people of Indonesia. The initial purpose of Pancasila was to create a common ground for the establishment of an independent, unified, modern state (Ramage, 1995). Sukarno was credited with the formulation of Pancasila, which served as a political means for accommodating the main contending forces: the Muslim majority, the nationalist independence movement, a strong socialist movement, and the separatist interests of several outer islands (Sander, 2000; Ramage, 1995). The New Order elaborated on the fourth principle of Pancasila creating seven points, which were then incorporated into the P-4 rule for the practice of democracy: (1) give priority to the interests of the state and society; (2) do not impose your own will upon others; (3) emphasize consensus in decision-making for common interests; (4) conduct deliberations to reach consensus in the spirit of brotherhood; (5) accept and carry out in good faith and with a sense of responsibility all decisions reached by consensus; (6) conduct deliberations with common sense and in accordance with your conscience; and (7) make decisions that are morally justifiable to God, thereby upholding human dignity and worth and the values of truth and justice (Sander, 2000: 351).

¹⁷ In 1994, the magazines *Tempo*, *Editor*, and *Detik* were shut down or banned because they published information or articles opposing government policy. Ramage (1995: 115) states that such acts could be interpreted as demonstration of the limits of military to support openness; in this case, the military did not speak out about freedom of press.

(Vatikiotis, 1998: 194), which had been advocated by President Sukarno and which reflected the traditional Javanese political prohibition of direct criticism against government policy.

Suharto put forth the concept of “wawasan nusantara” (national outlook) aimed to develop open-mindedness, mutual understanding, and respect for others. In order to maintain national cohesiveness and unity, he also instituted education programs about Pancasila (State Ideology) through P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila or A Guide on Appreciation and Application of the State Ideology), which was approved by a decree of the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) on 22 March 1978 (Ramage, 1995: 32). This program focused on the following documents: the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the state policy on the national development (GBHN). P4 was initially designed as a two-week course for civil servants who wanted to be promoted. Later, P4 courses were conducted overseas for Indonesians studying abroad, as well as for high school and university students in Indonesia and for board members of civil society associations and political parties.¹⁸

¹⁸ One of my friends told me the P4 courses emphasized that only the New Order was committed to addressing the aspirations of the Indonesian people and to promoting development and that any group that criticized the government and its policies, as well as of President Suharto and his family, were considered to be anti-development groups or “latent and threatening groups.” The “extreme left” (leftists or communist) and “extreme right” (Moslem fundamentalists) were among the political lexicon used by the New Order regime to refer to critical individuals/groups, to counter attack their critiques, as well as to give legitimacy to the government to convict these people of “criminal activities”. According to Vatikiotis (1998), the course itself contains little (critical) discussion or deep reflection about Pancasila. Pancasila was designed to encompass all aspects of social, spiritual, and political life—and to rule out alternatives. Even those intellectuals seeking to articulate alternative and more pluralistic expressions of political activity never questioned the relevance of Pancasila (Vatikiotis, 1998: 106).

1.2.3. The Era of Reformasi

With the downfall of Suharto's "authoritarian" New Order regime on 28 May 1998¹⁹, Indonesia moved toward a political system with relatively fair general election processes and with more room for those citizens who had different political viewpoints. King (2003: 179-81) explains that at its October 1999 general session the Assembly made changes to nine articles of the Constitution, which collectively became known as the First Amendment. This amendment strengthened the legislative and judicial branches of the government vis-à-vis the executive branch, for example, by reconstituting the General Election Commission on an independent and non-partisan basis; abolishing appointed, military seats in the House, and restricting the armed forces and police from having representatives in the People of Consultative Assembly beginning in 2004. In August 2000, the Assembly passed a bill and issued several other decrees addressing civil-military relations, the decentralization of power to the regions, and a bill of rights.

Democracy has become a burning issue in this era of *Reformasi*. Efforts to apply principles of democracy, such as individual freedoms and equitable treatment before the law, and efforts to promote democratic attitudes, such as tolerance, respect for diversity, and

¹⁹ The downfall of the New Order regime, according Effendy (2003) & Smith (2001), was because of several reasons : a) the monetary crisis as the main reason that hit Indonesia hard and was blamed by many Indonesia people as the impact of corruption, collusion and nepotism; b) demonstration led by students who demanded greater democracy; c) an urban poor riot against the removal of subsidies on basic commodities (mandated by the IFM); c) bloodshed and enormous destruction in cities like Jakarta, Medan, Solo, Banyuwangi, Yogyakarta, Padang, and Surabaya; d) the political stance of elites of Suharto loyalists such as Harmoko who inversed to Suharto by supporting the demands of demonstrators; and e) the reluctant stance of the military head, general Wiranto, to act against demonstration, removing Suharto's last hope of retaining power.

dignity of individuals, have been initiated toward constructing a more democratic society and state. However, Indonesia is still in the preliminary stages of a transition to democracy. For example, the 1999 general election did inspire euphoria but the operation of this general election did not reflect fully democratic principles (Diamond, 1999; King, 2003; Tempo, 1998). There are still large numbers of appointed seats in the People's Consultative Assembly which are reserved for members of the Military and Police. Moreover, people from different religious/ethnic groups and/or political parties do not believe that they will be treated fairly by the government system (Tempo, 1998).

1.3. Education for democracy

In most societies, education (both formal and non-formal program for adults and children/youth) is expected to play a significant role in developing democracy, by transmitting the knowledge, skills, and values needed by citizens in a democratic society. In Indonesia, as in other nations, education for citizenship focuses on knowledge of the government system as well as knowledge of the rights and responsibilities of citizens to the state and vice versa. It also promotes democratic values such as tolerance, mutual respect, and cooperation.

Education for democratic citizenship has been developed for the general population of Indonesia and has taken several forms. During the Old Order of Sukarno administration, education for citizenship focused on promoting concept of "unity in diversity", a national language (Bahasa Indonesian), a spirit of anti-imperialism and loyalty to state (Kingsbury,

2002). During the New Order of the Suharto administration (1965 to 1998), education for citizenship was manifested through the P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila or A Guide on Appreciation and Application of the State Ideology) program, which serves as a means to develop “wawasan nusantara” or a national outlook among the population in Indonesia (discussed above). It has been argued, however, that the realization of the P-4 program was subject to abuse as being primarily a means of maintaining the power of the regime (Sander, 2000).

In November 1998, the first post-Suharto session of the Indonesia’s People Consultative Assembly (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) repealed the P-4 decree of 1978, effectively removing the central apparatus for propagating the regime’s interpretation of Pancasila (Print & Coleman, 2003; Sander, 2000). During this time, the Ford Foundation²⁰ approached religious (Islamic) civil society associations to develop programs to promote the idea of civil society and democracy, and to establish a marriage between Western ideas of democracy and the tenets of Islam. These issues were approached from an Islamic perspective in order to strengthen pluralist and democratic values within the Muslim community and to reach into all levels of society (the Ford Foundation, 2000).

Prior to the 1999 general election, education for democracy was promoted in Indonesia through civil society organizations, such as NGOs and mass or civic associations, in response to the process of democratization, especially the holding of general elections. Such

²⁰ This foundation set up a packaged program in enabling Islamic civil society associations to play a significant role in the process of Indonesian democratization (i.e. strengthening democratic values).

efforts by civil society organizations have also been facilitated by civil society programs, which financially have been supported by international agencies such as UNDP (the United Nations for Development Programs) and USAID (United State Agency for International Development) (Encarnacion, 2001: 59). In practice, education for democracy or democratic citizenship has had a narrow focus on participation of Indonesian citizens in formal politics (e.g., voting in the 1999 general election).

After the 1999 general election, the government introduced Law 22/1999 (Decentralization law), which was enacted to accommodate diversity, participation, and real autonomy, and to ensure democratization and people empowerment (i.e., to promote popular participation in development programs at the village level). Education for democracy aims to provide village representatives with democratic knowledge and skills, thus helping the BPD (village council) to function as a governing body at the village level (Hadiwinata, 2003).

1.4. Islamic Civil Society Associations and Education for Democracy

Two large Indonesian Islamic civil society associations, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (M), were created during the colonial period. NU was established in 1926 by Javanese *ulama* (Javanese religious scholars) who were concerned with strengthening traditional Islam and unity of Indonesian Muslims against the threat posed both by the secular appeals of nationalism and communism and by the rival religious appeal of reformists such as *Wahabbism*, and Muhammadiyah (Kingsbury, 1998: 13, 35, 49; Sukma, 2003: 15).

The Muhammadiyah (followers of Muhammad) was founded in Jogjakarta, Java on 18 November 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan, who was educated for several years in Mecca, where he was influenced by the writings of the Egyptian reformist Muhammad Abduh. Abduh advocated the purification of Islamic thought and practice, and the defense of Islam against its critics (Kingsbury, 1998: 141). M seeks to purify Islam against *bid'ah* (heresy) and *khurafat* (myths) often practiced by Indonesian Muslim. M embarked upon a *tajdid* movement²¹, which means renewal, restoration, and modernization. For the promotion of these aims, M expands its activities in religious, social, and educational fields through extensive networks of

²¹ Some writers such as Voll (2004) and Esposito (1998) define *tajdid* as “renewal” and *islah* as “reform.” Together they reflect a continuing tradition of revitalization of Islamic faith and practice within the historic communities of Muslims. *Tajdid* provides a basis for the conviction that movements of renewal are an authentic part of the working out of the Islamic revelation in history. *Tajdid* group or revivalists advocate three major issues as: first, calling for a return to the pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad (the Qur'an and the *Sunna* of the Prophet); anything that works against or dilutes that devotion is considered ungrateful or unbelief and needs to be eliminated by the process of *tajdid* and *islah*. In broader terms, *mujaddids* were recognized as being more literalist in their interpretation and less likely to utilize symbolic or esoteric interpretations of the Qur'an. Second, the right of independent analysis (*ijihad*) of the Qur'an and the *Sunna* is encouraged in this application and *taqlid* (the adherence to the opinions of the preceding generations of the Muslim clerics of medieval age) is discouraged. Third, the affirmation of the authenticity and uniqueness of the Qur'anic experience has to be maintained. *Ijtihad* serves as a means to determine the proper application of the Qur'anic message in changing circumstances. Visible syncreticism and adoption of ideas and methods clearly originating from outside the historical Islamic experience have been rejected. The *tajdid-islah* mode vigorously affirms that the Qur'an and the *Sunna* are complete as guides for humanity, and they apply in all times and places. *Ijtihad*, according to Voll (1983), is to be solely an interpretive effort rather than an effort to supplement an already complete guidance framework. The goal is moral construction of Muslim society in order to restore to its Islamic center (Esposito, 1998).

youth and women's associations, clinics/hospitals and a modernized system of Islamic education (Sukma, 2003: 15).

Both NU and M have national, provincial, district, branch and sub-branch organizations, and each has approximately 30 million members, with NU's membership concentrated in rural areas and Muhammadiyah's members mainly live in urban areas. Both NU and M are actively involved in societal development through schooling, health, and religious guidance (*dakwah*). However, NU is better known by its traditional religious boarding schools (*pesantren*), while M runs hospitals, schools (from kindergarten to university), and orphan care facilities/programs.

Although each has different approaches to employing Islamic tenets in some aspects of *furuiyah* or in modern terminology *al-mutaghayyir* (flexible elements), both the NU and the M affirm the Sunni doctrine of Islam. For example, M rejects such cherished traditional practices as sacrificial meals (*selamatan*), visits to holy graves (*ziarah kubur*) or recitations of magically powerful text at life cycle ceremonies. In addition, M defends its principle of *ijtihad* (independent interpretation of the Qur'an and hadith), which goes against following one of the four traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence (*madzhab*) (van Bruinessen, 1995). Hooker (2003) suggests that the main difference is that attempts to deduce law directly from the *Qur'an* and *hadith* without consulting *fiqh* (technical rules of law, positive 'black' prescription) texts and this way or tradition is not permitted" within NU (Hooker,

2003: 56). In addition, *ulama* (religious scholars) are less dominant in the leadership of M than in the leadership of NU (Fealy, 2003)²².

Both M and the NU have organized members throughout the Indonesian society and thus have the potential to restructure the socio-cultural and political spheres of Indonesian life without becoming political parties (Ali, 2003). Both Islamic civil society associations have a lot of experience in organizing people of Indonesia as a way to promote their potential and to facilitate people in solving problems. This includes educating people about ‘politics’ in a broad sense, for instance, in terms of awareness of problems that arise in a community, participation in decision making, and the like. Furthermore, both the NU and M transmitted religious values congruent with the principles of western democracy, including tolerance, respect for differences, freedom of speech or opinion, and decision making (*shura*=deliberation for making decision).

In addition, during the Old Order of the Sukarno administration both NU and M were involved in the political process under the umbrella of Masyumi, which served as a pan-Islamic political federation. NU withdrew from Masyumi in 1952, later organizing itself into a political party that functioned until 1972. In 1973, Suharto forced NU to join together with three smaller Islamic parties to form the politically ineffective PPP (United Development Party). NU withdrew completely from the political arena in 1984 in order to

²² In the past, such differences may have resulted in a minor friction between the members of the two Islamic civil society associations. Currently, the different perspectives between these two Islamic civil society associations in the area of *furuiyah* have not prevented them to interact and cooperate.

concentrate on programs related to social and religious issues (Kingsbury, 2002: 11). M left the arena of electoral politics earlier than NU, continuing its activities as a non-party organization in 1960 (Hefner, 2000: 87; Kingsbury, 2002: 116). Such experiences helped to familiarize NU and M members with the manifestations of politics in Indonesia beginning with its days of independence.

Prior to era of reformation, both NU and M were actively involved in civil society programs, including education for democracy, through interlocking the principle of Islam with the principles of Western democracy (the Ford Foundation, 2000). During the era of *Reformasi*, both M and NU have been involved in programs for democratization and are committed to developing and sustaining democracy in various spheres of life via their own programs. Prior to the 1999 general election, both NU and M were involved in voter programs. They are currently involved in promoting values congruent to democratic principles, such as tolerance and mutual respect to their members by offering training, workshops, and other programs for their members. M's commitment is to preserve such civic virtues as open-mindedness, tolerance, pluralism, and respect for the dignity of individuals to its members through its programs. M has exhibited the principle of democracy in the decision making process (participatory approach) and in the bottom-up approach by designing its programs to include community development projects (Abdullah, 2001; Nakamura, 2001). Currently, NU aspires to develop a democratic civil society in Indonesia, which is basically non-Islamic and non-military (Falaakh, 2001). To pursue this mission, NU has developed various programs such as human rights advocacy, gender awareness advocacy

for Muslim society, education for democracy in rural areas, and advocacy for good governance (Lakspedam, 2003).

1.5. Research Problem

This study will focus on how both M and NU conceptualize and operationalize education for democratic citizenship. This study will address the following general questions: How are the conceptualizations and operationalizations of education for democratic citizenship similar to or different within and across the two Islamic civil society associations. More specifically, the study will seek to answer the following questions:

- How do the members of these Islamic civil society associations conceptualize and operationalize democracy and democratic society?
 - What values and principles do they highlight in their conceptualization of democracy?
 - What values and principles are reflected in the way of the organization functions in decision making and other other activities?
- How do the members of these Islamic civil society associations conceptualize and operationalize citizenship in a democratic society?
 - How do they conceptualize the roles, rights, and responsibilities of citizens in democratic society (in relation to other citizens, the state and people from other nation states)?

- How are M and NU Members involved in these organizations and what notions of citizenship are implied by such levels/forms of (non) involvement?
- How do the members of these Islamic civil society associations conceptualize and operationalize education for citizenship in a democratic society?
 - How do they define education in relation to developing democratic citizens?
 - What values, attitudes, principles, knowledge, and skills do members believe should be developed among citizens in democratic society?
 - What strategies do these associations use to develop democratic citizens among their members and the community at large?

2. FRAMING EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

In order to theoretically frame this study, I discuss the literature regarding democracy, citizenship and education for a democratic citizenship, including a focus on civil society. The discussion of each issue will be highlighted from various perspectives such as liberal, communitarian, critical, and Islamic. I am not able to find the literature on the Islamic perspective about education for democratic citizenship; therefore I will exclude discussion of the Islamic perspective.

2.1. Democracy, Citizenship and Civil Society

2.1.1. Democracy

Literally, the word democracy comes from the Greek word “*demos*” (people) and “*kratia*” (rule or authority) and means rule by the people (Lane & Errsson, 2003) or government by and for the majority. Democracy can thus be contrasted with rule by a single individual (as in monarchy or tyranny) or rule by a few (e.g. aristocracy or oligarchy) (Clarke & Fowaker, 2001; Craig, 1998; Dahl, 1998; Jahanbakhsh, 2001; Manent, 2003).

Democracy may be defined narrowly as a type of government system (Lane & Errsson, 2003: 25). Democracy is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote (Arblaster, 2002: 50; Hague & Harrop, 200: 16). Democracy serves as a

means to protect 'the ruled' from the abuse of power by 'the ruling' (Berry, 1989: 40). Democracy is a political system in which sovereignty is held by the people, rulers are held periodically accountable to the ruled, minority rights (including the right to become the majority) are protected, and political competition among individuals and ideas is open (Zartman, 2000: 232). A democratic government is characterized by free and fair elections with a secret ballot; the principles of one person/one vote; a division and separation of powers between government branches; the rule of law and justice for all before the law; open channels of communication between citizens and government officials; and basic human rights, such as freedom of speech or expression or freedom of religion (Cohen & Arato, 1992; Ginsburg, 2001: 169; Print, Orstrom & Nielsen, 2002: 199; Rosenberg, 1993: 230; Roshwald, 2000: 19-83;).

Democracy may be viewed in a broader perspective as well, addressing more than just a form of government (Lane & Errson, 2003) and more than just the constitutions, the elections and the rule of law (Levinger, 2000). It may be defined as a way of life, addressing willingness to compromise, tolerance, and a willingness to listen to and be influenced by arguments (Print, Omstrom & Nielsen, 2002). Democracy can also be defined as the acceptance of a social contract that entails responsible action, good citizenship, and the belief that no one is above the law (Levinger, 2002: 2).

According to Levin (1998), democracy comprises two dimensions: formal politics and a participative process. By "formal politics" he means voting, election, and political parties. With respect to formal politics, democracy is viewed as simply a market mechanism, i.e., the

voters are the consumers and the politicians are the entrepreneurs. In order to get support from public (masses), politicians use all means (such as money) to obtain political interests (for instance ‘money politics case’)²³. A participative process implies the involvement (participation) of the people in determining the programs and policies that government establishes. With respect to the participatory dimension, democracy aims to empower people (community) to make decisions and policies fairly (without repression or discrimination). Therefore, democracy ideally encourages and allows all people to be involved in making decisions (Levin, 1998: 58).

Democracy depends on two essential elements: liberty, or freedom, and equality. Freedom is defined as “the capacity to act in accordance with one’s will” (Roshwald, 2000: 20). Freedom for individuals implies freedom of speech or expression, freedom of religion, freedom from danger and fear, freedom from want, freedom of mind, freedom of association, which implies freedom of an individual to participate in the formation of the government as the basis of human rights (Print, Orstrom & Nielsen, 2002; Roshwald, 2000). Equality, the second element on which democracy depends, takes various forms. All human beings who have diverse backgrounds such as their race/ethnicity, religion, or economic status should have equal rights; that is, they should be treated equally before the law. In the political

²³ Harris (2003: 16) argues that political corruption entails vote buying; in some this is a routine political activity. At an obvious level, vote buying is akin to drug taking in competitive sports in that once one side embarks on it with impunity the choice facing others is between possibly winning corruptly and certainly losing honestly. Because the resources required to buy the vote must themselves be acquired, one form of corruption seldom stands alone. The corrupt politician takes bribes, reinvesting part of them in vote buying

sphere, for example, each citizen should have an equal and direct role in decision making (Jahanbakhsh, 2001).

There are various perspectives with respect to democracy: liberal, communitarian and critical. Liberal democracy is founded on several assumptions: individual freedom or autonomy and restriction of government to interfere with individual freedom (Gutmann, 2004). Writers such as Waldron, Madsen, and Cohen & Arato state that individual freedom or autonomy serves as a fundamental value of liberal democracy. Within liberalism, the interests of individuals do not necessarily or naturally harmonize with the interests of other individuals (Madsen, 2002; Waldron, 1998). Therefore, individual autonomy is necessary to enable citizens to choose from a variety of options, and also enable them to decide for themselves what “living a good life” means (Crittenden, 2002: 32-41). A person is free, capable of forming, revising, and pursuing his or her interest. Competitiveness between individuals is natural when it comes to pursuing and achieving their interests. With respect to polity, citizenship is considered as instrumental to the attainment of non-political goals of autonomous individuals making private choices, while political activity is conceptualized as mainly aiming at establishing a legal framework for the social intercourse of private individuals in their pursuit of individual interests (Axtmann, 1996: 37).

In liberalism, freedom implies the absence of government coercion, a limited role for government, and sovereignty of individuals (Dehnen, 2000). Based on a strong value of individual autonomy, the liberal view of democracy asserts that the state does not have the right to interfere in a citizen's life, except in restricted situations (Crittenden, 2002, Cohen

& Arato, 1992; Heater, 1999). The role of the government is to protect an individual's fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property. Such a role, according to Sehr (1997), constitutes the notion of privatized democracy. Should government abuse power, the people have the right to overthrow it and to establish a new government that would protect their liberties. Mistrust of government and minimal government intervention in economic and other affairs are required (Dehsen, 2000).

In contrast, communitarians state that individuals are situated within an historical and social context. Individual freedom must be integrated into the interests of society as a whole. Civic virtues involve a communal practice of citizenship that should be integrated within institutions of society at all levels and become habituated in the character, customs, and moral sentiments of every citizen (Cohen & Arato, 1992). A healthy public life requires citizens who are able to assert both individual and common interests (Perczynnski & Vink, 2002) in order to achieve the goal of democracy: building a strong community or good society based on a common identity within diversity, mutuality, autonomy, participation, and integration (Andersen & Hoff, 2001: 2; Janoski, 1998: 19). Communitarianism is anti individualism founded on the several principles: a) the non reducibility and significance of collectives, institutions, relations, meanings and the like; b) that the locus of value is not only the individual as such, but also the social individual, or even the community or society of which an individual is a member, as well as the importance of a range of values that have tended to be neglected in individualist philosophies: reciprocity, trust, solidarity, tradition and the like; and that the way to practice ethics and to derive political principles is not to try to deduce and apply

universally valid fundamental principles, but to interpret and refine values that are immanent in the ways of life of really living groups—societies/communities (Frazer, 1999).

The critical perspective is founded on following assumptions: a) many institutions, especially political, economic, and educational ones, maintain and reproduce inequitable and exploitative conditions that favor one group or class, the dominant one, over subordinate groups or classes; b) relationship between classes or groups serves centers of conflict ; c) the dominant class controls sources for their favored position and makes socially and economically disadvantaged classes subordinate; and d) to transform such unequal relations it is necessary to advocate for disempowered and subordinate groups. The proponents of a critical perspective believe that people have rights to be self-determined, or empowered, rather than to be controlled by those who hold power in an institutional position; e) The goals are to raise the consciousness of the oppressed members of society about the conditions of exploitation, and to liberate, and empower the disadvantaged groups to take control of their own lives and shape their own futures (Gutek, 2004).

Advocates of a critical perspective view democracy as an ideological struggle and are governed by competing conceptions of power, politics, and community (Giroux, 1988). A public democratic sphere offers everyone, especially marginalized groups, an opportunity to participate in shaping, influencing, and criticizing public opinion. Democracy can exist whenever popular sovereignty or public autonomy and private autonomy are guaranteed. Private autonomy can be justified through public autonomy,

which constitutes the notions of popular sovereignty. Communicative autonomy is linked to individual autonomy, which refers to the freedom of actors in society to shape, criticize, and reproduce essential norms, meanings, values, and identities through communicative action (Chamber, 2002; Cohen & Arato, 1997; Habermas, 1996).

Muslim scholars argue that *shura* has a meaning that is comparable to and compatible with democracy. *Shura*²⁴ implies a system of government' and the new Islamic political or "Islamic democracy", which encompasses democratic ideas and institution in the light of the following values or norms: First, the ultimate and absolute power is vested in God. *Shura* is based on the principles of the sovereignty of God and supremacy of *Shari'ah*. *Second*, the supreme and higher power in the Islamic state is the Divine Texts—the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*—and people as the second. Third, the people of the Earth derive their authority from God's authority according to the concept of *istikhlās* (vicegerency) (al-Sulami, 2003; Maududi, 1997; Moten, 1996; Mousalli, 1999).

Both Muslim's modernists and Western accommodationists argue that Islam advocates civil liberties such as freedom and equality²⁵ (Abdalati, 1995; Ahmad, 2003; Al'anani, 1990;

²⁴ In addition, *Shura* has other meanings: (a) deliberation and consultation with respect to religious affairs and societal matters; (b) consultation of the head of state with scholars; (c) people's involvement in (decision making) political matters and issues pertaining to community; and (d) an obligation to give advice to leaders and other people. *Shura* has to be developed starting from the family base and extending to life in all areas (Ali, 2002; Al-Sulami, 2003; Maududi, 1997; Mousalli, 1999; Osman, 2002).

²⁵ Islam teaches freedom (freedom of religion) as stated in several verses of al-Qur'an, such as, "No compulsion in embracing Islam (al-Qur'an 2: 110)," "You have your religion and I have mine (al-Qur'an 109:6). These two verses of al-Qur'an constitute a basic principle of freedom of religion, and imply peaceful and mutual respect, justice for all people regardless diverse backgrounds, mutual

Amstrong, 2000; Esposito, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003; Feldman, 2003; Hanafi, 2002; Khan, 2003; Maududi, 1997; Moussalli, 2000, 1999; Rosenthal, 1960; Wright, 1996, 2000; Zartman, 2001).

Civil liberties have a religious basis, *at-Tawhid*, which implies a principle that liberates human from submission to other humans (Al-Sulami, 2003). *Hurriyah* or freedom implies a variety of dimensions: (a) an individual is free from subjugation, sin, inherited inferiority, and ancestral hindrance, as well as self-determination; (b) individual rights are sacred as long as he/she does not deliberately violate the Law of God or violate the rights of others; (c) implies sovereignty, accountability and responsibility; (d) sovereignty of individuals is temporary, and the ultimate sovereignty belongs to God; (e) with the temporary sovereignty, every one has to be responsible for his/her acts before the public (*umma*) in the present world and, finally, God in the hereafter; and (f) balance between respecting the autonomy of the group and preserving a wide scope for individual freedom (Abdalati, 1995; Al'anani, 1990; Maududi, 1997; Moussalli, 2000, 1999). Equality (*musawat*) implies that all people in the sight of God are equal. In addition, they are diverse in terms of abilities, potentials, wealth and the like; but none of these differences can establish a status of superiority of one person or race to another (Abdalati, 1995). Also, equality implies the protection of human rights, including security of life and property, and should be demonstrated by an individual's faith in God's message and expected behavior of believers (Kurdi, 1984: 45-46).

respect of, and freedom or autonomy of different religious communities. Islam also teaches that, in the sight of God, all people are equal (al-Qur'an 49:13).

2.1.2. Citizenship

From the lexical standpoint, citizenship is “the condition of being a citizen” (Black, 1990: 244; Clarke & Fowaker, 2001: 52) or making a “distinction between those who are properly part of a nation (i.e. citizens) and those who are not” (Matyl, 1989). Citizenship refers to an identity or an attribute that encourages individuals to think of themselves as being part of a society or a state. Citizenship is also a fundamental identity that helps situate individuals in society (sense of citizenship) (Hindess, 2003; Lister, Smith & Middleton, 2003). Citizenship is also a status (full membership of a state) conferred by nation states, which carries rights (the horizontal aspect) and responsibilities or consequences (the vertical aspect) (Osler & Starkey, 2002; Zilbershats, 2002: 3).

The development of the modern concept of citizenship dates from the 1789 French Revolution and its development of the idea of *citoyen* (Turner, 1986). *Citoyen* is derived from *cite*, which denotes an assembly of persons who enjoyed certain limited rights within a city. This notion is synonymous with the idea of “denizen” in English, which is used to refer to the notion of living in a city (Turner, 1993). The concept of citizenship has been developed along with issues such as the inclusion of women in the category of a citizen, social change, political liberation and economic equality (Turner, 1986: 18-20).

There are various perspectives with respect to citizenship, such as liberal, communitarian, and critical. The liberal perspective emphasizes civil rights which have to be honored by the state and are much less demanding of individuals (Heater, 1999). Marshall was one of the influential scholars with respect to the liberal view of citizenship. He first

addressed the problem of citizenship in conjunction with the relationships between democracy and capitalism, i.e., trying to reconcile the formal political framework of democracy with the social consequences and organization of capitalism as an economic system. That is, while citizenship deals with democracy, which advocates equality (at least before the law and in terms of participation rights), capitalism advocates individualism and competition which produces inequality (Marshall, 1965). According to Marshall, while all citizens are equal with respect to the rights and duties for which the status is endowed, there are no universal principles that determine what those rights and duties shall be. Societies differ in their images of the ideal citizens against whom achievement can be measured and toward whom aspiration can be directed (Marshall, 1965: 92-93).

Marshall states that citizenship contains three sets of rights: civil (18th century), political (19th century), and social (20th century) elements. Civil rights include those rights necessary for freedoms of individuals—liberty of person; freedom of speech, thought, and faith; the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts; and the right to justice. Political rights developed along with the growth of modern state systems (e.g., parliamentary democracy), and were institutionalized in the parliamentary political system of competing parties. Political rights pertain to the access to a decision making process through participation in the choice of a parliament by universal suffrage. This concept emerged in the 19th century reflecting, in part, the demands of the working class for citizenship (political power). The social rights of citizens range from economic welfare and security to the right to share completely in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being, according to

the prevailing societal standard. Social rights of citizenship became more important in the 20th century and were institutionalized in the welfare state (Barbalet, 2000; Hindess, 1993; Hogan, 1997: 46; Lipset, 1965; Marshal, 1965; Turner, 1993).

In liberalism, citizenship serves as an instrument to the attainment of non-political goals of autonomous individuals making private choices (Axtmann, 1996). Liberalism puts emphasis on the maximization of individual rights and the minimalization of the pursuit of the public interests (Cogan, 1998). Citizenship is founded upon the important normative principles of political equality that requires equal formal political rights among those who considered being citizens. The practice of good citizens in liberal democracy is confined to the requirement of voting in elections and possibly serving on juries. Civic capacities and practices are assumed from a market model in which human beings are understood as competitive individualists. These individuals give priority to the pursuit of freedom and fulfillment in their private lives. Citizens' participation is within the context of the nation-state and government (Stoke, 2002). The government has to promote the freedom of individuals to be a more positive notion as the ability to participate in society as full citizens (Lister, 2003).

Communitarians view citizenship as achieved membership of an ethical community. Communitarians advocate the concept of active citizenship in terms of active participation in a community unified by shared values and respect for the common good. It is natural for citizens to join in common action with others to pursue a common good. The notion of public good existed prior to and is independent of individual desire and institutions (Mouffe,

1995). Being a citizen involves belonging to a historical development of community, that is, citizens are viewed to act responsibly when they stay within the limits of what is acceptable to the community (common identity). Individual autonomy and judgment cannot exist without a common basis (van Gunsteren, 1998: 17-21). In the creation of a common identity, individuals are to assimilate to the societies they have entered because they want to be accepted as full members (human association serves as a source of self-identity) (Little, 2002). Individuals from minority groups (such as immigrants) join in a dominant culture, which produces a continual evolution of the original culture, and functions morally, culturally, and politically as *diaspora* in relation to the immigrants' home country ('inner exclusion concept') (Taylor, 2003). Communities survive through individual member's sense of loyalty and strength, and individuals gain support and strength from being part of community. Communitarians stress duties more so than rights (O'Byrne, 2003).

From a critical perspective, Giroux advocates the concept of active citizenship. By active citizenship, he means that people have to struggle to obtain their own rights. The citizen has to be an active agent in questioning, defining, and shaping one's relationship to the political sphere and the wider society. He further argues that "active citizenship would not reduce democratic rights to mere participation in the process of electoral voting, but would extend the notion of rights to participate in the economy, the state, and other public spheres" (Giroux, 1988: 170-174). Active citizenship is developed and grasped from below by popular struggle and by popular social movement (Turner, 2000: 43-44). The role of government is limited to protect the individual freedom regardless of their backgrounds

(inclusion). The government has to promote the individual freedom to be a more positive notion as the ability to participate in society as full citizens (Lister, 2003) in the affairs of the public arena, in order to defend democratic society and critical citizenry (Giroux, 1988; Turner, 2000).

In Islam the discussion of citizenship has a connection with the concept of *Umma*. *Umma* means the brotherhood of faithful society across various boundaries such as geographical areas, ethnicity, and social and economic status (Kelsay, 2002; Kurdi, 1984). Its discussion is inseparable from civil society, which will be discussed in the next sub-section.

2.1.3. Civil Society

The term ‘civil society’ derives from *societas civitas*, the Latin translation of Aristotle’s *koinonia politike*, defined as “an ethical-political community of free and equal citizens who participate in ruling and being ruled under a legally defined system of public procedures and shared values” (Graig, 1998: 369), or it simply refers to “a community, a collection of human beings united within a legitimate political order” (Khilnani, 2001: 17). Civil society also derives from *societas civilis*—the definition of Cicero, a thinker of the pre-enlightenment era, who refers to it as ‘the state [*civitas*] and a partnership in law (*societas*) with equality of legal status among members’ (Black, 2001: 33). Civil society deals with a city, which is called the “liberty of citizen”, in which the inhabitants dwell safe from violence [*civitas, id est ‘cit (tra) vi (m) (habi) tas*]. The relations among inhabitants of such places were normally governed by law (contract theory) (Palmer, 2002: 50). These

definitions were used for societies in which only a minority of residents was accorded “citizenship”.

In the current usage, civil society has a variety of meanings. The libertarians (liberal market supporters) put forward the concept of civil society in the context of two cells/rivalries or a dichotomy (dualism) that places the public sector in opposition to private sector, economics in conflict with culture, and the state with the private sphere. From this perspective, civil society is a characteristic of the private sector but not economy. The public sector is where the government plays a predominant role, whereas the private sector deals with individuals, social organizations and civic (including religious) associations. Libertarians argue that government (which is public sector) tends to be coercive, whereas the private sector advocates equality (mutual respect), liberty, or freedom (Barber, 1999; Janoski, 1998).

In line with liberal perspective, Barber (1999) also explains the concept of three cells in civil society, which implies government, the private sector (individual, contract acts) and civic sectors (civic communities that qualify as members). From a liberal perspective the civic sector is viewed to be sufficiently open and egalitarian so people will be permitted to participate on voluntary bases—openness, voluntarism, and inclusion. Thus, restricting the role of government is necessary for maintaining a civil society (Barber, 1999).

Similar to liberalists, the developmentalist and neo-Tocqueveilian groups such as Putnam hold to an idea similar to the conservative thinker, de Tocqueville, defining civil society as the realm of intermediary associations. Civil society is a sphere between state and family structure populated by organizations, which are separate from the state, enjoy an

autonomous position in relation to the state, and seek to have a significant influence on public policies. In addition, those associations are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or advance their interest (Blair, 1998, White, 1996). They refer to a wide range of voluntary organizations, including traditional volitional institutions as well as contemporary civic institutions and associations, including NGOs (non-government organizations), POs (people's organizations), and philanthropic organizations (Mitsuo, 2001).

The communitarians describe civil society as a complex mass of social relations that ties people together into families, clans, neighborhood, communities and hierarchies. Civil society is a zone of human interaction, embeddings and bonding. It refers to associations of small and intimate communities with a shared sense of morality (Trentmann, 2000: 12).

In contrast to previous perspectives, critical theorists such as Gramsci argue that civil society is an arena over which intellectuals²⁶ struggle to secure hegemonic leadership of the working class and the masses (Turner, 2000), or an arena of struggle between the state and the citizens, in which the social and cultural hegemony of the ruling elite is permanently being contested (Hamzawy, 2003: 20-35).

²⁶ Sear (1997: 20-25) explores two main types of intellectuals advocated by Gramsci: traditional and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals are intellectuals whose positions in society were established under previously existing social relations of production. They have remained in existence despite far-reaching social transformation. Traditional intellectuals see themselves as independent of class interests. These groups organize and maintain the unequal social relations of capitalism through their work in business, government, and cultural production. Organic intellectuals perform essential economic, social, and political functions for the classes with which they are connected. These intellectuals provide the focus and direction necessary for their group to organize as movement through their articulation of alternative ideologies. Alternative ideologies create new understanding of the social world, and new visions that help mobilize people to struggle for social change. The radical social change is central.

Muslim scholars, including Middle Eastern (Arab's) scholars, have a variety of conceptualizations of and responses to civil society. Muslim scholars apply the concept *umma* to civil society. *Umma*²⁷ means brotherhood of faithful society across various boundaries such as geographical areas, ethnicity, social and economic status. *Umma* has positive elements, such as mutual support and security for individuals, which were established to combat negative elements like factionalism and nepotism that had to be resisted (Zubaida, 2001: 236). According to Hanafi (2002), the concept of *umma* does not exclusively exist in Moslem communities but also exists in various communities bound together by a treaty. Within this system, the rights of each religious community, i.e., to live within the confederated *umma* and exercise their own self-rule in many areas of communal life, are recognized and any efforts pertaining to modern ethic and religious cleansing have to be prevented (Hanafi, 2002: 63).

Umma is based on the following principles: a) solidarity, cohesion among members, across territorial borders, and heterogeneity (classes, ethnicities); b) bound with similar faith

²⁷ Muslim scholars trace the concept *umma* from the 6th century, the time of the Prophet, when he was to lead the Muslim people in a campaign by which he sought to unite the various Arab tribes into a new societal entity that would include Christians and Jews (Kelsay, 2002: 288, Kurdi, 1984: 131). *Umma*, according to Madjid, refers to “*al-mujtama’ al-madani*” in modern Arabic, which has a meaning similar to the concept of civil society or to, more appropriately, “civilized society (*al-mujtama’ al-mutamadyin*)” (Madjid, 2001). It is a model of societal arrangement of a pluralistic society. The model of society at that time was bound by the concept of *Mithaqi Madina* (Ali, 1999), or *Shahifatul Madinah* (Safi, 2002), or the constitution of Medina (Madjid, 2001), which was translated into the Medina Charter or an agreement among tribes and believers such as Muslims, Christians and Jews to coexist in partnership and harmony. The Medina Charter was aimed at maintaining peace and cooperation, protecting the life and property of the inhabitants of Medina, fighting aggression and injustice regardless of tribal or religious affiliations, and ensuring freedom of religion and movement (Safi, 2002).

(*Tawhid* or the Unity); c) polity, which is based on the *Tawhid* that God is the ultimate sovereignty, and subject to the rules and norms of the *Shariah*; and d) common affairs are undertaken in mutual consultation and discussion (*shura*) among members of *Umma*, and decisions are arrived at through *ijmak* (consensus among people and/or scholars) (Moten, 1996).

In response to the concept of civil society advocated by Western scholars, the contemporary Muslim and/or “Arab” scholars are divided into the following mainstreams:

a) *Islamists/fundamentalists* view civil society as an expression of modern secularism whose conceptual power is solely dependent upon the history and present reality of Western society (for example see Kautharani and Ismail Syaed). For them, the idea of civil society implies the suppression of religious movements and associations because they are believed to support traditional practices to be anti-democratic nature (Hamzawy, 2003); b) *Moderate or liberal scholars* have adapted Western ideas to explain civil society (see the Western concept of civil society); e) *Critical theorists* such as Kamil are influenced by the ideas of Antonio Gramsci. According to Kamil, this notion of civil society applies to the religious institutions and other civil institutions that are rooted in society, which react and represent peaceful, political resistance against the authoritarian states (Hamzawy, 2003: 20-35).

2.2. Education for Democratic Citizenship

Writers use different terms to address the concept of education for democratic citizenship. For instance, Naval, Print & Veldhuis (2002) refer to the concept of education for

democratic citizenship, while, other writers discuss education for citizenship or citizenship education (Russell, 2002; Barber, 1989), education for democracy (Levin, 1998) and even democratic education (Gutmann, 1987). Education for democratic citizenship aims at developing people's capabilities of thoughtful and responsible participation as democratic citizens in a political, economic, social, and cultural life (Naval, Print & Veldhuis, 2002: 114).

In defining education for democratic citizenship, writers place emphasis on different points. The notions of education for democracy may be classified into the following:

- a) Developing people's capabilities of thoughtful and responsible participation as democratic citizens in various spheres of life (Naval, Print & Veldhuis, 2002). Naval, Print & Veldhuis (2002) places emphasis on the process of making people democratic. It provides opportunities for acquiring (a) the knowledge, (b) skills, (c) attitude, and (d) values linked to democratic culture.
- b) Providing a set of core values of democracy or democratic attitudes such as respect for reasonable differences, different viewpoints, and human dignity, respect for minority rights, a caring attitude toward others, justice, equality, participation, freedom as requirements of citizens in order to create a democratic society (Bank, 1997; Calcendo, 2000; Christopher, 1989; CIVNET, 2000; Hoge, 2002; Kaltsounit, 1990; Meyer, 1990; Schwarzmantel, 2003), mutual respect, cooperation, recognition of the importance of law, and facilitation of individuals in making political judgments related to controversial issues in society (Engle & Ochoa, 1988; Mei-Hui, 1999; Eoh, 1999). These values are needed to form and maintain a vital democratic community or society (Dyngneson, 2001).

- c) Teaching how to use the concept of democracy in terms of a form of government especially, a democratic government. Education for citizenship provides people with knowledge and capability needed to understand and assess the application of a democratic government and human rights. It also teaches people about what citizenship is, how it is acquired or lost in particular political system, and its various rights and responsibilities (Patrick, 2000: 20).
- d) Making citizens 'political': citizens believe in, commit to, uphold, and carry out fundamental democratic principles and become effective citizens or politically literate (Conley, 1993; Pring, 1999).

Liberal democratic education relies upon the principles of liberalism such as autonomy of individuals. It presupposes a necessary condition of protective citizenship in line with the liberal democratic constitutional and institutional arrangements and social norm (Hogan, 1997). Communitarians view education for democratic citizenship group; emphasizing the need to belong to an ethno-cultural group; identifying communities' fundamental characteristics; and preserving essential elements which define personal identity such as language, gender, ethnicity, religion, and race (Hebert, 2002). It promotes democratic rules or norms that create a high degree of mutual understanding, trust, and commitment among members of society (Taylor, 2003).

To educate for democratic citizenship, according to the critical perspective, is to prepare people for active, critical, publicly oriented citizenship, committed to democratic public life. Educating people to be active citizens—common people are the only ones who

could guarantee that the government would not be corrupted (Ginsburg, 2001; Giroux, 1988; Sehr, 1997)--starts with the process of acquiring knowledge and critical awareness to understand and question oppressive patterns of social, political, and economic organization. This type of education contributes to an understanding of power relations and power structure (Lapayese, 2003).

3. METHODOLOGY

To address the research questions, I conducted a qualitative study. I employed “ethnographic methods” to explore conceptions and practices of members of two Islamic civil society associations in Indonesia (M and NU) with respect to “democracy”, citizenship, and education for democratic citizenship.

Ethnography is an approach to learning about the social and cultural life of communities, institutions, and other settings (LeCompte & Schensul, 1999, p. 1). According to LeCompte and Schensul (1999: 9), ethnographic research is carried out in natural settings; involves intimate and face-to-face interaction with participants; presents reflection of participants’ perspectives and behaviors; uses inductive, interactive and recursive data collection and analytic strategies to build local cultural theories; draws on multiple data sources, including both quantitative and qualitative data; and frames all human behavior and belief within various contexts. In this study, the (emic) perspective serves as an instrument to understanding and describing a situation and behavior (Fetterman, 1998: 20) with respect to three issues mentioned above.

3.1. Selection of Organizational Units and Key Informant

I carried out an ethnographic field study for about four months in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, Indonesia, from March to July 2004. I focused on two Islamic civil society

associations: Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (M). I selected M and NU for several reasons: a) the two Islamic civil society associations have greater potentials in terms of members, programs and network than any other civil society organizations including NGOs; b) their involvement in a political party (*Masyumi*) during the previous regimes makes it possible for these associations and members to get more familiar with political dynamics in Indonesia; c) their involvement in the process of democratization, including their participation in education for democracy, d) what roles M and NU serve in relation to state/government, international agencies, as well as super power states, especially in representing the Muslim society of Indonesia; and e) responsive to developing the tenets of Islam with respect to societal matters (*muammalah*) such as democracy, civil society and the like.

In addition, I was a board member of *Lembaga Pengembangan Masyarakat dan Sumber Daya Manusia* or the Center for Community and Human Resources Development (M-LPMSDM) from 1993 until 1996 (one period). I was also involved in establishing M sub-branch in my village during the summer break of 2001. My colleagues who are involved in one NGO, in which I was involved, are activists of NU-LAKPESDAM. Some members of my family, such as cousins, are activists of NU in the sub-district of my hometown. Moreover, my wife was a member of NU-Student Union (PMII) when she was an undergraduate student. Such a personal background has sparked my interest in studying M and NU, especially within the context of educating for democracy.

My field of study was effectively carried out from April to July 2004²⁸. With respect to Muhammadiyah, I changed the site of my field study from Jakarta to Yogyakarta, because I met an improper person in the office of M in Jakarta. That man talked to me for less than ten minutes and later ordered me to follow a formal procedure, i.e. sending a letter to the board of M and waiting for approval. A relative of mine helped me to meet the president of Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (MUY), my friend, who serves the chair of *Majlis Pembinaan Kader and Sumber Daya Insani* of M (Council for Cadre and Human Resource Development of M). The president of MUY offered me chances to do my field study, and also he facilitated me to make contacts with the boards of M at all levels (national, provincial, and district) as well as to access information in the libraries of and the University of M in Yogyakarta. I had to spend extra time to make appointments with key actors because of the general election and preparation for the direct presidential election. Some boards of M and NU were involved in supporting their own candidates for president and vice president. Therefore, it was not easy for me to make a contact with resource persons (key actors) of both M and NU.

²⁸ Because of a hot water burn on my leg, I was unable to walk, so I took rest for a month [the first week of March 2004].

M has councils and institutes²⁹ as well as autonomous organizations such as *Aisyiah* (female), *Nasyiatul Aisyiah* (female youth), *Pemuda Muhammadiyah* (male youth), *Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah* (students of Secondary and high school), *Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah* (Muhammadiyah Student Association), *Tapak Suci Putera Muhammadiyah* (Traditional Defense), and *Hizbul Wathan* (boy scout). M has 1112 primary schools, 972 secondary schools, 504 high schools, 145 vocational schools (high schools), 1168 madrasah ibtidaiyah, 530 madrasah thanawiyah, 172 madrasah aliyah, 54 pondok pesantren, 105 colleges/universities, 311 clinics/hospitals, 309 orphan care centers, 13 Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (Small banks for the promotion of small scale enterprises), 125 *baitul tanwil* (saving and loaning bank serving the smallest scale enterprises), 4 business corporation, and 794 cooperatives (PP. Muhammadiyah, 2004).

The central board of NU has 17 institutions serving da'wah (proselytization), education, economy, and social and cultural affairs. In addition, NU has 10 autonomous organizations constituting Muslimat NU (Female), Fatayat NU (female youth), Gerakan Pemuda Ansar (male youth), Ikatan Putra-Putri NU (Students of secondary and high schools), *Jam'iyah Ahli Thariqat al-Mu'tabarah an-Nahdliyyah* (spiritualism/Sufism),

²⁹ Council has hierarchically organizational structures from the central to the district levels; for example, the Council for Primary and Secondary Education, the council for Higher Education, the Council for Economic Development, the Council for Social Welfare, the Council for Health Promotion [Services], the Council for Islamic Guidance, the Council for Islamic Jurisprudence and Islamic Thought Development, and the Council for Institutional Property. The institute operates at the national level such as the Institute for Special Proselytization, the Institute for Community and Human Resource Development, the Institute for Organizational Development, and the Institute for Financial Control and Guidance.

jamiyah al-Qurra wa al-Huffazh (the association of those who memorize and understand the Qur'an), Ikatan Sarjana NU (NU Scholar Association), Ikatan Pencak Silat Pagar Nusa (Pagar Nusa Traditional Defense) and Lakpesdam-NU (Ka'bah, 1998). NU has 5742 *pesantrens*, which encompasses 4114 kindergartens, 780 junior high schools, 299 senior high schools, 19 universities and 26 other academic institutions (Riddell, 2002: 70).

I collect data from several persons as key informants (Johnson, 1990) or key actors (Fetterman, 1998). Informants were selected based on their familiarity with and/or involvement in a civil society program, especially a program for education for democracy. According to both Johnson (1990: 29-33) and Fetterman (1998: 48), key informants/actors:

- (a) play a pivotal role in a community that will expose him/her to significant information;
- (b) have knowledge or information possessed as a result of a respective role;
- (c) have knowledge about the contemporary interpersonal relationship, a wealth of information about the nuances of everyday life; and
- (d) Possesses willingness to communicate, cooperate, and be impartial.

All key informants were selected based on whether they were involved in a program in relation to the promotion of democracy or civil society, or they became familiar with the issues because they have a pivotal role in civil society associations (criteria a and b).

In M, those key informants are selected from M (central, provincial and district board), Ashiah (female), Nashiatul Aishiah (female youth), LP3 (Center for Educational Research and Development)-Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, and JIMM (a network of young intellectuals of M =NGO). Both Aisyiah and Nashiatul Aisyiah were involved in

educating for voters and electoral control. LP3-Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta has been developing civic education with a new perspective that is more responsive to the promotion of democracy and civil society and education for anti-corruption. JIMM is a M's NGO, which is advocating and developing critical perspectives pertaining to the religious studies (Islamic studies) by employing hermeneutics, social theories, and social movements (see Table 1).

With respect to NU, I selected key informants of Lakpesdam-NU, Fatayat-NU and P3M (Center for Pesantren and Community Development), an NGO that is ideologically affiliated with NU and founded by the NU³⁰, and 'modernist group'³¹ (Billah, 2004:374). These organizational bodies were selected for their involvement in initiating, advocating, and developing such contemporary issues as democracy, human rights, and gender equality within the NU. Lakpesdam-NU and P3M have been involved in developing critical perspectives with respect to the NU ideology (*ahlussunnah wal jama'ah*) and the scriptural text. They keep working on promoting the ideas of moderate, inclusive or pluralist or transformative or emancipatory Islam the public of Indonesia. In addition, both Lakpesdam-NU and P3M have developed a program about raising political awareness at the grass roots level by promoting citizens forums in several districts of Java (see table 1).

³⁰ NU leaders who were involved in forming this NGO are Abdurrahman Wahid, KH. Yusuf Hashim (Wahid's uncle), KH. Sahal Mahfudz, Abdullah Syarwani, and Nasihin Hasan.

³¹ The notion of modernist and traditionalist is described in the chapter 5. The modernists who were involved in the formation of this NGO are Dawam Rahardjo, and Adi Sasono (Muhammadiyah, Masyumi, HMI); Utomo Dananjaya (Persis, PII); KH Sholeh Iskandar (PUI, BKSPP); and Tuty Alawiyah.

Table 1 Minimal number of key informants/actors

Muhammadiyah		Nahdhatul Ulama	
1. M board (national)	5	1. NU Board	2
2. M board (province)	4	2. NU-Lakpesdam Board [National]	5
3. M Board (District)	3	3. NU-Lakpesdam [Provincial]	1
4. Aisyiah Board (Nat)	5	4. NU Lakpesdam/NU [District]	4
5. Nasyiatul Aisyiah board (National)	2	5. NU-Fatayat	4
6. Muhammadiyah Univ. Yogyakarta	3	6. P3M [NGO of NU people/activist]	5
7. JIMM [NGO of M activists]	1	7. 'Pesantren' [indigenous boarding]	1
		8. Expert in political Islam [NU]	1
	23		23

I employed snow-ball techniques: making contact with a small set of informants who were then asked to name other potential informants. Those informants were then asked to name further potential informants, and so on, until I got all the data needed to figure out the conceptions with respect to democracy, citizenship and education for democracy (Dobert, 1982: 218).

3.2. Data Collection Strategies

To obtain the relevant information, I did “limited” observation, conducted interviews, and collected documents (e.g., articles, reports, newsletters). In ethnographic studies, the researchers employ and make use of data from a variety of approaches (triangulation)

(Norman & Lincoln, 2000: 3; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). According to Denzin (1978), there are four basic types of triangulation:

- 1) data triangulation or the use of a variety of data sources in a study
- 2) investigator triangulation or the use of several different researchers
- 3) theory triangulation or the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data
- 4) methodological triangulation or the use of multiple methods to study a single problem (Denzin, 1978: 294-305”).

3.2.1. Observation

During my field study (in Yogyakarta), I stayed in the M office guest room. This gave me opportunities to interact with people from various levels and districts of this organization, as well as faculty members of M University of Yogyakarta. I was invited to take a part in a workshop about “educating for anti-corruption movement” conducted by the Anti-Corruption Alliance among religious believers (Islamic, Protestant, Hindu, Buddis and Confucians) in which M is a member of this alliance and led this workshop. I was a member of group that redesigned a manual for training for trainers about “Islam and anti-corruption.” The board of Aishiah (a female, autonomous organization of M) allowed me to observe a one-day seminar about Islamic proselytization.³² Such a situation enabled me to conduct informal interviews. In addition, the board of M (general secretary) allowed me to participate in a coordinating meeting of M boards of district level from all Java and Bali provinces. This meeting was the follow-up to the Annual Meeting of M (*Tanwir*) in a response to a political situation. This forum made me to understand M in response to current issues of Indonesian

³² The seminar focused on how Islamic proselytization should be done in response to societal dynamics (approaches and activities).

politics, especially M standing points of view. In Jakarta, the LAKPESDAM (NU Institute for Human Resource Studies and Development) gave me an opportunity to take part in a panel discussion about “NU and its Principles (*khittah*)³³ in relation the political struggle.” Such a forum gave me some information about NU and politics within the context of Indonesian democratization. However, I missed one meeting of the NU younger generation, which was carried out in a district of Banten province, because I had appointments with two key actors of NU at the same time.

As part of my ethnographic field work, I used a set of procedures: inscription, description, and transcription. Inscription is the act of making mental notes prior to writing things down. Inscription involves learning to notice what is important to other people and what one has not been trained to see. Description involves writing things down in jottings, diaries, logs, and field notes (Bernard, 1995, p. 181) and producing “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) or narrative of events, behaviors, conversations, activities, interpretations, and explanation. Taken together, the component of this step helps to create a portrayal of the soul and heart of a group, community, organization, or culture.

3.2.2. Interviews

The semi structured interviews, using open-ended questions, were designed to explore how both NU and M organization members conceptualize democracy, citizenship,

³³ Calling for a return to the 1926 *khittah* (Basic principles) of NU refers to the concept of NU as a social and religious association, which is dedicated and committed to the development of Islamic proselyzation, Islamic education and economics of the majority of people (poor) (will be discussed in chapter 6).

and education for democratic citizenship and how they perceive their organization putting these into practice (see interview guide in Appendix). In my report (case 1 and 2), I employed initial names of each key informant I interviewed. I interviewed 23 key actors, which were composed of 6 females and 17 males of the M Association. I interviewed the chair of the Central board of Aisyiah (An autonomous women's organization). I conducted a group interview with three key actors (LPP Aisyiah – Institute for study and development, an autonomous organ of Female Muhammadiyah). I was unable to interview the president of M until the last day of my field study in Yogyakarta.

I conducted interviews with 23 key actors of the *Nahdhatul Ulama* association consisting of 5 females and 18 males. I interviewed a woman key actor of NU Lakpesdam (program coordinator for political education for public). I interviewed the coordinators of emancipatory Islam program, voter education and education for anti-corruption of P3M (Center for Pesantren and Community Development). Also, I did a group interview with 4 females in the Fatayat-NU (Autonomous women youth organization). A relative of my wife helped me to access information on families of KH Hasyim Muzaddi (the NU president who was nominated to be a candidate of Indonesian vice president) and a chair of Majelis Shura of NU (NU Legislative Council), the former Ministry of Religious Affairs during the era of Abdurrahman Wahid. My brother and I flew to East Java and drove for three hours to Malang in order to interview a chair of Majelis Shura of NU and to talk about the possibility of interviewing the NU president. Although I was unable to conduct an interview with the

president of NU because he was busy with campaigning for presidential election, I was able to interview the acting president of NU.

The interviews lasted between one-half hour and two hours, depending on the time allotted by interviewees and the role they played within the association. Those key actors who are categorized into leaders or researchers paid more attention to conceptual issues than to the issues of the implementation. In my interview with the coordinators of voter education, civic education, education for the anti-corruption movement, and political appreciation my questions focused on how these approaches were implemented. Therefore, I selected certain issues listed in my interview guide and developed questions while interviewing key actors (probing).

My interviews with the females focused on gender issues. During my field study, there was a controversy among the NU religious scholars (Ulama) pertaining to gender issues. Twelve ulamas (religious scholars) released a fatwa (religious statement) prohibiting women to be a leader (president). Such a situation encouraged to develop my questions with respect to gender equality and women's involvement in the process of democratization. I did not ask every key actor about all issues but considered instead their roles and areas of involvement in each association. I asked for detailed information about a program, for instance, civic education, education for anti-corruption, and voter education from those key actors who were technically involved in the program. On the other hand, I questioned those key actors who hold high ranking positions in the association about conceptual issues. The coordinator for research and study program of the Lakpesdam, for instance, was more interested in

talking about the ideas (conceptual framework) or vision than technical issues of implementation.

3.2.3. Collecting documents

I collected documents from information centers of both organizations written by board members that reflect either their individual or organizational points of view (board reports, journal and books). During my stay in Yogyakarta, I collected materials with respect to M in the library of the M office and the library of M University of Yogyakarta. Pertaining to NU, I collected materials from Lakpesdam and P3M. I got information materials of both NU and M from the library of PPIM-UIN (Center for the Study of Islam and Society-Islamic State University) in Jakarta. In addition, I got books concerning NU and M from book stores in Yogyakarta and Bekasi (my town).

3.3. Data Analysis

In processing and analyzing the data, I followed the procedure of ethnographic data analysis as described by LeCompte & Schensul (1999) with adjustment. I organized all data that was collected (observation, documents and interviews) for the purpose of analysis. Analysis involves 'tidying up' data, organizing them in files, labeling the files, putting them on a shelf, as well as organizing and reducing data according to the ideas, themes, units, patterns, and structures within them that are beginning to become apparent. This involves some form of coding or categorizing data (LeCompte & Schensul, 1999: 11-47).

I took several steps to organize the data, as follows:

First, I made a transcript from data recorded from my interviews with 23 key actors of M on 26 cassettes and from 23 key actors of NU recorded on 25 cassettes. I spent 3 to 4 hours for transcribing each cassette, depending upon the duration of my interviews with the key actors. Second, I edited each transcription because almost all of the participants use colloquial language (Bahasa Indonesia). The second step was done in order to get the main ideas and supporting ideas. I also edited the data in order to make clear notes. Third, I devised themes and placed the data from each key actor into a matrix according to 4 themes: (a) democracy: the notion or perception of democracy, Islam and democracy (compatibility/incompatibility), response to democracy; (b) democratic society: notion, conception of the characteristics of democratic society (individual freedom, pluralism, tolerant, gender equality, criticism/critical group); (c) citizenship: concept and loyalty/commitment; (d) educating for democracy: concept, model of the implementation of educating for democracy. Fourth, I integrated and coordinated the information of each key actor according to theme.

The report of the study (dissertation) is organized into the following chapters: Introduction that includes background and research problems and questions (Chapter 1), frame of the study (Chapter 2), methodology (Chapter 3), Muhammadiyah and NU and Development of Democracy (Chapter 4); Case 1: Muhammadiyah's Conceptualization and practice of democracy and education for democracy (Chapter 5), Case 2: NU's Conceptualization and practice of democracy and education for democracy (Chapter 6),

Comparison between M and NU with respect to conceptualization and practice of democracy and Education for democracy (Chapter 7), and conclusion and recommendation (Chapter 8).

4. M AND NU AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY

In chapter 1, it was stated that both M and NU are expected to play a significant role in the democratization process of Indonesia, because both NU and M are Islamic civil society associations that have memberships and are engaged in a variety of activities relevant to the establishment of the New Order. Some experts such as Hefner (2000) say M and NU can play their roles in the process of democratization as long as they consistently uphold their principles as a civil society organization, i.e., being independent of the state, committed to uphold justice and equality, responsiveness to powerless groups, and promoting civic virtues or values.

The discussion in this chapter concerns how both M and NU have related to the state, especially during the eras of the Old and New Orders. What kinds of relationships were built during each order? What was the political stance of each regime toward “Islam” during the two orders in Indonesia? In addition, this chapter will discuss what both M and NU have contributed to create democratic atmosphere in the community at large. Neither M nor NU is currently a political party, though both were involved in the political arena as organizational members of a confederated Islamic political party, Masyumi. M never became a political party, though NU did from 1952 until 1972 (see NU). Nevertheless, neither M nor NU can be separated from politics in Indonesia (during either the Old or the New Order regimes). Each Islamic civil society association had different experiences in the political

sphere, which were shaped by the political cultures and leadership of each organization and state officials' perceptions of and policies toward Islam.

4.1. Muhammadiyah and democracy development

4.1.1. Muhammadiyah in relation to the state

This section describes the relation between M and the state during the Old Order and New Order regimes.

4.1.1.1. M and the Order regime of Soekarno

M is a social and religious association (Islamic civil society association) that has never been a political party. However, Rahmat (1999) argues that M, through its programs and activities, has developed the potential of the modernist *santris*, *i.e.*, Muslim devotee who are from the family of modernist group (see a footnote about traditionality and modernity in the Chapter 5) and its involvement have contributed to societal development in Indonesia. During the Old Order, M, together with NU and other Islamic organizations/groups, initiated and promoted a confederate Islamic political party, Masyumi (*Majlis 'Ala Shura Muslim Indonesia*). M was a member of Masyumi until this party was dissolved by President Sukarno in 1960. As a newly independent country, Indonesia was politically and economically unstable and it experienced continuous conflicts, both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, after Indonesia independence, there was a conflict over the composition of ministries in the cabinets and about the state ideology among members of the cabinet and

continued after the first general election in 1955. Vertically, provincial government officials were dissatisfied with the national government's policies and treatment and sought to break away from that country. In February 1958, for example, leaders in West Sumatra declared the creation of the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or The Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in opposition to the central government of Indonesia.

Some Masyumi leaders, such as Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohamad Natsir, and Burhanuddin Harahap, were involved in PRRI. By the end of 1960, President Sukarno dissolved or identified as illegal the Masyumi party (Maarif, 1988: 30-33). The leaders of M were repressed by the Sukarno regime (Rahmat, 1999). In 1972 the association formally declared that it would no longer be involved in "politics," but would concentrate its programs instead in the social, economic, education, and Islamic proselytization fields.

4.1.1.2. M and the New Order regime of Suharto

After coming to power in 1965, the Suharto (New Order) regime sought to promote and sustain development programs, viewing as necessary both stability³⁴ and citizen loyalty.

³⁴ To ensure the national stability, the New Order regime operated the so-called '*Kewaspadaan* (alertness) doctrine and program. *Kewaspadaan* would be urgently required to detect the activities of: (a) social organizations which in the past had shown hesitation in accepting *Pancasila* as the sole principle for all social organizations, and latter accepted it in a doubtful way; (b) the fourth generation communist group which based its tactics on the new style of communism, that is, no longer using physical means but constitutional methods, intellectual activities, government administration, and other means in order to "depoliticize" ABRI (Armed Forces); (c) extreme groups which would try to use extra-constitutional ways- such as instigating mass riot- to further their political interests based on racial and separatist motivation; and (d) a certain group of people (*pihak*

Any group that would destabilize the country in the sight of the regime, therefore, had to be removed (vanquished).

In line with this approach the Suharto regime established and maintained an unaccommodative stance toward “Islam” (Muslims and Islamic organizations) for at least three reasons (Gaffar, 2004: 270): First, there are many Muslims who believe that they can articulate and fight for their aspirations (interests) merely through promoting democracy or democratization. Second, since they represented a majority of the Indonesian population, they were seen to have great potential to threaten the status quo. Third, any Muslim or Islamic group was suspected of being associated with a literalist (“fundamentalist”) group that strongly criticized the regime and advocated an Islamic state in Indonesia. It should be noted that the hostility of the Muslim community toward the state was also increased as a result of a number of the New Order’s policies perceived as offensive to their religious beliefs, such as the Ali Sadikin’s (the governor of Jakarta) legalization of gambling, the national government’s introduction of a marriage law in 1973 which, according to Muslim groups, contradicted the principles of Islamic sharia’ (e.g., such as allowing Kantor Catatan Sipil [the office for Civil Affairs]) to justify marriage; the attempts of the regime during the *Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR) session to elevate *aliran kepercayaan* (Javanese mysticism)

tertentu) who wanted liberal democracy with unlimited freedom, and whose activities spread through academic forums, discussions, and seminars as well as via the mass media (Honna, 1999: 87).

to the position of a religion, and the imposition of Pancasila as the sole foundation of all social and political organizations (see Effendy, 2003: 49-51; Gaffar, 2004)³⁵.

The regime of the New Order demonstrated its accommodative stance toward “Islam” prior to 1990’s. Both sides, Muslim groups and the Suharto government, attempted to complement one another and avoid conflict. The accommodative stance of the Suharto regime was due to at least two reasons: a) Suharto became aware of the strength of the Islamic resurgence and he wanted to neutralize the growing popularity of “democratic ideas “ (such as freedom of press, freedoms of expression, openness and the like) among the younger generation of Muslims who are involved intensely in analytical discourses about development issues in various spheres of life (e.g., economic segregation, corruption, nepotism), and b) Suharto was seeking to strengthen relations with various groups to counter-balance his deteriorating relationship with those segments of the military leadership who were alarmed by the scale of the first family’s corruption (Hefner, 2003).

Therefore, the New Order regime adopted a number of policies giving four types of benefits to Muslims: structural, legislative, infrastructural and cultural (Effendy, 2003). Structural accommodation involved giving Muslim’s more access to education, economic activities, and government positions (accelerated recruitment and promotion of Muslims to

³⁵ Within this period, each party took a position against one another. The state was suspicious of any Islamic movement, and any group of Muslims that criticized the government (Suharto) was accused of being “the right extreme”. The New Order regime believed that both ‘the right extreme’ and ‘the left extreme (the communist group) would threaten or thwart the process of Indonesian development. The New Order regime manipulated a word of development to ban any critical movement, including the Islamic movement.

upper levels of the Military and bureaucracy) and by the establishment of ICMI³⁶ (The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) by the end of 1990 (December). The Suharto regime also passed legislation a) stipulating in 1988 the obligatory nature of religious instruction in non-madrasah (private and public schools); b) strengthening in 1989 the role of the Islamic court in adjudicating marriage, divorce, reconciliation, and inheritance issues; c) compiling in 1991 Islamic law; d) institutionalizing or legalizing Bazis, the *zakat* (religious alms) collection and distribution agency, in 1991; e) reversing in 1991 a policy that prohibited Muslim female high school students from wearing the *jilbab or hijab* (scarf); and f) invalidating in 1993 the *Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah* (SDSB), a national lottery. With regard to infrastructure, The New Order regime provided Muslims presidential assistance (*Inpres*) to develop mosques and religious educational institutions, send Muslim religious leaders (Imams) to the remote transmigration areas, and establish (in 1992) an

³⁶ Commenting ICMI, Hefner (1993: 1-3) says that for many Muslim Indonesians, the act of government (president) was merely the latest in a series of overtures the Suharto government has made over the past few years to the Muslim community. For other Indonesians, the president's blessing of ICMI seemed to represent a dangerous departure from the non-sectarian principles of the New Order. For Western observers unfamiliar with the government's openings to the Muslim community, finally, the scene appeared rich with irony. Here was a man regarded by many foreign scholars as *abangan* (refers to those Javanese less strict in their adherence to Muslim devotional forms than the so-called *santri*, practicing or 'orthodox' Muslims) mystic unsympathetic to "orthodox" Islam, not merely affecting the forms of Islamic rituals, but doing so while inaugurating an organization openly committed to, among other things, the deepening Islamization of Indonesian state and society. Was the president's gesture merely an opportunistic stratagem designed to court Muslim support at a time when he was being challenged by segments of the Indonesian military? Was President Suharto, therefore, "merely playing the Muslim card," as one secularist critic of the government told me in 1992? Or, as suggested by many members of ICMI with whom I spoke in 1991, 1992, and 1993, were the president's actions more strongly influenced by his recognition of broader changes in Indonesian society, in particular the deepening Islamization of the urban middle class?

Islamic Bank and insurance, BMI (Bank Muamalat Indonesia or Indonesian Muamalat Bank). The state evidenced cultural accommodation by incorporating Islamic idioms (e.g., *sultan*, *khalifatullah*, *mushawarah*) in official documents, adopting the Islamic greeting (*assalamu alaikum*) as the unofficial national greeting, giving sponsorship for an Islamic cultural festivals—Istiqlal Festivals in 1991 and 1995; and initiating a national television program to teach Arabic (Effendy, 2003: 151-170; Fealy, 2004: 141; Gaffar, 2004: 271-272; Hefner, 2004; Suwarno, 2002: 125).³⁷

In this context M's stance toward the New Order regime was also shaped by its political culture and leadership. Its political culture,³⁸ which includes the basic principles laid down by M regarding the relationship between the state and the *umma*, is derived from an Islamic tenets, *amar ma'ruf and nahyu munkar* (enjoining good deeds and forbidding wrongdoing), stated in the Qur'an surah Ali Imran 3: 104.³⁹ M's political culture is also

³⁷ According to Fealy (2004: 114), the regime's embracing of Islam created resentment and suspicion among secular nationalists, and non-Muslim, and caused splits within military, political elites and civil society. The regime's stance has been seen as a factor contributing to a rise in religious conflict in areas such as Maluku and Central Sulawesi from the later 1990's.

³⁸ Political culture is defined as the total collection of fundamental cognition, feelings, attitudes, and beliefs held by citizens toward objects of the political system (Lehner, 1976). Such values as fairness, equality, responsiveness, and individualism are embedded in the political culture of liberal democracies, and serves as normative standards for evaluating governmental performance (Craigh, 1993: 66). Political culture contains in itself two main points: citizen's responsibility for governing themselves –politics of participation, and governmental responsibility for making decisions—politics of power. Political participation has to do with being interested in politics, inquiring into and forming a judgment about some political events (Lehner, 1976; Praeger, 1968). Citizen participation is the functioning of a healthy society. Since citizens control the action of elite decision-makers, communicate public wants and needs to the elites and are informed about elite activities (Lehner, 1976).

³⁹ According to the Qur'an surah Ali Imran 3: 104 "There should rise from among you believers a group to lead the community to invite the people to perform what is good and right, to enjoin on

informed by its members'/leaders' interpretation of the Islamic tenets about *hablun min an-naas* (social relationships). M has elaborated these tenets in terms of the concepts of *ijtihad* (the use of independent and rational investigation) and *tajdid* (reformation), *alal birri* (to do good deed) or public interest (*masalihu umma*), *attaqwa* (God-righteousness or piety), *mauizah hasanah* (wisdom and good counsel), *mujadalah bil ihsan* (debate with other side in the presence of neutral outlooker), social praxis, responsiveness to problems rising in the community, and the employment of appropriate approaches in resolving societal problems. Also the M political culture contains such principles as egalitarianism, rationality, collegial leadership in the political process of organization, and collegial relationship between its board and members (Rais, 1998: 229; Suwarno, 2002).

Those principles are accommodated within the New Vision of M: first, the doctrine of *tawheed* has to be established as the fundamental basis for various spheres of life. The concept of *tawheed* has not only to be elaborated to the aspects of faith (*aqidah*) but also *muamalah ma'a an-naas* (social relationship). Second, M has to develop the enlightenment process to produce well enlightened Muslims. M has to continue its effort in the development of human resources, science, and technology. Third, M has to continue its efforts to advocate and develop good deeds (*amal saleh*). Fourth, M has to establish cooperation with various groups, i.e., other Muslim groups, Non-Muslims, and the

them practices of the Prophet and to forbid what is wrong. Should such a group emerge from your community, they will be the ones who attain salvation”

government, as well as the armed forces. Fifth, M does not need to involve itself in political arena (practice), but does not need to be apolitical either (Rais, 1998: 264-269).

In the 44th M National Conference (Muktamar) held in 2000 in Jakarta, for example, the conference mandated that M had to develop its role as an effective interest group, which advocates *amr ma'ruf and nahyi munkar* (promoting good deeds and forbidding wrongdoing). M does not need to be apolitical and a political party, but it has to advocate its critical ideas, which can be used to anticipate and make the state's policies in relation to problems of the nation state or public interests. M has to formulate Muslim political ethics that serves as a guide for Muslim politicians. M has to develop political awareness among M members and the community at large through political education, and the perpetuation of the civilized and democratic principles. M has to speak out about cases of injustice that occur within society and take benefits from various mass media to articulate aspiration, political stance, interests and the like for the M *umma* and the community at large. M has to attempt to unite the political potential of Indonesian Muslims. M has to make an effort to empower society in relation to creating civil society under the basis of the principles of the New Indonesian society (PP. Muhammadiyah, 2000).

M has provided a guide for its members (and others) in dealing with politics in a broader term: the arrangement of the state-*umma* relationship. With respect to this point, M upholds a rationally or critically accommodative stance. Such a political stance (principle) enables M to persist, stand still, and stand right in front of the state. M will have to confront any policies that are abusive (*the concept of fasad and dhalim*) public interests (*umma*) at any

cost. Such confrontative stances were demonstrated by M in response to such issues as the teacher ordinance (the policy of the Ministry of Education and Culture Dawud Yusuf), the marriage law, and the state reform. M shall be rational and critical of the government policies concerning the *umma* in order to seek solutions (HN).⁴⁰

However, the M political culture – and its stance vis-à-vis the Suharto government – has also been shaped by its leadership. From the days of establishment of the New Order regime until 1992, the M leadership took a stance similar to Javanese culture, avoiding direct political criticism and confrontation with the regime. Such a political stance was related to the leadership of the late AR Fachruddin who was an accomodationist and charismatic and did not want to demonstrate direct confrontation with the state (the New Order regime). Such a political stance was also adopted by his successor (the late Ahmad Azhar Basyir).

It has been argued that AR Fachruddin's and Azhar Basyir's accommodative and cooperative stance may have placed M in a subordinated position in relation to the government during their leadership (Suwarno, 2002: 73). Three key informants (As, RH &YS) confirmed the idea of Suwarno, saying that M tended to be stagnant (status quo) during their leadership. Their leadership style could be observed in that M did not criticize, let alone challenge, the government in relation to the cases of eviction of (poor) people from

⁴⁰ When the Suharto regime enforced Pancasila as the state ideology, Pancasila had to be the sole foundation for any socio-political organizations; for example, M repeatedly demonstrated an extended standing point of view. Such a political stance, according to HN, demonstrates M's criticism. M wanted to make sure that the state (government) had to pass its policies through democratic processes and did not want to give a blank check to the government.

their land for development project. In return, those (poor) people got the least reasonable price for a piece of land such as Kedung Ombo dam project and Tawang Mas housing for an elite group of society. YS, for example, stated that in the Tawang Mas case in Semarang the M leadership did not take any action to defend the rights of the lives of fishermen. And Hadinata (2003), who is not a member of M, criticizes M of only acting like a charity association or foundation rather than taking stances against the government on critical issues.

Such a M's political stance, according to HN, was also assumed to have a connection with the issue of "elite biases" of M. M produced many highly educated people through its schools and universities, and some of them were recruited into positions in Suharto's government. It is estimated that 78 % of the M leadership group was involved in the government sector as public servants, and that this may have driven them (and the association) to be less critical of the state. According to a key informant from NU (MFM), the M elites were being trapped in the so called *ewuh pakewuh* stance (being less critical and loyal to the regime or feeling uneasy to demonstrate critiques toward the regime of the New Order), since they were public servants holding high positions in the bureaucracy (executive).

In addition, as we know, the New Order regime attempted to force socio-political engineering in various spheres of life, in the name of development, and tended to establish patron-client relationships. By doing so, the New Order regime was able to control various spheres of life. Abdillah (2000) reports that M received many facilities from the government

to develop its *amal usaha* (practical deeds) such as schools, universities, and hospitals, and because M did not want to lose such financial support, it did not publicly criticize the New Order regime.

It is true, as stated by Rais, that M supported the New Order, but M did not give the New Order regime a blank check. M supported the New Order regime as far as this regime was committed to meet public interests and to fight corruption and injustice. Otherwise, M challenged the New Order regime. HN argues that M has been intensely involved in the quality promotion of the human resources of Indonesia through its schooling (schools and universities); the New Order regime considered these efforts to be objectively helping the state to solve the problems of education. M argues that M has lessened the burden of government in term of schooling, and, in turn, the government has to support M's efforts. So, the state (financial) assistance would serve only as a stimulant factor for the M schooling development⁴¹.

In 1993, M demonstrated its stance differently from the previous one. Amin Rais, one M board member, advocated the issue of successional leadership of Indonesia. Amin Rais and his colleagues argued that Suharto was not the only one who should lead the Republic of

⁴¹ Let's take an example: M built a campus of the University of Muhammadiyah of Yogyakarta (UMY), which is situated in the area of 26 hectares. President Suharto contributed Rp 500 millions, a small portion of total budget for the UMY to purchase this lot. So does M conceive of the state assistance more as the state obligation or duty, before its citizens than a political and ideological negotiation (subordination). In addition, M, like other Islamic civil society associations, was marginalized at least from the days of the New Order's establishment until 1985 by the New Order regime (see the policy of the Minister of Education and Culture, Dawud Yusuf).

Indonesia for his lifetime. Moreover, Suharto misled the mandate of the Indonesian public for his own or group interests (corruption and cronyism)⁴². In the National Meeting per annum (*Tanwir*) M issued a decree that Indonesia had to reform itself in order to be a democratic nation and state and this statement was restated on the 1995th M National Congress (*Muktamar*) in Aceh. On these occasions, Amin Rais advocated the idea of political reform – understood as a critique of the New Order regime.

Through the 1995th M Congress (*Muktamar*), Amin Rais was elected as the M president. Rais' ideas and criticism promoted awareness among the M younger generations, though some of his colleagues who had different points of view than him (e.g., Lukman Harun, and Yusril Ihya Mahendra) rejected such a political stance (Rais' idea). In the sights of the M younger generations, first, M was older than this republic; M has inner impetus (e.g., the spirits of reformism (*tajdid*) and interpretation (*ijtihad*) which enables M to be open or responsive to and critical of societal problems including critical issues such as human rights, political rights of the minority and gender equality. However, M tended to demonstrate its stance supporting the status quo of the regime of the New Order which had been corrupt. The opinion of the M younger generation was in line with the Rais' idea, saying that M leaders seemed to be exhausted and paid less attention to societal dynamics which have changed dramatically. Currently, M seemed to lose its spirits of reformism, as laid down in 1912. M needed to transform itself to be more responsive and diligent in

⁴² Rais criticized the New Order regime of Suharto through advocating the cases of Busang and Freeport. In turn, Rais was forced to resign from the position of ICMI boardhip.

realizing the spirits of *tajdid* and *ijtihad* with respect to societal issues such as social justice, human rights, corruption, nepotism, and the interests of powerless (Rais, 2004: 82-83). Second, M had to play a significant role to break through the obstinacy of the New Order regime; this effort was an implementation of the Islamic tenets about *amr ma'ruf nahyi munkar* (promoting good deeds and forbidding wrongdoing).

Rais' leadership was expected to transform within M itself and to encourage M to play a significant role (leading) in the process of Indonesian reformation (more critical). Rais' leadership, according to the M younger generation, encouraged M to move from a social and proselytization association to play a more critical and progressive role such as 'civil Islam' (in terms of Hefner). Although this did not mean that M has to be directly involved in political practice, M would have to play a role in the control of power abuse (As).

4.1.1.3. M's critical stance: High politics and "social tawheed"

The concept of high politics was advocated by Amin Rais in the 43rd M Congress (Muktamar) in 1995; this idea was derived from Rais' analysis on the national political system in both its cultural and structural dimensions. The political sphere evidenced conflicts of interest with the elite groups seeking to meet their own interests and caring little for defending or advocating public interests. Politicians in the executive branch of government tended to talk about their interests and the interests of the ruling class more than the interests of the Indonesian public, and the legislature tended to serve as a rubber stamp to legitimate the executive policies. Business created unhealthy economic competition, fully

supported by the power holders. Monopoly, monopsony, and business conglomeration flourished, disrespecting the principles of social justice. Four percent of the population controlled seventy-five percent of the socio-economic resources, and ten percent of the conglomerates held national assets equal to one-third of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product). The License for Auctioning Forest Concession (Hak Pengusaahaan Hutan, HPH) is unjustly dominated by ten people who maintain a monopoly over more than half of the tropical forest in the country. All of these demonstrated the economic injustices which have been manifested for a long time in the country (Rais, 1998: 112; Saleh, 2001: 180-181).

Based on his analysis, Rais insists that M has to play a significant role in promoting high politics. M has to encourage those who are involved in the legislative, executive, and juridical branches of government to behave in accord with religious-based ethics (high politics). M has to control the power of the rulers, so the ruling group would not abuse its power (but has to be committed to public interests) and none shall be marginalized economically, socially and politically by the ruling elites. In short, Rais' idea about high politics constitutes three main elements: (a) all politicians should commit to serve the public interest; (b) government officials should be trustworthy and accountable to the public (the manifestation of trust or mandate); and (c) they should uphold the principles of brotherhood (Suwarno, 2002).

The concept of high politics was derived from the concept of *tauhid sosial*. The idea of *tauhid sosial* was advocated by Rais, stating that any religious tenets (Islam) have to be interpreted in response to societal problems, which are complex and developed along with

the times. “Tauhid social” (Social *Tawheed*), which refers to manifesting the belief in the oneness of God (*Tawheed*), should guide one’s endeavor to promote social justice. The concept of *tawheed* gives every Muslim the assurance that a society can be built free of the exploitation, feudalism, and rejection of discrimination based on social class, race, or gender (Rais, 1998: 54, 107-111; Saleh, 2002: 178).

Rais’ idea was derived from his understanding of the following verse of the Qur’an:

You believers must bear in mind that God commands you to be just for all human being and generous to your kinsfolk; He forbids all evil deeds and shameful actions, all injustice and oppression. These are God’s instructions to (those of) you believers who intend to rule and govern (in His name); may you remembers these instructions at all times (surah An-Nahl 16:90).

In this regard, Islam advocates justice for all (equal rights to access economic resources and forbidding any privileged treatment such as monopoly by conglomerates, crony system and the like), *shura* (upholding ethical and moral principles), and salvation of the *musthadzafin* (marginalized group) and *dhuaafaa* (the powerless and poor) (Rais, 1998; Saleh, 2001: 181; Suwarno, 2002: 85, 92-93).

Muslims, according to Rais, find it difficult to implement the Islamic tenets of social justice into reality, though they do not have any problem with the implementation of other Islamic tenets such as not drinking alcohol, women wearing the head-scarf, consuming *halal* food, following ritual devotion like worship, fasting, participating in pilgrimage and the like. So does M, according to Rais, have to struggle with its efforts to manifest the tenets of Islam regarding justice, human rights, the abolishment of social injustice and the like (Rais, 1998: 112-113; Rais, 2004: 77-78).

The idea of high politics has been interpreted differently by M members. In reality it has been elaborated to political practice (“low politics”). In the *Tanwir* of Makasar and Bali, M issued a decree that M had to support its cadre to lead the continuation of Indonesian reformation (supporting a candidate for president). With respect to such a political stance, M members were divided into two groups: pro and con (ZQ). Another key informant (As) wondered whether or not M has played a role of high politics. For him, Rais has to be a *guru bangsa* (a leader who is not involved in the low politics) and M has to play a significant role in high politics. M has to control power and the implementation of the state public policies. In addition, M has to speak out for the aspirations of the Indonesian public and against any acts humiliating the rights of people. Nowadays, both M and NU are involved in an anti-corruption movement, and this action manifests high politics. M has to support a peace movement mediating conflicts occurring in a community and promote small scale enterprises (“people economy”). These examples demonstrate the dimensions of high politics. Issuing a decree to support Amin Rais as a candidate for president will push M to get involved in the scenario of some M people who wish to attain the so-called *shahwat politics* (political desire = a short term objective, i.e., getting positions in government).

The M younger generation, especially a critical group, according to ZQ, says that such a political stance has indicated that M is coming into the area of low politics. Tantowi (2004), a Muhammadiyah’s activist, says that M has proved itself sustainable for 90 years. It would be wasteful if M was directly involved in the political arena. M has to promote a political agenda, but M does not need to be apolitical and to be trapped in the political

competition, which would generate a short term benefit. ZQ worried M political stance represents the interpretation of high politics. But he cannot do anything since every member has a right to interpret that decree.

The older generations and the younger generation of M who supports the status quo, according to ZQ, would say that M's political stance (the *Tanwir* decree) was derived from the idea of high politics. In daily life, M gets in touch either directly or indirectly with the issue of politics (power, policy and the like). The critical members of the M younger generation assume that the proponent of the *Tanwir* decree would argue that M needs to be involved directly in the political arena rather than being an observer. By direct involvement in the political arena, M will get familiar with real politics. There are many societal problems that M will have difficulty resolving if M is out of the cycle of power. In addition, M has a large members having affiliated with various political parties. By direct involvement in the political arena, M can establish moral and ethical principles in the political sphere and can control the practice of immoral politicians, especially M politicians. This is, according to ZQ, the logic underlying support of the *Tanwir* decree. As the opponent of the *Tanwir* decree, ZQ wondered whether or not M would be able to transform the political life and to endorse ethical and moral values within the political arena. Politics is not always dirty, but it is not honest in reality since politics is power sharing and there is a lot of temptation. ZQ was not sure whether or not M politicians would consistently uphold ethical and moral values; they cannot be tempted by political corruption, the crony system, etc. For ZQ, let Amin Rais be a leader of Indonesia without getting involved in political arena. Let M play a significant role

and become vocal to speak out about the critical issues without its involvement in electoral politics. That is “my opinion”, according to ZQ; however, everyone in M has freedom of speech and opinion, so no one shall devalue the idea of another.

4.1.2. Role of Muhammadiyah in promoting democracy

This subsection describes the role of M in promoting values of democracy to its members and the community at large. According to BC, M has a principle of *amr ma'ruf and nahyi munkar*, which is derived from the Qur'an. When this principle can be manifested among elites, bureaucrats, and opinion leaders, a democratic society can be established. M has elaborated the principle of *amar ma'ruf nahyi munkar* (enjoining good deeds and forbidding wrongdoing) in its *amal usaha* (practical deeds) such as religious forums, schools, universities, clinics and hospitals, banks, cooperatives and the like. However, M has to extend the elaboration of its principle into the areas wherein NGOs are involved (empowering the powerless). The M younger generation wants M to get involved more intensely in defending the rights of marginalized groups (*al-mustad'afun*) of society. Getting involved in this area, they argue, enables M to be in line with the spirits of *ijtihad* and *tajdid* (reformism), as laid down by its founding fathers. In the current situation, according to the M younger generation, M has to return to its role as “civil Islam”, upholding justice amidst society (*ar-rujuu ilaa civil society*) as the realization of an Islamic tenet of “*amr ma'ruf nahyi munkar*” (As).

M, according to HN, has upheld the culture of modernity, even according to several writers such as Azra (1997) and Fealy (2003), the modernity⁴³ and traditionality are subject to debate in a current situation. By modernity, HR refers to the open-mindedness in response to modern ideas. M, for instance, has implemented the principles of democracy in day-to-day activities (decision making). M does not establish hierarchical relationships between M clerics and members, or boards and other members. It does not establish the tradition of *shura* council (positioning the clerics or ulama in the privileged position). All *amal usaha* (practical deeds), such schools, universities, clinics, hospitals, banks, orphan care, cooperatives and other businesses belong to the association. These kinds of businesses have to be managed accountably and transparently. M board selection is done through various stages⁴⁴. In M, both males and females are involved together in discussing any issue. Such

⁴³ It was Deliar Noer who advocated the idea of “traditionality–modernity” to study the Islam movement in Indonesia. NU is traditional while Muhammadiyah, Persis, al-Irsyad and the like being to the modernists group. Although traditionalist in its commitment to the school of Islamic law (*mazhab fiqhiyyah*), NU had long undergone a reformation of its own and eagerly embraced the ideals of Indonesian nationalism (Hefner, 2003). Azra argues NU has done with reinterpreting the classical ideas of *fiqh* with respect, for instance, to social and economic spheres of life such as bank interests and economic cooperation with the non-Muslims manifested through, for example, the establishment of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) NU-Summa. M is also adaptive and accommodative to modern institution, however it is conservative (revivalist) with respect to the religious ideology (Puritanism) advocating the idea *ar-ruju ilaa al-Qur'an wa as-Sunnah* (calling for a return to the pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad). The dichotomous perspective, putting M into a modern group and NU into a traditional group, needs to be reviewed since each side (M or NU) has liberal, moderate and orthodoxical groups (Azra, 1997: 225).

⁴⁴ M has a bylaw about the mechanism such as Mukthamar (five yearly Congress), Tanwir (annual meeting); muswil (provincial level), musda (district), muscab (sub-district level), and musran (unit of sub-district). Members of Tanwir are selected from M board or members from district and provincial levels through member-board meetings. Its tasks are to assess the policy, program, and implementation per annum, to recruit candidates of the M national board. Voting is a means used in leadership election (bylaw).

cross-gender interaction occurs in M schools (RH). Therefore, when the issues of civil society and democracy are introduced to the M members, M, according to HN, does not have a serious problem with them. In contrast, HN argues that NU members have demonstrated a drastic change in response to the issues of civil society and democratization because NU (especially the conservative group) tends to continue its hierarchical tradition. If we look at it carefully, we will find that M has contributed to the development of civil society and democracy through its human resources development programs. M has contributed 10% of total schools and 169 universities in Indonesia. Through its schools and universities, M has produced well educated people who, in turn, can develop the principles of democracy (civic values) to the community at large (RH). At the grass roots level, the M board in the sub-district and village gives guidance to the community through religious forums and other means. These activities promote the idea of empowering and enlightening people at low level of social and economical status (Mar).

Informants stated that M promoted democracy (creating democratic atmosphere) in several ways. First, M has also succeeded in eradicating feudal mentality and constructing a democratic attitude. M has succeeded in establishing egalitarian relationships, i.e., all people in M have the same potential, that is they have to rely on themselves and not necessarily be dependent upon the elite group (clerics). This is the greatest contribution of M in establishing a fundamental basis for democracy and civil society.

Second, M has established a willingness to help others as a tradition among its members and a basic principle for its autonomous associations (infrastructure). Such

awareness is a fundamental basis for creating a social and economic infrastructure, which, in turn, will support the development of democracy and civil society.

Third, M could maintain equal relationship with the government. The government could not force the M board to mobilize its members in the pursuit of the regime's interests (e.g., in electoral voting) because M does not maintain patrimonialism.

Third, through its educational institution, M might have developed a societal awareness of its members and the community at large. Those institutions are established to anticipate or respond to societal dynamics.

Fourth, M has been developing a theology for the environment, which is derived from the concept of forbidding *fasad* (acting corruptly) in relation to environmental issues (HN, As; and see also Berton, 1995).

Furthermore these key informants add significant points such as: fifth, M is the first Islamic association that initiated the establishment of a women's association (the so-called Aisyiah) in 1918, which serves to develop the potential of females and to give more room for females to articulate their own aspirations (gender issue). With respect to a gender equality issues nowadays, M issued a decree about the female leadership. The *Tanwir* allowed a radical change wherein M has given more room for females to charge the M leadership (the M board). This decree has moved ahead of Islamic discourses in Middle East countries with respect to females in public spheres (BS, INA, and MM; and see also Berton, 1995). However, ZQ, AH, and As wondered whether or not the practice of this issue is without any resistance.

Sixth, M has succeeded in constructing a more rational attitude, decreasing superstitious influence, and increasing critical thinking and freedom of opinion. A key informant (BS) offered an example. Once the M board was busy with organizing the *amal usaha* (practical deeds) and other programs such as education, and proselytization were left behind, Ahmad Dahlan was criticized and accused. However, those who criticized the M board did not take over the leadership, but they encouraged a forum to make a decision.

Seventh, M members were involved in the issues of the nation state. For instance, K Bagus Hadikusuma was a member of the ad hoc committee for the 1945 Constitution. More recently, M issued a decree that M members should commit to the national agreement about the results of the 2004 general election (BS, INA &MM; see also Berton, 1995).

However, according to HN, M does not have a specific discourse to explain to the public especially academic society at large that M has done with the issues of democracy and civil society. Some M critics say that M became stagnant and lost its own spirit of reformism (Mulkhan, 1996; Rais, 2004), especially during the era of the New Order. According to BC, M tends to be bureaucratic. The corporate culture of M is different from the virtue of its universities'. Within M universities, individual independence or autonomy is strongly encouraged to develop. UMY (the University of Muhammadiyah of Yogyakarta) has made progress 23 years ahead of the Islamic University of Indonesia, the oldest private university in Indonesia. The M University of Malang (East Java) has moved faster than UMY. BC argued that making a radical change is difficult within M, since it is embedded in organizational regulations and interests of each group. In M universities, the leadership can be changed in

accordance with needs (for the sake of progress). M leadership (board membership) shall be determined by certain criteria, of which the seniority (locally called *urut kacang*) is often a predominant factor (BC). BC explains a negative phenomenon regarding the way a person tends to approach the M board (*tampil bergandengan dengan pimpinan atau pimpinan pusat Muhammadiyah* or escorting the central board of M) in order to be publicly known. Such people have done nothing to produce any attainment. Without the demonstration “escorting the M national board”, the faculty members of UMY are able to produce productive works such as writing articles and the like which can promote the M name (image). In contrast, on the M campuses, faculty members are encouraged to produce work (*prestasi*).

4.2. NU and the process of Democratization

This subsection discusses about significant role NU played in creating a democratic atmosphere within itself and the community at large. It presents the NU political stance in relation to the Old and New orders and its efforts to create a democratic atmosphere.

4.2.1. NU in relation to the state

NU upholds the principles of Sunni ideology (*ahlussunnah wal jamaah*) as the basis of its political culture (see Chapter 6). Cooperation or collaboration with those holding power (the state regime) is a characteristic of the Sunni ideology (Azra, 1997). NU developed such principles as *tawassuth* (moderate), *i'tidal* (upholding justice), *tawazun* (creating equilibrium), and *tasamuh* (tolerance); thus, NU rejects any extreme acts and thoughts contradicting the Islamic tenets. These principles are established as the sole of the NU

political culture (Qomar, 2002: 65, 71). In addition, as stated earlier NU establishes *fiqh* as a tradition serving as the sole of an Islamic knowledge. *Fiqh* is considered as a guide for the acts and attitudes of the NU *umma* as well as in decision making for various spheres of life, including politics. NU members would rather follow the ideas or stance of its clerics. The NU clerics assert that calling for a return to the pristine ways of the scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad (*ar-rujuu ilaa al-qur'an and as-sunnah*), as advocated by the “modernist group”, will allow an individual to go astray. Therefore, Muslims have to follow conscientiously the *ijtihad* products of four *fiqh* schools of thought of Sunni, i.e., Hanafism, Syafiism, Malikism, and Hambalism (Azra, 1997:228; Qomar, 2002: 65, 71).

Some *fiqh* principles used by NU in determining its political stance include: a) *al-muhaafadzatu ala al-qadim wa al-akhudzu bi aljadidd al-ashlah* (Defending what has been working well (relevant) and seeking or taking a new idea or perspective that is better); b) *Al-ashlu baqa'una ma kaana 'alaa makaana* (so far there are no changes; any regulation or principle has to be defended); c) *maala yudraaku kulluhu laa yutraak ba'duhu* (we have to appreciate or take what we have attained into consideration, though such attainment remain beyond our expectation); d) *Sulthonun zholim khairun min fitnathim tadum* (The established rulers (even acting corruptly) who can guarantee the stability of state/society are better than continual anarchy); e) *Daarul mafasid muqaddamun ala jalbil mashaalih* (Forbidding deprivation is a higher priority than taking benefits); and f) *Tasharruf al-imaam 'ala ar-raaiyyah manuthun bi al-mashlaah* (The policies and acts of the ruler must be in accord with the public interest).

NU refers to the first principle of maintaining local tradition. Keeping the first principle, NU appreciates and adopts local tradition as a means to motivate the NU members to perform good deeds. NU also uses the first principle to respond to contemporary issues. Both the NU board and members claim that the first principle enables the NU members to be responsive to and appreciative of plurality. NU used to employ the principles (b, c, d, and e), during the Old Order, to justify its cooperation with the Soekarno regime. Soekarno imposed the Guided Democracy and forced trilogy power of Indonesia (NASAKOM = Nationalist, Religious and Communism) tended to be authoritarian, and backed up the Indonesian communist party. The NU involvement in the Old Order regime and allegiance (NASAKOM) was to defend *umma* interests. The NU employed this principle to support the government in defending the nation-state (the Unified Indonesian Republic) within a situation where revolts broke out in various provinces and the state was newly declared politically and economically weak. NU also uses these principles to demonstrate that NU will not commit to radical or coercive action but will commit instead to gradual changes. The (f) principle is used to assess the policy and its implementation of the state (government) (Abdillah, 2001; Falah, 1998; Hadzik & Asnafi, 1996; Umam, 1996).

4.2.1.1. NU and the Old Order of Soekarno

As stated earlier NU ended its involvement in Masyumi earlier than M did; later in May of 1952, NU became an independent political party. NU resigned from the Masyumi's membership because it was disappointed with the dominant roles of the modernist group in

that political party. In 1952, there was a transformation of political leadership from Sukirman Wirjosandjojo to Mohammad Natsir. Sukirman was well known as an accommodative leader who gave more room for the *pesantren* (NU) group than Natsir (from *Persis* who was involved in the debate about *furuiyah* issues with the NU people before World War II). NU was granted a membership position in the *Shura* Council of this party, such a position, according to NU, did not match the numbers of the NU *umma*, and was less significant in the political process (the decision making) (Ma'arif, 1998).

NU demonstrated its accommodative stance to the Soekarno regime (Sunni ideology). Modernists felt hurt because of the NU political stance. Masyumi opposed the Soekarno regime policy about NASAKOM and Guided Democracy, but NU did not⁴⁵. The regime of Sukarno allowed NU to become one element of the national political powers (trilogy pillars of Indonesian politics), known as *Nasakom* (Nationalists, religious groups and communists) by the end of 1960. Such a NU political stance drew other Muslim groups to the opinion that NU was very opportunistic, inconsistent or seeking safety for itself (in the pursuit for its political interests). NU did not demonstrate a clear political stance, at least at the first stage, against the Indonesian communism party that was backed up by the Sukarno regime. Leaders and all members of NU argued that the guided democracy of the Soekarno regime was in line

⁴⁵ NU had pro (accommodationist) and con (rejectionist) groups regarding to its political stance. The accommodationist argued that the involvement of NU members in the Old Order regime was to defend public interest. In contrast, its rejectionists considered their involvement as human rights violation since Soekarno' acted in opposition to the rules of law [became an authoritarian] (Azra, 1997: 222).

with the basic principles of NU (NU organizational culture). The guided democracy matched the values of Islam that *pesantren* advocated, including the concept of *taqlid* (being obedient without reserve). PSII and Perti had similar political stances with the NU. The NU political stance demonstrated its moderation and concern about defending the principle of public interest (*mashalihu ummah* principle). At that time, the regime, according to NU, was not able to fulfill all of demands of the “Islam groups”; NU had to accept such political treatment. Moreover, NU decided its political stance based on a principle of *kaidah fiqh* (*fiqh* guide) taught in *pesantren*, saying “*maa laa yudraaku kulluhu laa yutraaku ba’duhu* (whenever we cannot achieve 100 % of the target, we do not need to leave what we have gained) (MM &M, see also Maarif, 1988).

In contrast, Masyumi, which was supported by Muslim scholars who had been educated in the West⁴⁶, argued that President Sukarno sought to establish himself as the repository of all power, exercising control over the country, providing guidance, and creating the ideological and institutional bases of the system (Vasil, 1997, p. 44), in opposition to the principles of democracy (Hafis, 1996).

4.2.1.2. NU and the New Order of Suharto

It is common knowledge that the New Order regime of Suharto demonstrated an unaccommodative stance toward “Islam” from 1967-1985. Prior to the 1990’s, the regime of Suharto demonstrated its willingness to accommodate “Islam”. However, the relationship

⁴⁶ Politically this (modernist) group advocated the Western ideas such as democracy, nationalism, popular sovereignty, and individual freedoms etc. (Azra, 1997: 231).

between NU and the state (the New Order regime) was not harmonious. The NU alienation was demonstrated by the unwillingness of the New Order regime to involve NU as a partner in the process of development, though NU, together with M, contributed to restore the New Order and to tear down the Indonesian communism.⁴⁷ Examples of the unaccommodative stance of the New Order regime includes: a) The NU leaders found it difficult to gain access to positions in executive offices (bureaucracy), especially taking charge of religious affairs (the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Indonesia); b) the New Order regime did not give room for the NU leaders (politicians) to hold leadership positions in the political party (PPP or United Development Party); c) the New Order regime restricted intellectual activists and the NU leaders who were involved in Pesantren, madrasah and NGOs to activate their mission in those fields; d) NU has a large number of its members (approximately 30 million), but only few members of NU are represented in the parliament; and e) NU was not involved in the establishment of ICMI (The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). The conflict between the New Order regime and NU was exacerbated because the New Order regime involved the modernist group, as a partner in the development process (Prasetyo & Munhanif, 2003: 209).

There are some reasons why the New Order regime did not demonstrate an accommodative stance to NU. According to Ida (2004), the regime did not believe that NU's members were highly educated to take on technocratic positions in the fields of economy,

⁴⁷ From 1965-1966, both NU and M supported the establishment of the New Order, nominated Suharto for presidency, fought against Indonesian communist party (PKI) (Azra, 1997).

politics, and technology. On the other hand, the Islamic modernist group such as M has had more highly educated members than NU has since the colonial period. Therefore, M was considered ready to take on technocratic positions in various fields (Ida, 2004). The modernist group took benefit from the accommodative stance of the New Order, but NU did not. Even, according to Hefner (2003), several leaders of the modernist group supported highly Suharto regime.

NU leaders and members argue that the Suharto's opinion was true that NU did not have highly educated members within the colonial period and the Old Order era. However, since NU restated its 1926 spirit and withdrew from political arena in 1984, it has many highly educated members who are ready to take on technocratic positions (Vasil, 1997: 115). Unfortunately, the New Order regime did not pay much attention to NU. In addition, Suharto disliked the critical stance of Gus Dur (the NU president), which was demonstrated by his advocacy and demand about respecting human rights that include individual freedoms (Ida, 2004: 362-365)⁴⁸. Therefore, the accommodative stance of the New Order regime, which was initially demonstrated in 1990s, did not have a significant meaning with respect to NU and the regime's relationship.

⁴⁸ The unharmonious relationship between NU and the New Order regime occurred, according to Azra (1997), because the Suharto regime concealed the first electoral voting (from 1967 to 1968), enacted the Presidential Decree about prohibiting the involvement of senior officials of service servant in a political party, did not allow the Ministry of Religious Affairs to hold a mission to elaborate and promote the principles of Jakarta charter as the pressure of the Catholic young generation, and did not give room for NU leader to charge the Ministry of religious Affairs (MORA).

However, 1996 showed a new era for the relation between the NU (Abdurahman Wahid) and the New Order regime (Suharto). Both Abdurahman Wahid and Suharto met in the national conference (Muktamar) of *Rabitah Ma'hadil Islamiyah* (RMI)⁴⁹ and shook hands. This signaled reconciliation between the two leaders and an end to the unharmonious relationships between NU and the New Order regime. The NU political stance (Abdurahman) was not in opposition to the regime of the New Order (Suharto), but on the contrary, Abdurahman Wahid together with Muslim elites such as Hasan Basri (the Indonesian Cleric Council), Lukman Harun, Projokusumo and Dien Syamsuddin (Muhammadiyah), supported Suharto to lead Indonesia for the period of 1997-2005. Abdurahman Wahid demonstrated his close relationships with the daughter of Suharto prior to the 1997 electoral vote⁵⁰ (Suwarno, 2002: 96, 137).

4.2.2. NU role in promoting democracy

I noted two significant role of NU in creating democratic atmosphere within the Indonesian society: self-transformation and promoting civil society movement. NU

⁴⁹ It was KH Ahmad Syaikh, Chair 1 of NU, who advocated the idea of RMI because he observed the development of pesantren [indigenous Islamic boarding schools] being led into a stagnant condition. His idea was concerning how all pesantren should become more effective in producing Islamic thought and independent from political intervention. In the 22nd NU Congress (Muktamar), held in Surabaya in 1954, the idea of RMI was introduced to the NU congress participants. Several NU clerics such as KH Ahmad Siddiq (Jember), KH Machrus Ali (Kediri), KH Najib Wahad (Jombang), and KH Hasan Saifurrisal (Probolinggo) were welcome; at the same time RMI (the Pesantren Council) was established. RMI is the association of pesantren affiliated with NU. It was KH Ahmad Syaikh who led the first leadership of this council (Kompas, 1999).

⁵⁰ In May 1998, Abdurahman was among the Muslim leaders invited by President Suharto in relation to the cabinet reshuffling. Suharto's act was to maintain his status quo

has transformed its orthodox understanding of Aswaja and fiqh. The younger generation of NU claims that transforming orthodoxical understanding about the NU ideology and *fiqh* tradition enables NU to develop criticism and open-mindedness to contemporary issues (this will be discussed later).

NU sought to revitalize or reinterpret its ideology, *ahlus sunnah wal jamaah*, into the conceptualization of *al-adalah* (justice), *musawah* (equality), *at-tawazun* (balance/moderation) and *al'itidal*. *Khitah* 1926 declared that NU was dedicated to moderate Islam, tolerance, *tawazun* and the like; and to advocate progressive perspectives about Islam as well as critical or liberal ideas. NU asserts that everyone has rights and none shall devalue the ideas of other. Such conditions have given more room for the NU younger generation to be involved and develop Islamic discourses in relation to the Indonesian politics and democratization. The NU younger generation demonstrated critical ideas and stance toward the hegemony of the New Order regime (organic intellectuals). They have good backgrounds in Islamic classical studies (*pesantren*), but they are open-minded for new approaches (integrating classical studies into modern approaches).

NU appreciates such local traditions as societal inheritance. Such appreciation gives more room for local tradition to grow amidst religious practices. In order to put the idea of cultural movements into practice, NU has implemented programs that promote the intellectual capacity of the NU *ummah*, especially the NU younger generations, through intensive discourses about Islam and such contemporary issues as Islamic politics, pluralism and gender equality. They have been doing analytical studies on the Islamic classical works

as references (*kutub al-maraji*) of al-Ghazaly (*nashihatu al-muluuk* or advices for the rulers), al-Baqillani, and Ibnu Taimiyyah for Islamic politics; as well as fiqh *al-Nisa* (Islamic jurisprudence on gender) in relation to the issue of “Islam and women’s reproduction right (will be discussed in the Chapter 6).”

The second role NU played in promoting civil society movement was manifested through several efforts:

1) NU, especially its young generation, has developed a critical tradition among the NU *umma*. These efforts were manifested into the NU cultural movement, which cannot be separated from the spirits and mission of the so-called “calling for a return to *khithah* 1926”. According to IR, “calling for a return to *khithah* 1926” contains in itself five grand agendas generating the NU self-transformation. NU was called to return to its original mission as a social and religious body (*Jam’iyyah*) dedicated to development of education, proselyzation and other social activities than to electoral politics. Pesantren, madrasah and the economic program of NU were stagnant because of the excessive involvement of NU in political practices;

2) NU declares that Pancasila is a common platform or state philosophy. So, NU has resolved the conflicting issues with respect to Pancasila and Islam. NU is of the opinion that Islam and Pancasila are incomparable. Islam (*shari’ah*) serves as a religious guide, while Pancasila is the state ideology. The NU congress (Muktamar) in 1984 stated that the Unified Indonesian Republic (NKRI) is a nation state with Pancasila as its ideology. NU is an Islamic organization which accepted Pancasila;

3) NU has developed political awareness among its members and to some extent among the community at large. For instance, Abdurrahman Wahid has promoted political awareness among Muslims, especially “civil Islam”. His objectives are to uphold the principles of democracy as the basis of the Indonesian political system with respect to the rights of individuals (e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of mind, freedom of association, and equality of rights). The central goal of NU movement was not to establish or restore an “Islamic state,” but to create a Muslim society dedicated to the ideals of justice, freedom, and pluralistic diffusion of social power throughout society (Hefner, 2003; Prasetyo & Munhanif, 2003);

4) The NU younger generation has developed programs to strengthen civil society movement through the NU’s NGOs and autonomous bodies. In the 1980s and 1990s, NU added new elements to its organizational base (Hefner, 2000; Arief, 1999). NU affiliated Muslim-non organizations (NGOs) emerged, dedicated to democratizing and pluralizing NU’s political culture by disseminating critical ideas to the community at large;

5) NU, especially Abdurrahman Wahid, succeeded in building a public opinion and a network among those who were concerned with the Indonesian transformation (democratization) to advocate his ideas about democracy and “civil religion” (Arifin, 1996). Gus Dur, with his colleagues, established a forum for democracy (FORDEM) to advocate critical ideas with respect to democracy and democratization in Indonesia. The forum’s strategy emphasizes the promotion of democratic ideas, particularly the ideas of religious tolerance. To achieve political democracy, according to Abdurrahman Wahid, Pancasila has

to be upheld by religious organizations such as NU, M and the like as the sole principle (in order to prevent sectarianism). The development of genuine democracy in Indonesia needs three basic conditions: a) a separation of the state and civil domain; second, b) a separation between civil society and government, and c) a separation of power within government: that is a system of checks and balances (Ramavage, 1995: 166-167);

6) NU has succeeded in building its independent political stance in relation to the state (the New Order regime). NU proved its stance from the days of the New Order establishment until 1995. Vatikiotis (1998) expresses that NU is free to pursue its activities without government interference because NU has publications, an internal newspaper, public meetings and oral instruction. When NU was marginalized by the New Order regime, NU sought to maximize the role of civil society to articulate the NU political concerns. NU has attempted to promote the socio-political awareness of its members and the community at large in relation to the New Order regime without confrontation (cultural movement).

5. CASE 1: MUHAMMADIYAH'S IDEAS AND PRACTICES ON DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY

This chapter explores the understanding (perception) of M members and M's experiences with respect to the issues of democracy and educating for democracy. The chapter discusses a) democracy, democratic society, which encompasses such issues as M members' understandings of democracy, compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with the Western democracy; their responses to democracy; the characteristics of a democratic society, as well as M members' understanding of each characteristics; citizenship, the concept of rights and responsibility as well as commitment; and b) educating for democracy, which describes the concept and its implementation.

5.1. Democracy

5.1.1. How do Muhammadiyah's people perceive democracy?

To date, M, like other Islamic civil associations, does not have a particular conception of democracy and holds the ideas of procedural and substantive democracies, though institutionally M perceives that Islam has values congruent with the principles of democracy. However, personally each M board or member might have a different point of view from one to another. Some M people reject pluralism; an idea has a connection with democracy. Another group holds to the idea of theodemocracy advocated by Abu A'la Maududi. Such

various perspectives are assumed to have a connection with several factors, such as interpretation of scriptural texts, personal experiences, and interaction with a variety of groups and perspectives and the double standard of countries that advocate democracy toward developing countries (world justice) (As).

Their opinions are categorized into two models of democracy: substantive and procedural. The detailed description of their opinions is as follows:

5.1.1.1. Substantive democracy

These key informants (AH, GL, HPPA, RH & ZQ) refer to substantive democracy to democratic attitudes and aptitudes, wherein respect for differences and plurality, as well as individual freedoms, including freedom of mind and expression, equality of rights and justice are upheld in various spheres of life. RH argues that justice does mean that, because everyone has equal rights, an individual as a member of society or citizen has to be equally or justly treated before the law regardless of his or her background. Equality of right, according to GL, implies the idea that no one is allowed to enforce his or her wishes while violating the rights of others. Any acts or attitudes that violate the rights of others contradict democracy. AH suggests that equal rights assume involvement (participation) of people who are making and whom will be affected by decisions. Deliberation and dialogue may be used as a means to promote people's participation.

Democratic relationship, according to AH and MA, is characterized by respect for equality, which means that any discrimination by ethnicity, gender, and religious affiliation

shall be prevented from various spheres of life; willingness of individuals to be open-minded and to acknowledge an equal position with people of diverse backgrounds; mutual relationship, which means that paternalistic (patron-client) relationships shall be avoided; and giving more room for members to express their aspirations and critiques.

BC argues that freedom is *fitrah* (innate potential) for everybody that God granted when he or she was born. Everyone is commanded by God to use his or her rationality or intellect to think about the mystery of the universe as stated in the Qur'an "*Tatafakarun, yaqiluun or ta'qiluun* (to use intellect for thinking)." By freedom, according to BC, an individual shall become independent and his or her independence constitutes a democratic life. Therefore, M has to make every effort to make individuals independent. M members, according to INA, have to respect and commit to the freedoms of individuals, in keeping with the principle of Islam, the state ideology, and the rule of law of this country (see educating for democracy).

5.1.1.2. Procedural Democracy

The second group (As, BS, HN, Mar, ST, YS and ZQ) looks at democracy from the context of power or a political system. Democracy refers to people's sovereignty or power sharing. From the Islamic perspective, they believe that *shura* or *musyawarah*, which has various meanings (discussed earlier), is congruent with the principles of democracy. *Shura* assumes that every person has an equal position (no privileged positions). However, many people (Muslim), according ST, pay less attention to this command (*shura*). Such Muslim's

attitude contradict the prophet who was guided by the revelation of God always did *shura* (deliberation and dialogue) in making decisions for the public interest (*masalih li al-umma*).

ST adds that from the perspective of the history of Islam, it is apparent that the Prophet also applied the representation system in the process of decision making for public interests. This representation system was put into practice, especially when the number of Muslim (*jamaah*) increased to the point where direct participation (one person one vote) could not be well implemented. Some M members are questioning (rejecting) the concept of popular or individual sovereignty, since they claim that Islam acknowledges merely the concept of sovereignty of God (no individual sovereignty). This opinion was argued by ST, saying that the concept of God's sovereignty needs to be elaborated in actual settings. If the concept of people's sovereignty had been translated into actions such as the benefits of power for the public interests (*mashaalih li al-umma*), like enjoining justice and forbidding the abuse of power, the manifestation of individual sovereignty might have represented the sovereignty of God. Why? God commanded us to uphold justice and prohibit injustice or abuse of power (like personal interest). Some people tend to see literally and like to contradict one another. It is common knowledge that any system, including democracy, contains weaknesses. ST adds that democracy implies principles that can accommodate the concept of democracy in Islam (*shura*).

M uses *shura* (deliberation and dialogue) to make decisions for both organizational and public interests, as well as board recruitment. M has bylaw about a democratic

mechanism for making decisions and electing its leaders at various levels (e.g., Mukhtar and Tanwir (national); *muswil* (provincial level), *musda* (district), *muscab* (sub-district level), and *musran* (unit of sub-district)). Mukhtar is a national congress carried out once for five years and *Tanwir* is a national meeting executed per annum. Tanwir serves a counsel whose membership represents from M at provincial and district levels⁵¹ with its task to assess the policy, program and implementation per annum, and to recruit candidates of the M national board.

5.1.2. Compatibility and incompatibility of Islam with democracy

With respect to the issue of the compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with democracy, M members are divided into rejectionist, accommodationist, and those in between. Some M members advocate the idea of an Islamic state but some other, maybe the majority, do not (ZQ). The detailed opinions of M members are as follows:

5.1.2.1. Islam is compatible with democracy

For accommodationists (modernists or reformist), democracy does not contradict Islam. For example, As says that Islam advocated the concept of *bai'ah* in selecting a leader while the kingdom system was applied during that time. At that time, As adds, this system was more progressive than any other system. When the Prophet did not leave any decree concerning who would be his successor, or let the *umma* make a decision, the Prophet's decision demonstrated the contemporary principles of democracy. The successor, Abu Bakar,

⁵¹ The *Tanwir*'s members are selected through board-member meeting in the provincial and district levels.

was elected by *bai'ah*. Before he died, he gave a mandate about leadership to Umar (not to his son or family). Later, Umar was appointed by *bai'at*. Though the process of selecting a leader was traditional, that system might have reflected the principles of democracy in the modern era. Nowadays, *baiat* reflects to a social and political contract between a leader and *umma* by which a leader politically deserves to organize and handle *ummah*. Should a leader abuse power, the *umma* has the right to overthrow him and to elect a new leader. Does it mean a model of governance was practiced at that time? As said that he does not know exactly. However, this system demonstrates a model of organizing society. Politically *bai'ah* indicates the process of organizing society.

M's leaders, like Syaifii Ma'arif and Amin Rais, advocate the compatibility of Islam with democracy, saying that the values of democracy are congruent with the Islamic tenet (*shura*). Syaifii suggests that the Islamic tenets encourage the *umma* to be rational and critical and that these cannot be separated from democracy. Amin insists that the minority group should not be alienated by the majority group within a society or state. As the citizens of a state, the minority group has similar rights to the majority group. Democracy is demonstrated by the equality of rights, access to lives socially and economically, and to justice. Such principles are congruent with the moral and ethical principles of Islam (Rais, 1996).

5.1.2.2. Islam is Incompatible with democracy

Some M members argue that Islam is incompatible with democracy because democracy is not recognized within the Islamic tradition. Like other religions, Islam does not contain a concept of freedom. For instance, Mar says that the Qur'an or Sunnah does not contain in itself the idea of democracy. For him, *shura* is incompatible with the Western ideas of democracy for several reasons. In Islam, the ultimate sovereignty belongs to God; God mandates to human beings temporary sovereignty to develop the universe for the benefit of all human beings. In democracy, a leader is elected through voting (majority system). However, the concept of majority, according to Mar, is not representing genuine interests of the majority. Mar, for instance, explains that a politician or political party that owns large financial resources can buy votes from voters in electoral voting. Bribery or money politics, which is very often practiced by politicians (see Harris, 2003), contradicts the tenets of Islam.

Another key informant, BS, explains that Islam commands human beings, as the vicegerency on the earth (temporary sovereignty), to set up and regulate the universe in order. In addition, the concept of leadership (*khalifah*) constitutes the leadership for both religious and secular spheres of life (state).⁵² This model was originally founded by the Prophet. That model, according to Mar, was developed into an electoral system after the death of the Prophet. Mar was questioning the effectiveness of a western system of democracy because (a) it take a lot of time to make a decision, and (b) the voting system (or the majority of votes) tends to ignore the aspect of quality in a community where the

⁵² According to Mar, there is no separation between religion and public sphere in Islam.

majority of people have a low educational background and the law enforcement is not working effectively (see money politics).

Who rejects the idea of compatibility Islam with democracy? They are literalists who advocate the idea that the sacred text cannot be subject to interpretation, reject the ideas or interpretation from classical clerics of the medieval age and any ideas from the West, follow the ideas and practices of righteous ancestor (*al-salaf al-salih*), and promote the idea of God's sovereignty (*al-hakimiyah Allah*) (see Maududi's concept about theodemocracy).

5.1.2.3. Islam is not comparable to or distinguishable from democracy

According to this group, democracy is not identical with "liberal perspective." Islam grants mankind freedom, for example, to seek knowledge, or embrace and practice his or her belief. In practice, democracy makes up various forms, (e.g., in America, England, and Japan). The American model of democracy is based upon the philosophy of individual happiness to which individualism and material happiness serve as the basic foundation. In contrast to Islam, Western society defines happiness as material happiness and the individual freedom and desire to seek unlimited material attainment (*hubud dunya*). Islam advocates happiness in the present world and hereafter. The goal of political democracy is to achieve material happiness, which many Muslim do not realize. Therefore, for BC, M board and members have to establish democracy according to the Islamic frame of minds. The USA greatly respects the rights of its citizens, but it ignores the rights of citizens of other countries (like double standard of America toward developing countries, especially Muslim countries).

Such a double standard of the American policy and attitude demonstrates the weakness of American democracy (BC). Therefore, M board and members have to be critical of the procedural democracy that is advocated today. Practically the principle of majority, according to N and GL, ignores the ethical and moral values. In Islam, ethical and moral values should be the fundamental principles that have to be applied to governance or leadership. Ignoring the ethical and moral values will mislead the implementation of democracy (for instance, money politics and bribery).

MM says that as far as he knows that two groups, (i.e., literalists and scholastic traditionalists) reject the ideas of contemporary issues including democracy. Literalists reject the ideas of democracy because it is not stated in the sacred text and coming from the West. The Scholastic group upholds blindly the ideas (interpretation) of clerics of the medieval ages, which is very literal and verbal, and out of reach with daily human problems. In contrast, MM argues that several tenets of Islam as stated earlier advocates ideas of, for instance, respect for plurality, the right of others, tolerance and the like. Therefore, for him, how can Muslims match Islamic tenets with the principle of democracy?

Islam advocates the concept of *shura*, which implies deliberation, dialogue, and commitment to agreement among those who are involved in making decisions. As stated earlier Islam contains in itself tenets congruent with democracy like respect rule of law,⁵³ transparency and participation,⁵⁴ human rights (right to live),⁵⁵ property rights and right to

⁵³ See al-Qur'an surah An-Nisaa 4: 58, 105, 135; al-Maidah 5: 6.

⁵⁴ See al-Qur'an surahs Ash-Shura 26: 50-52; An-Nisaa 4: 59.

earn income,⁵⁶ right of equality before the law⁵⁷). However, in regard to the concept of authority, Islam constitutes principles distinguishable from the principles of Western democracy. First, Islam establishes *wahyu* (the scriptural text) as the primary authority, since *wahyu* is the speech of God. This principle differs from the democracy of the West, which advocates people's (individual's) sovereignty. Second, power or authority should be embodied by the law, i.e., the law must be derived from *wahyu* (the scriptural text). Third, democracy advocates and respects individual freedoms. Islam grants individual's freedom; however the individual's freedoms must not contradict the *wahyu*. By democracy, a leader elect has to struggle to create prosperity for people in the present world. Islam teaches that a leader has to be responsible for the prosperity of people (*masaalihi umma*) at the present world and hereafter. Fifth, a leader has to be responsible before the public according to democracy, while, according to Islam, a leader has to be responsible before the public in the present world and before God in the hereafter (Fanani, 2002).

5.1.3. Muhammadiyah's Members views about western ideas of democracy

For some groups, the discourse on the issue of compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with democracy has drawn people to advocate the idea of the Islamic state or *shari'a* state. Those who advocate the idea of the Islamic state are keenly involved in discussing the issue such as "Does Islam need to be involved in political arena? According to ZQ, within civil Islam there are several groups. The first group wants to establish Islam as moral or

⁵⁵ See al-Qur'an surah al-Isra 17: 33.

⁵⁶ See al-Qur'an surahs al-Baqarah 2: 188, and An-Nisaa 4: 29, 32.

⁵⁷ See al-Qur'an surahs an-Nisaa 4: 58 and Ash-Shura 42: 41.

ethical basis per se for society and has to be put aside from state (secularist or rejectionists). The second group advocates and struggles to establish an Islamic or shari'ah state. The third group does not advocate an Islamic state, but wants "civil Islam" involved in the political practice (like a political party). The fourth group wants civil Islam to keep its mission consistently as a cultural movement. The third and fourth groups are still involved in debate regarding several questions: "Does civil Islam need to be a political party?" or "does "civil Islam" need to be the advocate of a particular political party? Such a debate becomes heated prior to elections when people in political parties compete to reach many more seats in parliament or to gain the presidential position (see also Effendy, 2004).

The fourth group, according to ZQ, advocates that Islam has relationships with democracy or the state; however both of them can be distinguishable in each magnitude, i.e., Islam as a religion and democracy as a system of a modern state. This group suggests that the most important point is concerned with how the values of Islam are adopted by the state and serve as the moral control over power (state). This idea is currently advocated by theoreticians of Islamic politics or theoreticians of Islamic politicians in Indonesia. Those advocates of this idea are Nurchalis Madjid, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL= Network of Liberal Islam), and JIMM (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah =Network of M Younger Intellectuals). This group is considered by the older generation and literalists to be secular and the agent of America, CIA, or International church organizations.

ZQ argues that M has a half-hearted stance, i.e. acknowledging the ideas of democracy but "civil Islam" needs not be involved in the political arena. The debate about

this issue keeps on going. Currently, Amin Rais, the former president of M, founded a political party (Mandate Party= PAN) but organizationally M did not recognize PAN (National Mandate Party) as the M party. However, in 2000 M Congress and Tanwir M released a decree to support its cadre to be a candidate for the president. This statement is, according to ZQ, half-hearted recognition. Unlike NU, NU was involved in a political party from 1955 until 1972. In 1999, NU was involved in the political arena by establishing a political party, i.e., PKB.

Aside from this debate, Muslims in Indonesia are faced with pre-emptive ideological suspicion while studying democracy. N says those faculty members are likely pushed to objectify and rationalize the idea of democracy, i.e., treat all religions fairly (in justice) and at the same time they have also to be inclined to one religion (personal preference). On the other hand, he said that they only know democracy from the text telling us that America is democratic; they do not know how democracy (procedural and substantive) is put into practice. Faculty members of UMY are frustrated by the contradiction between the ideas of democracy from academe (like respect for freedom and human dignity) and the attitude and action of political elites of developed countries toward developing countries. The students can see how arrogant the political elites of developed countries are in many cases: for instance, Iraqi occupation and inhuman interrogation of war prisoners (contradicting Geneva agreement) in Al-Gharib and Afghanistan. Such cases make it difficult for his students and himself to believe that democracy is pro human rights. N and Mar further said that the political elites of developed countries strive for their own personal desires (interests) in the

name of democracy. In fact, they pretend to advocate democracy and democratization in developing countries while violating the rights of people in developing countries. It seems to those key informants their actions (human rights violation) are justified as long as it is for their own interests.

5.2. Democratic Society

5.2.1. Conceptualization

The second issue concerns how M members conceive of democratic society and the characteristics of democratic society. Principly all key informants of M define democratic society as a society wherein its members uphold democractic principles such as freedom, respect for plurality, tolerance, justice, open-mindedness and the like in various spheres of life, though they placed different emphasis. For instance, this key actor (As) defines democratic society as pluralistic society wherein members of society respect plurality. According to him, M via its universities (the University of M Yogyakarta, for example) has formulated the concept of pluralism as stated in a textbook of Civic Education for university students. Democratic society, according to As, is also a participatory society wherein all members of society are encouraged to take part at various levels such as local, national and global⁵⁸. At the local level, according to N, democratic society demonstrates the active

⁵⁸ Why is this concept advocated? As and other writers observe that many Muslims perceive that the global civilization does not constitute Muslims' civilization. Such perception could stimulate people to get involved in radicalism. Therefore, a participatory society for Muslims, according to them, means that Muslims have to respond and contribute to development of humane civilization.

participation of those people who are involved in decision making for the public interests (creating prosperity).

For BC, democratic society is an open society, which derives from the concept of human being as *ahsanu taqwim* (human being in the very best of moulds), relying upon to the concept of human being and the concept of vicegerency—that God gives a mandate to human beings to organize the world for the prosperity of all creatures in the universe. However, human being tends to be untrustworthy, so God has granted humans the capacity and freedom to be independent. Democratic society is a society wherein its members respect and appreciate mandate or trustworthiness (*amanah*) and justice (*adil*). *Amanah* means to be trustful or being trusted. Trustworthy people keeps tightly mandate and avoid abusing power for self or group interests. Any attitude or action that contradicts *amanah* such as abuse of power is illegitimate. Therefore, freedom, open mindedness, and *amanah* are needed to create a democratic society. Abuse of power, corruption, manipulation, and the like can occur in society whenever people don't keep *amanah*.

According to Mar, when people have sovereignty, a democratic society exists. In Islam, God has the ultimate sovereignty and God grants human being freedom and sovereignty according to God's will (*iradah*). Human beings have to cooperate in enjoining good deed and prohibiting evil or wrongdoing (*ta'aawanu ala al-birri wa at-taqwa wala ta'aawanu ala al-ithni wa al-'udwaan*). Islam advocates the idea of shura as stated earlier. However, the Qur'an contains in itself doctrine (*qati*) by which there is no room for a person to make a choice. For instance, Islam prohibits (*haram*) killing a person or committing

suicide (considered as a great evil). The exception would be a pregnant woman. If by delivering a baby, she and/or her baby could die, Islam allows the mother to have an abortion in such circumstances.

In a democratic society, people (citizens), according to ST and ZQ, are to be committed with the rule of law and upholding justice so that all members feel equality of rights in various spheres of life. Members of society respect the equality of rights, differences or plurality and they are granted the freedom to speak, so they need not be worried about different opinions. If these attitudes are, according to ZQ, well established in a community, people will tolerate different political ideology among themselves. However, in the political arena, every one will be faced with a problem (e.g., bargaining position and power sharing, by which everybody has to calculate the benefits or advantages that he or she will gain)⁵⁹. Respect for differences or plurality can be a means of establishing “mature” (mutual) relationships among people who have different ideological backgrounds, and of making people aware of different agendas that people with different political ideology fight for.

In a democratic society, people, according to AH and INA, respect the rights of women (gender equality), which is manifested through the involvement of women in the public sphere, such as taking leadership (will be discussed later). Is argues that democratic society is characterized by mutual (balanced) relationships between the state and citizens.

⁵⁹ According to ZQ, people are demanded to be more pragmatic—relying too much upon the calculation of benefits or advantages than ideology or values. It becomes problematique whenever a person demands much more from another person, while he or she ignores the rights of others (imbalance).

The state or government has to respect the rights of its citizens; on the other hand citizens have access to, and responsibility to participate in and to control development and the implementation of state policy. In a democratic society, according to AR, a decision has to be made through the process of voting⁶⁰. Though the majority group has a determinant role in making a decision, the majority group is not allowed to abuse power by, for instance, alienating or neglecting the rights of minority group.

Democratic society demonstrates open and egalitarian relationships among the members of society. To this point, M, according to ST and BSt, advocates openness and has loosely hierarchical relationships. Everyone can speak what he or she wishes about the board or the president of M. For instance, in M there is no tradition for members to do *cium tangan* (to kiss the hand) of those who socially have high position such as clerics for respecting the respected people,⁶¹ criticism against leaders and clerics is very common,⁶² and giving room for those who advocate (contextualists) and those who reject (literalists) contemporary issues such as democracy, pluralism and gender equality.

⁶⁰ According to ST, BSt, and HN, the founding father of M laid down the principals of democracy such as a voting system in making decisions (stated by law) for either public interest or organizational issues, in which this system has been practiced since the days of M establishment.

⁶¹ This tradition is established within the NU members.

⁶² The extreme example demonstrated the accusation of disbelief (*kafer*) to KH Ahmad Dahlan by those who were not in agreement with his ideas.

5.2.2. Description of the characteristics of democratic society

5.2.1.1. Individual freedom

In general, M members are of the opinion that Islam not only advocates individual freedoms, but also gives guidance. What limits individual freedoms? According to GL and Mar, freedom does not mean liberalism, i.e., people being free to do what they wish. With respect to freedom of religion or faith, Mar says that Islam teaches Muslims the principles concerning how they have to respect the other religious groups. The Qur'an states "*lakum dinukum waliyadin*" (To you is your religion, and to me is mine)." Every person has the right of religion (freedom of belief), however he or she does not have the right to force other people to convert (embrace) his or her religion. Mar says that Islam teaches us that every person has been granted freedom, but he or she does not have to abuse his or her freedom, i.e., violating the rights of others or devastating the life of a human being. For example, if a doctor has done the maximum for a patient and the doctor understands that his or her patient will never get well; according to Islam the doctor is not allowed to take a short cut (to cause the patient to die).

According to N and ST, an individual has freedoms but his or her freedoms have to be limited. N argues that an individual has to hold fundamental and instrumental principles of law. Fundamental law refers to religious values (Islamic tenets). Social relation has to be embedded in the religious tenets. Religion (Islam) teaches Muslims how to respect the equal right of a human being; since the noblest people in the eye of God are those who are pious

(have equal rights/position). The instrument of law means an accord or agreement that avails in a certain society, group, or country, such as political system of Indonesia, which may be differently applied from one group to another.

In M, individual freedom, as I observed, appears in the decision making for the interests of both the organization and the community at large through *mushawarah* (deliberation and dialogue) and voting mechanisms at various levels (stated earlier). With regard to the relationship between board and members, M gives room for members to speak their own ideas, aspiration or rights (e.g., everyone can speak what he or she wishes about the board or the president of the board or criticizing). As far as I know there is no privileged position for clerics.⁶³ In addition, M gives room for liberal or reformist and literalist groups to coexist and facilitates both parties to communicate through various forums, which are available within M.

5.2.1.2. Pluralism

Plurality within various spheres of life is assumed to raise a dilemma, i.e., (a) plurality can enrich cultural heritage and enable diverse groups to cooperate, but (b) can create a

⁶³ M does not have *shura* council wherein its clerics hold privileged positions and tradition to do “*cium tangan*”: i.e., to kiss the hand of those who have a socially low position such as a member to those who socially have high position such as the board, and clerics for appreciation. ST took an extreme example (e.g., demonstrating the accusation of disbelief (*kafer*) to KH Ahmad Dahlan by those who were not in agreement with his ideas. did not release a fatwa considering the liberal group as *kafer* (disbelievers), and did not respond to the demands of the literalist group to pull out a book “The thematic interpretation of Qur’an (this will be discussed in pluralism).

conflict among those believers. In response to such a condition, Abdullah says Islam has laid down such principles as *taarafu* (mutual understanding, cooperation), *jaadilhum bilati hiya ahsan* (dialogue) and *laa ikraaha fid-diin* (no compulsion to embrace a religion) as stated in verses of “Islamic inclusivism”. Islam teaches its believers to respect the other believers and its tenets imply mutual respect and cooperation as stated in the surah al-Hujurat 49: 13 (Abdullah, 1997; Aslan, 2001). This *ayah* (verse), according to Barlas (2002), also entails the concept of anti-racism based on ethnicity and gender bias (Barlas, 2002). The primary mission of this *ayah* is to encourage Muslims to abolish discrimination (Aslan, 1998: 188-190):

Plurality is accepted as a natural phenomenon as stated in the Quran, surah al-Hujurat 49: 13. One of the prime tasks of Islam is to eliminate discrimination based upon race or color by proposing a single Islamic brotherhood which aims to unite all the different people under one faith. According to the Qur’an, Islam is not a name only given to a system of faith or religion, but it is also the name of an act of surrendering to the will of God. Anything which bows to God’s will voluntarily or even involuntarily is qualified as Muslim.

There are some examples of the verses of “Islamic inclusivism.” Al-Baqarah 2: 115 explains the concept of God, which connotes God for all human being. Aslan (1998: 187) says that a Muslim has to be able to accommodate the tradition or belief of believers of other religions:

Islam explicitly endorses the universality of God’s revelation, which plays a significant part in the Islamic understanding of other religions. The God of the Qur’an is not only the God of the Muslim people but the God of all humankind (see al-Baqarh 2: 115).Therefore in Islam the notion of universality of God’s revelations has always played a key role in constituting an Islamic theology of religions. As a result of adopting this

belief, Muslims are able to participate in the essence and the ‘religious proximity’ of other traditions.

It is hard for Muslims and other religious groups to accept Hick’s idea about pluralism for two reasons: a) anybody embraces a religion because he or she sees that his or her religion has advantages or truth over other religions (personal pride and dogma), and b) every religion has exclusivist tenets. Similar to other religions,⁶⁴ Islam constitutes a “religious exclusivisme or truth claim” stated in the Qur’an surah Ali Imran 3: 19 and 85. However, Aslan (1998: 192) argues that these verses are indefinite and open to interpretation. The verses can be interpreted from the concept of Islam, i.e., Islam means *istislam*, which means submission to the Will of Allah or surrender, obedience (*taa’at*), and iman (religious belief in general). The verses of “Islamic exclusivism” contain more room to be inclusive. At the same time, Islam advocates respect for the believers of other religions such as Judaism and Christianity (people of the book). Sachedina (2001) argues that Qur’anic pluralism was founded on the ethical principles of doing good work (*khair, ma’ruf*). Its conception of universal moral order was grounded in the recognition of a nature common to all humans.

⁶⁴ The Roman Catholic teachings, for instance, on this issue can be summed up in the doctrinal statements, *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, outside the church there is no salvation (Aslan, 1998: 104; Hick, 1985: 51). Judaism advocates the doctrine of “the chosen people (*fadlaltukum ala al-a’alamiin*)” and Islam contains in itself a tenet saying “*inna ad-diina ‘inda Allah al-Islam* (Truly in the eyes of God, religion is submission to His law and sincere obedience to His commands (Islam) (Qur’an surah Ali Imran 3: 19) and “Whoever searches for a religion other than the religion of complete submission and contentment (Islam), with a prophet who he can elevate above other prophets, and a Book which he can deem to be more exalted than other books, considering himself free to accept or reject this new decree and this new prophet—this religion will not be accepted, and on the Last Day his loss will become manifest (Qur’an surah Ali Imran 3: 85) (Toha, 2004: 16).”

Islam viewed this common nature as endowed with ethical cognition and the capacity to reason morally in order to do good deeds (Schadena, 2001: 69). Therefore, the Islamic pluralism must be distinguished from the Hick's⁶⁵.

Muhammadiyah and pluralism

The founding fathers of M such as KH Ahmad Dahlan, demonstrated inclusiveness (and he was respected by various groups of society). According to ST, KH Dahlan promoted respect for various religious groups; he was known as a friend among the priests of Christianity and Catholicism. Jaenuri (2002) noted that KH Ahmad Dahlan did not feel uneasy about attending churches for dialogue while wearing *haj* clothes. KH Dahlan was involved in Budi Utomo, a secular association. He allowed Darsono and Semaun, the leaders of ISDV (*Indisch Sociaal Demoratische Partij*) to speak about their points of view and ideas countering the attack to the policies on Dutch colonial authorities and to campaign their ideas about socialism in a forum held by *Aisyiah*. Two cases mentioned earlier demonstrate the inclusiveness of the M founding fathers in relation to other groups who had a different political ideology (political pluralism).

What created “inclusivism” among the M proponents in the first period of the 20th century? Jaenuri (2002: 112-127) noted some important points as follows: First, the proponents of M contended seriously that the scriptural text (the Qur'an and Sunnah) are the

⁶⁵ Hick (1985: 92-93, 95) defines religious pluralism as the view that the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to reality-centredness is taken place in different ways. It is thus defined as the theological view that there is truth in every religion.

absolute truth. What Muslims have understood, according to the M founding fathers, constitutes the interpretation of the absolute values, and that interpretation varies from one to another. Muslims have, according to them, to respect the diversity of interpretation. Those who claim that their or his (her) group's ideas alone are the truest, while ignoring the perception of the other group, could be misled. People may have a different perception relying upon space or environment, time, and an intellectual capacity toward understanding the tenets of Islam. The interpretation of an individual or group can only be valid within his/her own social setting and may not be valid for another setting (not absolute or principle of relativism). Having an understanding about the principles of relativism, the proponents of M became inclusive. They contended very much that each individual could not reach a perfect understanding of the scriptural text, since an individual had limited knowledge. The principle of relativism makes people open to new ideas. Understanding the principle of relativism, the proponents of M became inclusive Muslim (Jaenuri, 2002: 117-126).

How do M members perceive pluralism within the 21st century? M members do not have a problem with political pluralism, since many M activists are involved in diverse political parties. Similarly, they do not have a problem with cultural pluralism, since M has a range of network spreading over all Indonesian provinces. However, when M members come into contact with religious pluralism, they do not automatically approve or demonstrate "inclusiveness."

With respect to the ideas of pluralism, according to ZQ, there are diverse perspectives. Pluralism refers to a model of society wherein the Prophet led all tribes with

different religious backgrounds such as Jews and Christians who were brought together by the *Medina* charter. The Medina charter⁶⁶ served as a guide to establish a pluralistic society where *umma*, constituting Muslim and non-Muslim groups, upholds the freedom and dignity of each group (AH).

According to As, pluralism connotes the enforcement of the wishes of the majority group over the minority group in the name of democracy. This idea is not well accepted among the M boards of old generation and literalists. Taking the course of “ke-Muhammadiyah and al-Islam” as an example, the key actor wants to demonstrate how pluralism is practiced in the M schools or colleges/universities. He found three categories (groups). The first group (pluralist) appreciates or respects the rights of minority groups (Christian, Hindus, Buddhists and the like), and allows these groups to organize their own religious education to students who are member of these groups. The second group (instrumentalist) argues that “ke-Muhammadiyah and al-Islam” is obligatory, and thus, every student, regardless of their religious backgrounds, must take this course of studies and pass the exam. The third group (ideologists), according to (As), use the 1970 and 1980 perspective, i.e., advocating the idea against the missionary movement (Christianization)⁶⁷. For As, Alwi’s finding could be true at one side and might be not true on the other side. Both parties, Muslims and Christians, have their nuances, and their understandings have been developed along with the societal dynamics and the access of information. There are some M

⁶⁶ See Rippin & Knappert (1990: 80-81).

⁶⁷ This group has confirmed the findings of Alwi Shihab’s dissertation telling us that the primary motive of founding M was to counterattack the missionary movement.

members who hold an ideological perspective in line with Alwi's, but there are many M people who have gotten in touch with diverse believers and contemporary issues such as pluralism, gender equality, and civil society. There are Christians, including Catholics, who have established a close relationship with Muslims including members of M. Nowadays, there is more room to establish a dialogue among believers. Both parties are struggling to establish a close contact, though dialogue remains most precious (elitist).

According to BC, pluralism is built in the creation of the universe. This universe is created by God and inhabited by human beings who have diverse backgrounds, i.e. ethnicity, ideology, and religion. The Qur'an states that human beings are created in diversity. So we, Muslims, have to start our understanding from this point of view in order that we can live in a pluralistic society. The problem is the majority of Indonesian Muslims have a one-sided understanding (superficial) with respect to Islam and they tend to understand Islam parochially.

Islam appreciates pluralism, according to MA as stated in the Qur'an surah al-Hujurat 49: 13,⁶⁸ a human being is created in diversity and such diversity is not to alienate one group

⁶⁸ Surah Al-Hujurat 49: 13 "O Mankind! We have created you all from one man and one woman, and We have made you, throughout the centuries, into families and tribes so that you might come to know your place and position in the human race. Your heritage—that which you inherit from your forbears—may prompt you to enquire into the history of different cultures, the sciences of genetics, and the study of racial characteristics, the handing down of knowledge and the growth of various civilization- but it should not lead to pride and bigotry. Nothing is a source of pride and honor unless God has deemed it so. The most honored among you in the sight of God is he who is the most God-fearing; God knows who fears Him, and to what degree, for He has absolute knowledge of all things" [Behbudi, 1997].

to another. Ridiculing or looking down is not allowed as stated in the same surah verse 12⁶⁹. Pluralism is a fact that every person has to respect as stated in the surah al-Hujurat 49: 13 “*lita’arafu* (to build mutual understanding one to another).” Islam teaches its believers to respect the right of the life of the individual.⁷⁰ His understanding about the concept of religious tolerance (*tasamuh*) is derived from this verse.

With respect to pluralism (religious pluralism), according to ZQ, M members are divided into two groups. The first group perceives religious pluralism as a reality, and M members have to respect plurality. M members have to acknowledge that other religions (besides Islam) contain truth aside from Islam. The second group conceives of the idea of religious pluralism as syncreticism or heterodoxy (mixing various faiths, i.e., Islam and non Islam). From the second group’s perspective, those who acknowledge that other religions have truth have deviated from the Islamic faiths (*aqidah Islam*) and those who hold the ideas

⁶⁹ Surah Al-Hujurat 49: 12 “O you who believe! Do not let men of one tribe (or community) mock or ridicule the men of another; it may be that the belief of the later is stronger than of the former. And do not let the women of one tribe mock or ridicule the women of another; it may be that belief of the latter stronger than that of the former. Do not malign others or call them by offensive and humiliating names. Once a person has come to believe, he ought to realize that to speak ill of others—be it through defamation or the use of offensive nick-name—is a sin; those who persist in this sin, which is a legacy from the age of ignorance, will be counted among the oppressors, those black of heart and deed” (Behbudi, 1997).

⁷⁰ Stated in the surah al-Maidah 5:33 “It was on account of this that We ordained for the children of Israel that if anyone killed a believer—unless it be retaliation for murder, or arson and plunder, or for spreading corruption through the land – it would be as though he had killed all of mankind; and if anyone saved the life of a believer, it would be as though he had saved the life of all the lives of all mankind. Our prophets came to the Children of Israel with clear proofs, and continued to transgress and shed blood to excess throughout the land “(Behbudi, 1997).

of religious pluralism are considered unbelievers (*kafer*). The second group, according to ZQ, has few people but they are vocal (keep on advocating anti pluralism).

In M, the ideas of (religious) pluralism remains new and less developed. According to As and ZQ, pluralism was introduced by M members or board who have obtained education from Westerns countries such as America, Canada and Europe. Pluralism was firstly introduced to the M younger generation by Muslim Abd. Rahman. The proponents of pluralism are Syafii Maarif, Munir Mulkhan, and Munir Ilyas. The advocates of pluralism have multipronged methodologies toward understanding Islam (from various dimensions). They have different areas of works. Amin Abdullah and Munir Mulkhan put emphasis on promoting the academic discourse about pluralism. Munir Ilyas specializes in promoting the theology of pluralism. The M younger generations who have organized themselves within JIMM (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah), have a concern similar to Amin and Mulkhan in developing intellectual discourses.

Reaction to M's people who advocate pluralism

According to ZQ, the ideas of pluralism remain debatable within the M association. Institutionally, M has not advocated the ideas of pluralism, and those who advocate pluralism are personal. HN argues that M is getting immersed in academic discourse about pluralism so that M can decide which aspects of religion (Islam)—faith and ritual (*aqidah and ubudiyah*) and social interaction (*hablum minanaas*) that M members may advocate the ideas of pluralism. M published a book entitled “Thematic Interpretation of al-Qur’an” because M

does not have a detailed Qur'anic commentary about the relationship between religion and pluralism within Islam. The "Thematic Interpretation of al-Qur'an" contains, a) the principles of relationships among religious believers including the issues of acknowledgement of plurality, competition for good deed, coexistence, and peace among religious believers, justice, and equality, b) sustaining good or harmonious relationships among religious believers and mutual cooperation among them, c) definition or description of people of the Book (*ahli kitab*), and d) intermarriages among religious believers from the al-Qur'anic perspective (Majlis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam, 2000).

Some M reformist or moderate members have expanded the idea of *ahlu kitab*, which constitutes Confucianism. This ide, according to MM, is discovered from semi-scientific writing from the classical book of Islam. MM adds that M introduced the idea of *dakwah kultural*⁷¹ (proselytization based on cultural approach), which is based on the spirits of respecting multiculturalism and responding to societal dynamics. Becoming a Muslim, according to MM, a person cannot be separated from his or her socio-cultural setting as well as societal dynamics to which M has to pay much more attention. M, therefore, has to transform its orthodox understanding about heterodoxy into a more progressive notion: i.e. acts devastate human life such as corruption, collusion, nepotism, injustice and the like. M member would be better involved in these issues than in the long lasting debate about

⁷¹ Cultural approach in proselytization (*dakwah kultural*) is based on the concept as stated in the Qur'an surah Ibrahim 14:4 "*bilisaani qaumihi*," which means an effort to deliver, translate, and to interpret Islamic tenets by recognizing and appreciating psychological, social, economic, demographic dimensions of the target groups (PP. Muhammadiyah, 2003: 58).

furuiyah (already discussed). To me, their involvement in the *furuiyah* debate will draw M into stagnancy (contrary to the spirit of *tajdid*) and being trapped in peripheral issues of the Muslim *umma*. At the same time M had better appreciate local culture such as *salawatan*, *selamaten* and the like rather than being intolerant, and see its positive side in a wise and critical way in terms of the promotion of societal cohesiveness (Muslim brotherhood), the Islamic understandings to the community at large and M's proselytization approaches.

I believe there are still many M members questioning whether Christians and Jews are *ahlu kitab* (people of the books). For example, Mar and Maz argue that both Christians and Jews deviated from the concept of *tawheed* (the unity of God) and were no longer *ahlu al-kitab*. Maz is one of M members who strongly rejected the expanded concept of *ahlu kitab*, insisting that "revealed religion" (*samawi*) such as Islam be different from "worldly religions" like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The "revealed religion" is the truth from God while worldly religions are created from tradition and developed by human beings. Mar, Maz and other M members who have similar opinion to them cannot be separated from the Qur'anic interpretation of several Clerics of the medieval age. Based on this idea, Mar, Maz and other M literalists have the opinion that a male Muslim is allowed to marry a female of *ahlu al-kitaab*. I am holding an opinion similar to those who argue that the Qur'an refers to *ahlu kitab* the Christians and Jews; though at the same time the Qur'an acknowledged that the majority of both groups deviated⁷² from concept of *tawheed*. I also observed that many

⁷²My opinion is based on the history of declaration of the doctrine of the Trinity. Rahim (1991:40) explains that in 325 A.D., the famous Council of Nicea was held. The doctrine of the Trinity was

more M members (the majority) rejected the expanded concept of *ahlu al-kitab*, which was advocated by the moderate or reformist group. With respect to intermarriage, I would rather hold the opinion of Taba'tabai⁷³ that a male Muslim is allowed to marry a Christian or Jew female.

According to ST, in general M *umma* recognize plurality, but some of them do not want to make a reinterpretation to religious tenets. To me, ST's statement is subject to debate since other key informants such as As argues that M still has many members who reject the ideas of pluralism though he does not have statistical data. As' opinion is based on his impression during field research and establishing dialogue between pro and con groups. ZQ confirms the opinion of As, saying that M has many members demanding those M board who institutionally advocates pluralism to be retired from the position of board member. They also consider the publication of the thematic commentary of the Qur'an illegal and this book has to be pulled off the market, but the central board of M did not do so. The literalist group released special issues through the journal of *Majlis Tabligh and Dakwah Khusus* or Council

declared to be the official doctrine of the Pauline Church, and one of the consequences of this decision was that out of the three hundred or so Gospels extant at the time, four were chosen as the official Gospels of the Church. The remaining Gospels, including the Gospel of Barnabas, were ordered to be destroyed completely. This was the first well-organized attempt to remove all the records of Jesus' original teaching....

⁷³ Taba'tabai (1982: 299) argues that the Qur'an Maidah 5:6 allows a male Muslim to marry a female of *ahlu al-kitaab* (people of the book). The Qur'an 60:10 which is used by another Muslim group to prohibit marriage with a female of people of the book speaks about a man who accepts Islam and his wife remains a disbeliever, then he is forbidden to hold intact the marriage-tie with that women, while Maaidah 5: 6 speaks about performing a new marriage with a woman from the people of the book. The Quran Baqarah 2: 221 and 60: 10 cannot abrogate the verse 5:6.

for Proselytization and Special Islamic Calls (MTDK)⁷⁴ in order to counter attack against those who advocate pluralism. This literalist group considers those who advocate pluralism, inclusivism and liberal Islam disbeliever (*kafer*), though this group did not release *fatwa*.

To me, those articles could be interpreted as ‘psycho war’ between those who are for and against pluralism. To lessen the tension between two groups within M younger generations, As, as the chair of Center for Muhammadiyah Studies, facilitated a dialogue through a serial program entitled “Dialectics among M Younger Generations.” This theme is broken down into several issues: i.e., theology of pluralism pertaining to the truth claims of Religions, Muhammadiyah’s Perspective, Majlis Tarjih’s Methodology in adopting Critical Perspectives of al-Jadiri (Arabian literature critic) and *irfani* (*sufistic*) methodology. Majlis Tarjih developed three methodologies in relation to promoting the Islamic thoughts: i.e., *Manhaj bayani* (literalist; textual analysis or perspective), *manhaj bayani ra’yi* (rational or philosophical perspective and contextual analysis: historical, socio-anthropological and political ideology), social analysis, and *irfani* or spiritual or sufistic approaches (two approaches are developed by the M younger generation). For M’s younger generation, *irfani approach* (*sufistic or esoteric*) might function to abridge pluralism (also see Riyadi, 2003). However, the old generation of M rejected that idea and considers it to be a form of

⁷⁴ I was impressed that the council membership is dominated by the literalist groups. For instance, Kamal (2004) says that the ideas of religious pluralism were advocated by Christianity and have been disseminated into Muslim society. Those (Muslims) who advocate the ideas of religious pluralism have been in doubt of Islam as the absolute truth of God. Toha (2004) argues that claim of “universal truth” (other religions are equally valid ways to the same truth) is problematic and might have thwarted the religious and spiritual life of human being.

heterodoxy (*bid'ah*). In order to make students of MUY appreciate pluralism, AH asked her students to discuss the issue concerning “how non-Muslims (Christian and Chinese groups) feel about the treatment of the majority group (Muslims)”. Also she asked her students to observe the non-Muslims with respect to Muslim treatment over them.

It is assumed that the decree of M *Tanwir* has stimulated M members, especially M's younger generation, to develop the ideas of pluralism. Those members or board were involved in forums for interfaith dialogue advocating pluralism and attempting an action program. Pak Syafii Maarif, according to As, has been involved in initiating a dialogue among believers. Also, he, together with KH Muzaddi (the NU President), initiated a coalition among believers to educate members for the anti-corruption movement.

M, together with NU, was involved in discussing the bill of Harmony among believers RUU KUB (Kerukunan Umat Beragama), and this forum was conducted by a joint committee of M and NU. This bill is to regulate harmonious cooperation and coexistence among religious believers in Indonesia. All key informants say that M involvement in this matter demonstrates its willingness to manifest the Tanwir mandate (e.g. to establish intensive interaction with Non-M groups including non-Muslims).

Why are they reluctant to the idea of pluralism?

Abdullah (1997) states that the historical context of *mufasir* (Qur'an'ic exoteric commentators) while interpreting the scriptural text is assumed to make a contribution to the rejection of pluralism. The capability of many Muslims in understanding the religious tenets can be supportive for such a stance. Economic and political interests are often used to

reject any contemporary ideas such as pluralism. Muslim clerics are worried about the implication of ideas of relativism with respect to religious interpretation—eroding the standard norms of *faith (aqidah)*. They assume that relativism is identical with nihilism of moral values. By acknowledging that idea of pluralism people will have opinion that all religions have equals values; people will have fallen into the ideas of nihilism. Abdullah further argues that relativism is a methodology used to understand and interpret and give the text meaningful in relation to social dynamics.

ST says that in general M members have moderate perspectives pertaining to pluralism. This statement, to me, remains unclear; whether the majority does not have ideas or hold a position in between, since it is also stated by another key informant, such as As, saying that many M members reject the idea of (religious) pluralism. For instance, AH argues that the *fiqh* perspective (black and white way of looking) has dominated the way of thinking of her students and many M members. So when, she introduced pluralism they said it was American, and she was considered a person who was American minded.⁷⁵ She encouraged her students to see the religious issues from the dimension of humanity in order to avoid being trapped in the conservatism. She said that human beings do not have the authority to make religious judgments over other people; only God has absolute authority to

⁷⁵ According to AH, the M literalists including its young generation have a similar opinion to her students (against the Islamic values).

make such a judgment.⁷⁶ By humanity, she means how the religious tenets function in giving theological basis for enjoining good deeds and refraining wrongdoing such as corruption, injustice and the like for the benefits of all human beings.

BC confirms the idea of AH saying that the majority of Indonesian Muslims have the narrow understanding of Islam (*fiqh* perspective). For instance, many Indonesian Muslim students find it difficult to study abroad in Europe or America because of minor factors such as no calls for prayer and no general community participation in Ramadan. In fact, while the Qur'an commands its believers to roam over the world in order to understand the universe. Indonesian Muslims tend to see religion in a parochial way. Another factor is that Indonesian Muslims are more accustomed to living in a homogenous community. Therefore, it is understandable that they find it difficult to understand or accept pluralism.

N states that he does not agree with the idea of the liberal group that Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are similar, because each religion has different backgrounds and tenets. He contends very strongly that differences among those religions exist. However, he said that Muslims could establish agreements on social relations on the basis of those differences. In establishing cooperation among members of different religions, we (M members) encounter the concern that establishing social relationships with other religions (believers) will lessen one's spirituality. He also disagrees with the Islamist group which advocates the idea that pluralism conceals a mission of the missionary movement

⁷⁶ I often found a person or group who consider him(her) self or his/her group as a representation of God wanted humans to be like the ideal type, his (her) task then goes beyond the normal self-understanding.

(Christianization). However, he wants to make a balance in understanding the issue of pluralism (willingness to reconcile between two conflicting groups). For him, a formalist (“Islamist”) group considers the methodological aspects that are claimed by liberalists as substantive aspects of religion (*aqidah*). Therefore, the formalist group argues that liberalists have deviated from *aqidah* (*kafer*). The Islamic formalists consider the pluralist’s perspective with respect to pluralism as something coming across the area of *aqidah* (*faith*), while pluralists see the ideas of religious pluralism from phenomenological, anthropological and sociological dimensions. The two perspectives, according to ZQ, contradict each other.

5.2.1.3. Tolerance

Religious tolerance can be seen from three dimensions: legality, social and intellectual. a) Legal tolerance involves the de jure protection of the freedom of assembly, speech, religion, and any other (tolerance through law). b) Religious tolerance in the context of the social arena means treating with dignity and respect people with whom we differ religiously. c) Religious tolerance is the intellectual. This sphere deals not only with people’s actions but also with their religious belief. Genuine tolerance does not dispute the truth claims of others. The real tolerance of other religions involves the absence of any expression of dubiety or disagreement regarding religious assertions and belief (Stetson, 1994: 77). Tolerance does not mean merely the uncritical and unreflective embrace of any and every

idea or supposition. Respect for difference (plurality) or tolerance does not mean human beings have to tolerate any action that will devastate human life.

Tolerance is not an absolute concept; it is not to be extended to every person, in every circumstance, regardless of the particular context. For example, an individual who, out of a strong desire to be tolerant and nonjudgmental, stands by and watches a heinous crime being committed—doing nothing to stop it when he or she has the ability to do so—could hardly be praised for being tolerant of the belief or actions of another (in this case, a criminal). Tolerance, rightly understood, essentially a conceptual device—prescribing a certain mode of thought and action—that makes it possible for persons of diverse opinions to interact cognitively within a bond of civility. Being tolerant means that one accepts the presence of the belief and recognizes its holder's right to it, while at the same time rejecting—not necessarily out of arrogance—the content of the belief. There is a clear distinction between accepting and acknowledging someone's holding a certain belief, and accepting and embracing the substance of and warrant for that belief. If I were to beat them or imprison them personally because I disagree with their religious position, that would be intolerant and immoral (Stetson, 1994: 74-76).

How do key actors conceive of tolerance⁷⁷ especially religious tolerance? MA argues that Islam has laid down some principles similar to pluralism (stated earlier). Furthermore, any one has to respect different ideologies including religious affiliation without having attitude or effort to annihilate the existence of other religions. Tolerance implies mutual

⁷⁷ Ansari explores Islamic ethics with respect to the relation between Muslim and non-Muslim as follows: al-Qur'an permits the extension of social relation with non-Muslims in proportion to the affinity which they may have with the Qur'anic moral and spiritual values. Thus, it permits marriage with the women who follow some revealed religion (people of the book) stated on the surah al-Maidah 5: 5. Qur'an prohibits Muslim to force the conversion of non-Muslims stated in the surah al-Baqarah 2:256. Hurting the religious feelings through hurtful language even when it relates to pure and simple superstitions is prohibited. Absolute justice under all circumstances is enjoined as stated in surah al-Maidah 5:9. Fulfillment of pacts, contracts and treaties are enjoined stated in the surah al-Maidah 5: 1. Forgiveness, in case of personal injuries from non-Muslim, is enjoined as stated in the surah Abraham 14: 14. Granting protection to non-Muslim, even from amongst enemies, if they so desire, is enjoined as stated in the surah at-Taubah 9: 6. Maintaining the attitude of readiness for making peace with the enemies of Islam in the interests of human welfare is enjoined stated in surah al-Anal 8: 61 and 62. Observing justice in all respects and in all dealings with the enemies of Islam is enjoined as bounden [obligatory] duty stated in al-Maidah 5:9 (Amstar, n.a.).

understanding, which means that none is justified in enforcing other people to convert his or her religion, since Islam teaches its believers “no compulsion in religion”.

For Mar, tolerance means opposition to hostility and such unfriendly acts or attitudes (are not justified). With respect to religious or theological issues, Muslims have to argue in a rational and wise way. Also, tolerance, according to Maz, means that Muslims have to respect the rights of Christians, whether Muslims like them or not, and that they are not allowed to cause his or her death.

According to HN, M does not have a problem of social relation with other religious groups (believers) in the sphere of social relation. HN also confirms that there is competition between M and Christians in terms of maximizing its efforts to develop communities. M organizes its programs in various spheres of life such as education, proselytization, health care and the like in order to promote the quality life of Muslims. He also corroborates that there are some people (group) within M holding tightly the political ideology of the 1950th (advocating the creation of an Islamic state). Such a group competes negatively with other religious groups (advocating the issues of the missionary movement or Christianization movement) in Indonesia. M board does not have the right to limit the freedom of mind or expression of any body.

Among the M younger generation and the foreign educated elites advocate a liberal idea about religious tolerance (e.g., getting immersed into the concept or tradition of other religions or learning other religions). That liberal idea was rejected by the majority of M members. Mar, Maz and N explains a special area wherein Muslims are not allowed to get in

or have to limit themselves, i.e. *aqidah* (faith). *Aqidah* (faith), according to N, is very intrinsic in which Muslims are prohibited to tolerate the belief of others at the expense of *aqidah*. Individual preferences over the political and economic spheres, for instance, make up extrinsic elements of life. In those spheres, Muslims are allowed to be more tolerant. Those key informants agree that Muslims can establish cooperation with non-Muslim as the manifestation of tolerance. However, regarding social relation such as saying “Merry Christmas” and “going to church for social relation or dialogue,” N reverses HN, Maz and Mar. N believes that saying “Merry Christmas” and “going to a church for social relation” have a connection with the extrinsic elements of religion. But these activities do not have a relationship with *aqidah* (faith) and do not imperil *iman* (faith). However, these issues remain very sensitive for Muslim society in Indonesia, at least for the time being. Probably the majority of Muslims will natter (chat) about those who are saying ‘Merry Christmas’. In contrast, HN, Mar and Maz argues that such activities may peril *aqidah* (faith).

Overall, M gives room for “Islamist” or literalist and liberalist or moderate groups who were considered by the former group *kafer*. M board, according to ZQ, let two groups have their own religious understandings (interpretation). M has councils for *fatwa* (*Majlis Tarjih*), education (*Majlis Pendidikan*), and policies (*Majlis Hikmah*) that enable both groups to communicate or talk about critical issues such as pluralism. ZQ feels very sure that those who reject critical ideas, including democracy, pluralism, human rights, and gender equality will better understand (a matter of time).

5.2.1.4. Gender equality

Like pluralism, gender equality remains very sensitive for M members. It is peculiar for them, probably for several reasons. There are some issues stated in the scriptural texts (the Qur'an and Sunnah) pertaining to gender that were misinterpreted. Barlas (2002: 7) argues that the Qur'anic interpretation of clerics of the medieval ages tended to male biased interests.

Muslims read patriarchy and sexual inequality into the Qur'an on the basis of specific verses (*Ayaat*, s. *ayah*) and of the Qur'an's different treatment of women and men with regard to such issues as marriage, divorce and inheritance. From these, they infer that men and women are not only biologically different but also unequal. On the readings of conservatives, male superiority is both ontological, since women are said to have been created from or after man and for his pleasure. God also is said to have given men a 'degree' above women and to have appointed them guardian over women.

Many Muslims consider gender equality as the Western idea and those who advocate gender equality do not use local or "religious" terms in campaigning about gender issues. It could be that in M there is a rejectionist group (salafi literalist) (see Chapter 7) who resists any idea coming from the West. They reject gender equality for either socio-political motives or economic interests. Possibly, there are many factors beyond the rejection of pluralism. To uncover the hidden motives I believe a special study is needed. This sub-section will explore the understandings and experiences of M in advocating or promoting the issue of gender equality.

M, according to HN, ST, RN, and INA, does not have a problem with gender equality, since M has given more room for females to express their rights or aspiration in the public

sphere. *Aisyiah*, a female, autonomous organizational body of M, was founded in 1918 for the sake of this purpose. Since the days of its establishment, M adopted an educational system of the West, i.e. male and female students attending M schools together; and M schooling aims at giving more chances for females to have access to education. Do M members demonstrate moderation or inclusivism or open-mindedness in response to gender equality?

M's members react to the issues of gender equality

AH, a faculty member of UMY, explains that she teaches the concept of gender, how the gender concept is manifested in a society, what gender discrimination surfaces in daily life, and the implication of injustice pertaining to female and male relationships as well. She is attempting to establish connections between these ideas and those found in the scriptural text (the Qur'an and Sunnah) in teaching gender equality. She explains the Qur'anic verses with respect to gender equality from various dimensions, such as *asbabun nuzul* (the occasion of revelation) and *asbabul wurud* for hadith or as-sunnah (occasion of hadith narration). GL says that looking at this verse of the Qur'an in depth "*hunna libaasul lakum wa antum libasul lakum* (... they are your garment, and you are their...),⁷⁸ Muslims will find out the concept of equal relationships between male and female (equal degree), though both female and male have different functions. Equality, according to him, does not mean both sides have the same position in all aspects of humanity. For him, there are some aspects

⁷⁸ Stated in the Qur'an surah al-Baqarah 2: 188.

(spheres) valid only for males or females for certain circumstances (nature). For instance, a football game is only probable for males. However, in terms of seeking knowledge and earning money (economy), both males and females have equal rights. In a public sphere like parliament, gender equality, according to HPPA, is demonstrated by female representation, which until today is not significant.

According to MA, the Qur'an teaches its believers to appreciate one another (male to female and vice versa). In the sight of God, the noble people are those who are pious (have God consciousness). The Qur'an states both female and male the terms "*shaaimuum, shooimaat, qaanitiin dan qaanitaat*" or another verse saying "*man amila shalihan mindzkarain aw a untsa'* (whosoever either male or female) to refer to the rights of equality of both sides in the eye of God.

Nur sees that both domestic and public domains have to become the concern of both males and females. In reality there is no strict gendered division of labor between men and women. In rural areas, males take charge of domestic works while his wife is involved in societal activities such as *pengajian* (religious forum). *Aisyiah* encourages its members (*jamaah*) to be involved in societal activities. Therefore, domestic works should not prevent females from getting involved in societal activities. However, Nur contends that there are still many people who diverge (dichotomize) domestic and public domains and put the domestic work on the shoulders of females.

ZQ argues that gender equality does not mean to treat alike both sides, male and female. He points out the role or function, which M members have to consider in looking at

gender equality. There are some kinds of work that are functionally more suitable for male to handle, and there are some kinds of work that are functionally more suitable for females to handle. However, ZQ is questioning whether or not the idea of males being superior to females is justified. Is it true that a male is more intelligent or stronger than a female? A female in a rural area, ZQ adds, leaves her home early in the morning or at 6 a.m to the rice field; she goes back home holding the pilling up of grass at 6 p.m. A male leaves home to the rice field; he goes back home holding the pilling up of wood. This case demonstrates that both female and male are physically strong. Delivering and suckling a baby are of female's responsibility. However, who deserves the care of children?

According to ZQ, Muslims, possibly the majority, say that a female has to take care of children, so she is not permitted to work. Some people say that for a female leaving home to work will result in calumny. These are problems that will be encountered by people who advocate gender equality. Moreover, Muslims tend to be prejudiced with respect to gender issues saying "gender equality is coming from the west and those who advocate this issue want to live free from any norms." These issues make us uneasy to about advocating gender.

Debatable issues with respect to the Sacred text (al-Qur'an and as-Sunnah)

There are several issues that attract people to be involved in the long lasting debate. The debatable issues are:

Men have a “degree” over women

The concepts of *qawwamuna* and *fadhala* stated in the al-Qur'an surah An-Nisaa 4:34⁷⁹ involve Muslim scholars in the long lasting debate. AH and HPPA perceive that the interpretation of *ar-rijaalu qawwamu a'laa an-nisaa* has been a biased male interpretation within Muslims of Indonesia. They conceive that the male is the breadwinner; therefore the male has a degree (physically, economically and intellectually) over the female. AH clarifies this verse for her students from the various dimensions such as linguistics and *asbabun nuzul* (the occasion of revelation). By so doing, students will understand that their previous understanding was a male biased interpretation. *Qawam* does not mean that the male has a degree over or superiority to the female, but refers to justice (*'adalah*). This interpretation is not coming from liberal Islam, but from the concept of justice in Islam. Justice represents harmony between two sides, female and male, in which both sides are not to be alienated.

Contrary to AH, Maz insists that God has bestowed a male a degree in terms of physical and intellectual capabilities, as stated in the Qur'an "*fadh-dhala ba'dhahum 'alaa ba'dhin*". The male uses his rationality or intellect in handling a problem, while the female employs emotion. Taking an example, as stated by Maz, a child is falling down. Usually, the female would rather cry than helping the kid, whereas the male will help the kid quickly. It

⁷⁹ Qur'an surah An-Nisa 4: 34 "Men have a degree over (*qawwaamuuna 'ala*) women, (on the basis) of what Allah has (preferred) (*fadh-dhalla*) some of them over others, and (on the basis) of what they spend of their property (for support of women). So good women are (*qaanitaat*), guarding in secret that which Allah has guarded. As for those from whom you fear (*nushuz*) admonish them, banish them to beds apart, and scourge them. Then, if they obey you, seek not a way against them.

is possible that female students can attain the highest academic achievement but those are few. Female students have a degree over male students in the field of social studies. However, if the female students are faced with logical issues (thinking), they will be left behind by male students.

To some extent, Ilyas (2002: 69-70) has an opinion similar to the idea of Maz, but Ilyas has a different conceptualization of intellect. A male has a degree over female intellectually in terms of facing a conflicting problem (involving ratio and emotion), but not in terms of intellectual potential. Faced with such a conflicting issue, a female will give more emotional precedence rather than rationality. In the normal condition, a female may have a degree over a male depending upon several factors such as educational attainment, experiences and the like. According to HPPA, *ba'dhulun* has to be linked with the verse of surah At-Taubah 9: 71⁸⁰ referring to the idea of “mutual cooperation and protection”. Wadud-Muhsin (1999: 71) says *fadh-dhalla* cannot be unconditional because verse An-nisa 4:34 does not read they (masculine plural) are preferred over them (femine plural). It reads ‘*ba’dl*’ (some) of them over “*ba’dl*”. The use of *ba’dl* relates to what obviously has been observed in the human context. All men do not excel over women in all matters. Some men excel over some women in some manners. Likewise, some women excel over men in some matters. So, whatever Allah has preferred, it is still not absolute.

⁸⁰ Surah At-Taubah 9: 71 states “And the believers, the men and the women, are friends one of the other; they bid to honor, and forbid dishonor; they perform the prayer, and pay the alms, and they obey God and His Messenger. Those—upon them God will have mercy; God is All-mighty, All-wise.”

Heritage is a crucial issue

When AH talks about the female share of heritage, she found out her students fit into main streams: a) those that hold tightly the male biased Qur'anic interpretation and b) those that have critical perspectives. The first group includes those who have not learned the sociology of religion. They say that the heritages system is fair since the male is the breadwinner. The second group states that the heritage system is unfair. The situation has changed and in reality she often finds out that a wife earns an income higher than her husband's. AH contends very much that women who earn a higher income than their husbands' are few. Therefore, according to her, Muslims have to look at the *nash* (the scriptural text) from the context, not from the text (not in terms of sex differences). AH adds there are still many M members (the majority) who hold a similar idea to the first group of his students.

Witness (testimony)

According to the cleric ideas in the medieval age (*fiqh*), two females are needed to appeal a case as the witness, while one male can serve as a witness to appeal a case. AH is questioning such a *fiqh* decree. Does it mean that a male is smarter than a female or a female is foolish and cannot be trusted to keep secrecy?

Female leadership

According to ZQ, a female is allowed to take part in the public sphere. However, the female leadership is subject to debate among the Muslim clerics (*ulama*). Some clerics

perceive that women are prohibited (*haram*) from being a leader, such as the president⁸¹. In fact, according to Maz, a female is not allowed or prohibited from being the chair of the Islamic court or chair of judge. This key actor insists that women be prohibited from being a chair of judge since women give more emotional rather than rational consideration and might make controversial decisions.

Factors causing gender bias

In general, the proponent of gender equality says that several factors such as tradition, cleric interpretation, and political interest generate gender bias. HPPA argues that there are two factors that result in male biased perception. First, a patriarchal tradition or culture has been strongly established within the Indonesian society. While it cannot be argued that males are physically stronger than females, it is undeniable that females are biologically different from males; they have different special organs. For example, only females can become pregnant, deliver and suckle a baby. Second, the Qur'anic interpretation was the product of clerics of the medieval age that was male biased (occurred during the era of patriarchy). The clerics tend to interpret the text more literally than contextually. When

⁸¹ Ilyas (2002) argues that Surat An-nisa 4:34 is not appropriate to use the basis for prohibiting a female from being a president, since the context of this verse is household (family). Moreover surat An-Nisa 4: 71 implies a notion that both male and female have to establish a cooperation of being a leader and being led. That *hadith* does not prohibit a woman from being a leader. It has a connection with the condition of daughter of the Persian king who was expected to hold a kingdom, but had less capability (no leadership skills). During that time, a king has an authority over a variety of institutions such as executive, legislative, and judicial bodies. The text says *laa yuflihu* (not to be prosperous) and does not tell *laa yahillu* (prohibited).

the Qur'an was revealed, the fate of women was worst. The Qur'an states that in the era of pagan ignorance, the Arabs killed their daughters.

The Qur'an promoted the status/position of women. However, people misinterpret *qawwamun*, which connotes the prohibition of women from taking charge of leadership. The Qur'an states that a male and a female have equal positions, since "the most honored among you in the sight of Allah is he or she who is the most pious (righteous)." HPPA confirms that the Qur'an entails the difference between males and females, but it does mean that males are superior to females. "*Qawwamu 'ala an- nisa'*" refers to responsibility in the context of household. The male has to be responsible for strengthening the household; therefore the male has to earn an income for eating, housing, and clothing. Both males and females have equal rights but both have different functions. But the majority of people argue that males are superior to females.

Qawwamu was perceived as "leader". *Qawwammu*, according to HPPA, derives from *qaama* and *qawwama* in line with the pattern of *fa'ala* dan *fa'a'ala*, which refers to "persons who take a responsibility to strengthen a household". *Qawwaamu*, which is defined as "a leader, is derived from the way of thinking of the era of patriarchy. " This concept is applied in the public sphere; therefore, a male has more of a right (deserves) to be a leader in both the household and the public sphere than females. Therefore, a female does not have any right to be a leader, like taking charge of the presidency. Extremely stated, according to HPPA, a female has to obey the command of a male though she was harassed and treated unfairly.

The Implementation of gender equality within M's leadership

MA says that M allows women to take charge of the M leadership at the various levels, i.e., center, provincial, district, branch, and sub-branch. Males and females have the right to compete for leadership position. However, a female has not yet achieved the highest position, even though M has opened more room for females as guaranteed by bylaw. According to RH, conceptually, nothing prevents a female from being the M leader, however reality demonstrates that inequality still appears, as indicted by the figures (90 % of leaders are males hold leadership positions and 10 % of leaders are females). M boards in lower level (provincial, district, branch and sub-branch) still resist the idea or the decree of a National Meeting (*Tanwir*).

A gender activist of NU, Mulia (2002: 129-131) comments that M has gone one step ahead of NU (1971) in determining a decision to involve women in the leadership of *Majlis Tarjih* (stated on the guideline of this council), however she was wondering about the actual implementation. Does this council articulate the aspiration of women and assign more women to be involved in the leadership of this council? She argues that M is not vocal enough to articulate the issues of gender. Some women activists of M (Aisyiah and Nasyyatul Aisyiah) complain the situation is very slow. They had better join the activities of Fatayat or Muslimat NU with respect to development of gender issues.

ZQ confirms the opinion of Mulia, saying that M is late to respond to gender issues. Nowadays, M has made some progress in terms of gender, by allowing women to charge

leadership position. YS adds that his brother-in-law, who was on a board of M at the central level, ordered his wife to stop working even though his family is economically vulnerable (got the hardest hit). He says that a woman has to stay home and care for children.

According to HN and ST, the issue of gender has become a paradox (controversial) among the M members. Empirically, M does not have a problem with this issue, since M initiated the women's movement by establishing Aisyiah in 1918, which serves to give more room for women to articulate their potential and interests in the public sphere. However, M has still many members who hold the previous political ideology (Islamic state) and a literalist perspective. Women, according to this group, have to care for domestic works (left behind or becoming the second class). Nowadays, according to HN and ST, M has made a more progressive step—i.e., making decisions in the Bandung *Tanwir* in 2000 as stated on bylaw (ART=*Anggaran Rumah Tangga*), with respect “Aisyiah as a special and autonomous body.” The Bali *Tanwir* produced a decree that women are allowed to take charge of leadership positions in M. However, M has not yet intensified theological discourses about the leadership of women (*a'immatul uza*). Moreover, M does not make a problem out of the female presidency. According to these key actors, those who prohibit women from being president do not make a problem out of it in the sphere of social relation (*muamalat*). Therefore prohibition is not absolute (different from the prohibition of eating pork meat).

5.2.1.5. Criticism and critical groups

A critical attitude is needed to create a democratic society. Any organization shall develop the potential of its members through a variety of activities or programs—such as training, education and the like—so that they become critical members. Nowadays, the younger generations of NU and M have been getting immersed in critical perspectives in understanding religious spheres. How do M people conceive of critical attitude and criticism? How do M people respond to a critical group especially the young generation?

Being critical, according to GL, does not mean that a person says something just for the sake of having something to say. A person has to have a certain basis (argument)—truth. M members have to be critical when M members have to care for any acts against the rules of law, but they have to hold facts (reasoning). Islam prohibits its followers from parroting. To criticize means giving alternative ways for solution. According to Maz, to criticize or explore the weaknesses of an individual is allowed as long as a person is well informed and does not make it public. Critiques are employed to see the weaknesses and advantages of persons for the sake of the public interests or as means of enjoining a good deed and prohibiting wrongdoing (*amar ma'ruf dan nahyi munkar*). Struggling to uncover weaknesses to make the public well informed (in negative way) is prohibited. AH says that Muslims have to be critical of the implementation of public policy. Muslims may use a variety of approaches and media, such as demonstration, protest, and the like; but they have to respect

ethical issues (moral values). For instance, Muslims are not allowed to wreck public facilities or the property of other people while protesting.

As far as I observe criticism against M board is very common. For instance, pak Syaifi'i (the M president) was strongly criticized because he advocated the idea of religious pluralism. The M younger generation has developed critical perspective regarding the study of Islam and contemporary issues such as democracy, human rights, gender equality and tolerance by adopting social and philosophical theories and social movement. The literalist group was suspicious about the younger generation movement. As stated in the Chapter 4, I stated that M was less critical of development issues during the New Order regime (discussed in the chapter 6), Rais was a M pioneer who advocated a critical stance toward the New Order regime. Rais boosted the spirit of *tajdid* (renewal, awakening and reform) through promoting the ideas of social *tawheed* as the basis of the M new vision. At the same time the M younger generation adapted social and philosophical theories as well as social movements to promote intense studies of Islam in relation to contemporary issues (methodology).

Who advocates critical perspectives in relation to religious studies?

As says the M younger generation is engaged in developing their own potential and establishing intensive interaction with people who have different ideologies or perspectives. They have an educational background in the field of Islamic studies. They have great enthusiasm in developing M through promoting academic discourses with respect to Islam (religious thoughts), but they have much less attention from M. They are developing intensive studies on religions by employing a variety of approaches and perspectives—

hermeneutics, social theories and social movements. They intensify critical studies about the Qur'an by employing such critical perspectives as Marx, Habermas, and Gramsci with their commitment to empower people, especially the powerless.

ZQ argues that the M autonomous organizational bodies such as PM (M youth), IMM etc are unable to accommodate the younger generations who were born from the M tradition and have great potential, and so JIMM was founded. On the other hand, there are many younger members of M who are on the board are inactive and have less intellectual capability. The tendency is that M assigns a member of the younger generation who has been established. But M does not pay much more attention to the younger generation who is still struggling to develop their own potential, *alaralung*, (they seem to be out of reach). JIMM serves as a means to promote the intellectual potential of the younger generation who are out of reach of M.

Unlike M, NU has many institutions such as LKIS, LKPSM-NU, P3, Syarikat the like to accommodate the potential and criticism of NU younger generations. NU has become a barometer of Islamic discourses. Actually, M has many younger members who have a potential and critical capability similar to NU's. For instance, Muslim Abdurahaman is M, but he is more involved (in) with NU people, and so is Sobari. Darlis is M, but he feels more at home with the Catholic group. Those potential young generations of M are less accommodated by M.

Critique against critical groups

According to ZQ, critique and critical thinking by the younger generation are tolerated, but those who are most critical have to face high risks, especially those who advocate pluralism. JIMM, as a forum of a critical group, was criticized. They think that JIMM serve as a vehicle of the post power syndrome group who wishes to hold power in autonomous organizational bodies of M, but they were unable to do so. People who disagree with JIMM are often questioning this group by saying” Why are those people advocating pluralism while M has not admitted them? “Why did this group criticize the decree of M with respect to the designation of Amin Rais to be a president? This group has to consult with M while speaking out on the issues in relation to M. If it does not, they have done illegal activities.

As explains that this group (JIMM)⁸² has developed critical perspectives intensively of Islamic studies (using critical perspectives to interpret or reinterpret the Qur’anic commentary). The critical ideas of this group were rejected by the old group who hold tightly the perspective (*ar-rujuu ilaa al-Qur’an waa as-Sunnah*= calling for a return to the pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad). The old group says that M members need not to question *al-Qur’an* and *as-Sunnah*. Developing a critical perspective with respect to religion (*al-Qur’an and as-Sunnah*) connotes doubt about

⁸² Though As was one of the initiator of JIMM, he has made a reflection pertaining to the activities of the M young generation. He is wondering whether their commitment is for the sake of sponsor interests. Perhaps they take benefits from the studies of hermeneutic, social theories, and the new social movement to do a critical interpretation of the Qur’anic texts, for the sake of sponsorship.

the Qur'an and Sunnah. They have broken up the Qur'an. Though As was one of the initiator of JIMM, he has made a reflection pertaining to the activities of M's younger generation. He is wondering whether their commitment is for the sake of sponsor interests. Perhaps, they take benefits from the studies of hermeneutic, social theories, and social movement to do a critical interpretation of the Qur'anic texts for the sake of sponsorship.

HN confirms that some M board and members reject critical perspectives. Perhaps NU has a group who has points of view similar to M's. The conservative group of NU advocated *fatwa* about prohibiting Liberal Islam (JIL) (*haram*). In contrast, other Islamic civil society associations such as M did not do it. According to HN, M lets both liberal and literalist groups develop according their own frames of mind, because no one has the right to devalue ways of thinking (world views) of each side. M has facilitated a dialogue to abridge tension. However, each side sticks to its perspective firmly. So let both groups become control groups for M and let them keep on debating. M gives more room for any group to develop critical perspectives or ideas. M has forums such as the National meeting, *Tarjih*, and the like that may give them room for dialogue.

5.3. Citizenship

5.3.1. How does Muhammadiyah conceive of citizenship

Until now, M has not intensified an academic discourse about citizenship. MM argues that M vision about an ideal society (*cita-cita sosial Muhammadiyah*) is probably identical to the concept of citizenship. The concept of the ideal society advocated by M was first

introduced in the 41st National Conference (*Muktamar*) held in Solo “To venerate and glorify the Islamic tenets in order to establish the excellent or ideal society (*masyarakat utama=ummah fadlilah*), in which members uphold justice and the equal distribution of prosperity as well as the struggle to reach God’s favor.” *Masyarakat utama* contains two main components: i.e., institution and individuals. From the institutional dimension, *masyarakat utama* has to be a social and cultural system, which enables its member to create both material and spiritual prosperity. *Masyarakat utama* demonstrates legal order, safety, and peaceful condition; and respects the rights of members; and upholds justice and the equal distribution of wealth. Each person competes (*fastabiqul khairah*) to uphold *iman* (faith) and keep doing *ibadah* (ritual) good deeds (see also Hasyim, 2000:86-87). Second, in the 44th National Conference (*Muktamar*) held in 2000 in Jakarta, M decided the concept of *khairu ummah* (the best society) as its vision as the development of a previous concept. So the vision of M, according to HN, MM, and As, is stated as follows: “M is an Islamic movement, which upholds the tenets of the Qur’an and Sunnah, commits to developing the spirits of reformation and to doing *dakwah Islam* (Islamic proselytizing) consistently, by enjoining good deed forbidding evil in various spheres of life to create *rahmatan lil’aalamin* (prosperity for all human beings) in order to create a true Islamic society (see also PP. Muhammadiyah, 2000).” According to HN, the true Islamic society is *khairu ummah* (the best society) guided by the Islamic tenets (Ali-Imran 3: 110), being civilized or respecting human rights (al-Isra 17: 70); keeping close relationships with God and humanity (Ali-Imran 3: 112), and upholding equality and prosperity for all human beings (see also Naser, 2001:130).

Though M decided its vision above, M does not wish to create an Islamic state of Indonesia. M, according to HN, has to commit to NKRI (the Unified State of Indonesian Republic). M keeps tightly the NKRI frame in relation to the concept of nationalism for certain reasons: a) M wants public propriety (*masalahah umma*) to be the main objective of the political struggle of any political parties; b) M has to be aware of ‘a new or hidden agenda’ of the globalization proponents, which may be pushed to developing countries into the hegemony of neo-colonialism, so M has to construct the concept of state in order to defend the sovereignty of state, nation, and territories from the intervention of other countries (global injustice). So, M has seen this issue critically in order to construct and develop a state, nation, and civil society in response to the future. However, M has not elaborated this concept in detail.

In the era of *reformasi*, M University of Yogyakarta has made changes toward the concept of civic education. During the New Order of Suharto, this course was subject for maintaining the status quo (abused). The team of civic education has formulated the concept of “responsible citizenship/citizens”. According to AH, responsible citizens demonstrate their willingness to be involved in or take care for problems or issues that arise in this country. For instance, they use and understand their rights in electoral voting. Responsible citizens have critical attitudes.⁸³ By means of critical attitude, according AH, HPPA and HR, citizens

⁸³ AH encourages her students to adopt the practice of democracy for selecting student body such as campaign. Students, according to her, have to be accustomed practicing democratic process and procedures, so that they will not grope. However, they have also to be taught ethical values in manifesting democracy (political process).

have to control or criticize any deviation like injustice, to be conscious of their rights, to respect and tolerate differences, to be politically mature, as well as to be against discrimination, parochialism, and chauvinism.

Citizenship, according to As, refers to people who are committed with agreement or regulation (contractual basis) to run societal life. The “Islamic formalists” insist that *Islamic shari’a* should be institutionalized (formalized), i.e. Islamic state. In contrast, the “Islamic culturalists” argue that M members need not set up an Islamic state, but they have to encourage the holding power (government) to adopt Islamic values in running its governance (to control power). Through social contract, citizens (people) can make them aware that they have to be involved in defending the unity and development of society, and in controlling any deviation. In other words, a social contract makes members of society aware of taking part in the development of society as well as in controlling any deviation.

Responsible citizens, according to N, make up individuals or communities who have rights and responsibilities in relation to the state. People have equality of rights to get better education, economy, and self development, including defending the state in terms of a non-physical perspective. In a democratic society, as stated by According to INA and MM, responsible citizens have characteristics that mirror civilized society such as respect for the rules of law, rights of other and the like.⁸⁴ M, according to MM, has to develop awareness of

⁸⁴ INA argues that Indonesian people were depressed during the New Order Regime for 32 years, now they have relatively more room to express their rights; however, they often break up regulations and ethical norms (abusing the rights of others on behalf of democracy). Therefore, Indonesian people

law to its members (e.g., M members have to be more appreciative and to take initiatives or efforts to make communities aware of the law) as stated in the decrees of Muktamar of Ponorogo, and Palembang.

5.3.2. Loyalty and commitment

“Which of these, loyalty or commitment, has to be developed to citizens?” “How must it be done?” I believe that both commitment and loyalty has been embedded in the concept of citizenship. However, during the New Order of Suharto, the concept of loyalty was elaborated and imparted to the public for the sake of the status quo. The regime often abused “loyalty” to the state to suffocate those who were critical of Suharto, his policies, and the business of his family. The critics were threatened by “subversive law”. In other words, to be loyal to the state is to support the New Order regime. How does M conceive of commitment and loyalty to the state?

Until now, M, according to MM, has not yet formulated the concept of commitment or loyalty to the state. In his book, he states the M concept about social vision (*cita-cita social*), which is assumed to have a connection with the concept of citizenship but needs to be elaborated. MM argues that the state is the product of a capitalist democracy, which might be appropriate for Indonesia. M is committed with imparting social principles, which are supposedly related to the issue of state. INA argues that loyalty or commitment should

have to make an effort to strengthen or make people aware of their rights and responsibilities (equal position between citizens and state).

correspond to the mission of state (not regime or government). Loyalty has to be translated into the equal relationships between state and citizens.

Maz classifies loyalty in relation to social relation (*dunyawiyah*) and to God. With respect to social relation, loyalty might be manifested in various societal elements such as political party, organization and like. Pertaining to *aqidah* (faith), M members have to be committed with God (hold firmly the religious tenets). According to Maz, they have to be loyal to a leader as long as the leader is still keeping firmly the tenets of God. When the leader deviates from the tenets of God, Muslims have to be critical, i.e. Muslims have to struggle for a change⁸⁵.

RH explains that to be loyal refers to establishing mutual relationships between the state and citizens. Citizens become aware of rights and responsibilities. The individual rights are not absolute because a person has to respect the rights of other people. Respecting the rights of other people is a responsibility of a Muslim. In other words, Muslims are not allowed to humiliate the rights of other in demanding or defending our rights. "Being loyal to state", according to BC, requires being critical of or taking control over the state especially when the state or government deviates from the rule of law. A responsible citizen has to keep the state secrecy.

Say defines responsible citizens as citizens who have responsibility or care of social and physical environment. Keeping one's surrounding area clean is an example of people care

⁸⁵ How do we have to make a change? Mar suggests several steps: a) establishing a dialogue or debate; b) making a protes through, for example, petitions, demonstrations, and other activities that are legitimate; and c) contending by heart, which is the weakest way.

of their physical environment. To make a social environmentally tidy, for example, members of society strive efforts to follow rules of laws and to refrain any acts that break up the rules of law such as bribery, breaking up traffic law, and the like. When a person is involved in bribery, or becomes permissive to corruption, he or she has no a responsibility to the environment.

M, according to MM, has a bylaw regarding the rights and responsibilities of a member. M's bylaw provides rules of law concerning what and how members' act, a leader or leadership is assigned (recruitment), members' participation as a right and responsibility. The rights and responsibilities of members and leaders are formulated through the democratic process. However, As., AH, MM and N acknowledge that the rights and responsibilities are not clear or strict as practiced in business corporations, since the involvement of M board and members in M (or locally called *ber-Muhammadiyah*) is more determined by "cultural basis" or social motives. For instance, what direct rate of return can M members get from being M and what do they have to give to M? The most important thing concerns how both M as an institution and its members make meanings for themselves. According to these key informants, being a M member, they got *social satisfaction*, which they considered the most valuable thing.

5.4. Educating for democracy

It is common knowledge that every organization attempts to develop values congruent with the principles of democracy, such as open mindedness, tolerance, respect for

difference, critical thought, and the like. These values or ideologies and attitudes are transmitted to its members through a variety of programs or forums like training, workshops, board and member meetings at various levels and the like. By so doing, each member has the pride of his or her organization or group (personal preference). People will make a problem of it (pride) whenever they do not give room for other people to appreciate and manifest their own ideologies, including pride. The discussion of this sub-section concerns how M people conceive of educating for democracy and how it has been practiced within M.

5.4.1. What do M people understand about educating for democracy?

M, according to MM, develops open-mindedness, respect for difference, tolerance and the like to its members through various activities or forums such as *pengajian* (religious forums), trainings, and board-member meeting at various (*Muktamar, Musyawarah Wilayah, Musyawarah Daerah, Musyawarah Cabang* and *Musyawarah Ranting*). Recently, M through the M University of Yogyakarta, for instance, has been making a radical change concerning how civic education should be taught to students in response to the new era of Indonesia. In addition, some autonomous organizations of M such as Aisyiah, Nasyiatul Aisyiah, and IMM, were involved in education for democracy in terms of people's participation in the formal politics, i.e., voter education. Some M people who have been intensely discussing political issues argue that the involvement of M in voter education and monitoring electoral voting will result in a minimal impact to develop a culture of democracy to general people in the various spheres of life. Therefore, M has to make efforts to elaborate the notions of

substantive democracy, and to promote these substantial values to the Indonesian community at large.

Educating for democracy, according to BC, is the process of making people aware of themselves in order to be trustful (*amanah*). A trustful individual has the courage to take responsibility because he or she is not dependent upon others. Therefore, *amanah* contains in itself independence. Both Indonesian Muslims and Indonesians at large make less effort in their development of independence within the general population of Indonesia, especially in the political process. Educating for democracy is needed for his students in order that they become independent (as a characteristic of maturity). It is hoped that whenever they have done their studies and are to get involved in the political arena, they will become independent politicians.

During the New Order regime, BC adds that educating for democracy, especially political education, made politicians dependent upon others. People were joining a political party, which was assumed to have a large number of constituents and might have won a political contest, though the majority of leaders of that political party did not have a clear understanding and clear agenda with response to promoting the rights of constituents (public interests or prosperity). It is hard to find a politician who is idealistically and consistently developing and advocating a mission, policy, and commitment to developing a community that include democracy in various spheres of life. In Indonesia, both political process and political education demonstrate self-interest fulfillment and money politics. For instance, it is common knowledge that the Golkar convention demonstrated money politics. Each

candidate bribed each participant a certain amount of money (let's say Rp 250 million for a delegate/district) to have a vote in the attainment of a leadership position (BC). Furthermore BC says that those Indonesian politicians do not have sound and clear vision and mission; they were dependent too much upon money in order to win the political contest. Therefore, education for democracy, according to BC, is to make people politically aware and independent.⁸⁶

GL argues that educating for democracy is an effort that enables people (a) to have the capability to make decisions reasonably, (b) to be open-minded and respectful for different ideas, and (c) to commit to establish dialogue and deliberation (*mushawara*) in making decisions for public interests. Educating for democracy shall produce democratic persons, i.e., those who are not only able to speak out about their ideas (rights), but also able to respect the ideas of other people, able to make generalizations and decisions, which will satisfy all sides who are involved in decision-making. In order to produce a democratic person, GL suggest that M has to impart such values with respect to the others; critical and constructive thinking to its members and the community at large. A democratic person makes a critique and gives a solution in a wise way (*al- hikmah*)⁸⁷, which according to Muhammad Abduh, connotes *ilmu shahifah* (knowledge gives benefits for public interests).

⁸⁶ For example, people's participation in the political process is not because of money but because they are aware of their political rights and want changes (betterment) in various spheres of life (BC).

⁸⁷ Stated in -the Qur'an surah An-Naml 16:12-127 "Invites the polytheists to God's Path with wisdom and good council; debate with them only in the presence of neutral onlookers, since this makes for the best and most courteous of debates. Your Lord knows best those who have strayed from His Path and those who have received guidance." "And if you enter into a debate with them and they begin

HN acknowledges that though M has not formulated educating for democracy in a specific formula, M has operated under the principles of democracy with respect to (a) the process of getting a consensus, finding solutions and making decisions; as well as (b) social interaction. In M, democracy is designated to rational thinking in coping with societal problems. In terms of *umrud ad-dunyawiyah* (social spheres of life), M does not have a problem with democracy. M members are to involve all elements of society in making decisions with respect to a social sphere of life and formulating religious understandings.

The decisions of *Muktamar*, according to HN, HPPA, MM, ST, and MA, are processed from the bottom levels: provincial, district, branch and sub-branch. The M board is elected via democratic procedures. The first step is the selection of members of Tanwir (body that will select candidates of national boards of M). The selection of Tanwir members takes its process from the lower level to the province (the procedure takes after the selection system of a senator in America). On the second step, the Tanwir members nominate 39 candidates of M boards at the national level. On the third step, the participants of Muktamar have to select 13 out of 39 candidates of M boards selected by the Tanwir members. This process, according to MM, is a form of educating for democracy. The same process is also applied to select members of the board of Majelis Tarjih and Promotion of Islamic Thought. The selection of members of this council is based on the criteria such as knowledgability of Islam and a discipline of knowledge (like medical, economics, politics, and the like).

to berate you or to act in a way that is threatening, you are free to repel the attack, so long as you do not give worse than you get. But if you practice self-restraint and forbearance it will be better for you.”

In M, according to N, educating for democracy is done through civic education. M had made a change from the orientation of the New Order regime of Suharto into a new orientation toward civic education. It gives more nuances on democracy and civil society (will be discussed later). Unlike Sun and En, they argue that educating for democracy is manifested through people's participation in formal politics, especially the representation of women within the legislative body. The issue of women's representation is important since, during the regime of New Order, women who were involved in the parliament were less proportionate. Out of the total number of congresswomen, few of them were vocal enough to speak out about the rights or aspirations of women.

Educating for democracy, according to ZQ, has to refer to a decree of the Annual M's Board Meeting (Tanwir), i.e., to teach M members how to live in a pluralistic society. For example, ZQ suggests that M members need not devalue the rights or roles of NU members and vice versa. The younger generations of M need not annihilate the role of NU young generations. M has good schooling and has to give more room for NU members to get access to the M educational system, and so does the NU. Both sides, NU and M, have to respect one another.

Educating for democracy, according to BS, is the process of creating good citizens. It teaches people how to know themselves or identity (Who am I?). By good citizens he means the citizens love their country, since loving one's country constitutes faith (*iman*). *Hizbul wathan*, M's boy scouts, serves as a means to teach how students apply the principles of democracy, such as getting familiar with state governance, love of country, respect for

others, and fair-mindedness. By so doing, they know who they are, have fair-mindedness in seeing problems and respecting differences. Nowadays in the political arena, educating for democracy, especially political education, according to BS, was misused by teaching people how to defeat political rivalry by using intrigue.

INA argues that educating for democracy applies the process of making people aware of human rights. That means Muslims have to contend with the fact that Islam advocates and respects human rights. Whenever Muslims uphold human rights firmly, they have done a good deed (*'amala as-saalihat*) because Islam addresses human rights as the basic rights. In addition, Islam not only teaches its believers to defend their rights but also to respect the rights of others. Islam prohibits *zulm*, which means any acts, like injustice and other kinds of human violation, result from transgressing against another person's rights.⁸⁸

5.4.2. The manifestation of educating for democracy (kinds/models)

M has its universities make a change of the orientation of civic education to promote core values of democracy and participatory approaches in running civic education. In addition to its autonomous organizations such Aisyiah (women), Nasyiatul Aisyiah (female), the IMM (M student association), and IRM (secondary school student association) were

⁸⁸ The hadith states “*‘an Abii Sa’iid ibn alik ibn Sinaanal-Khudri radiya Allahu ‘anhu qaala: anna rasulalaahi salallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam qaala: laa darara walaa diraara (rawahu Ibnu Maaajah, Ad-daaru Qutni wa ghairihuma)*” “On the authority of Abu Sa’id ibny Malik ibn Sinan al-Khudri (may Allah be pleased with him) the Prophet of Allah (may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) said: There should be neither harming nor reciprocating (related by Ibnu Majah, ad-Daaraqutni and others].”

involved in raising political awareness of public through voter education; monitoring electoral voting and education for anti-corruption; and promoting gender sensitivity.

5.4.2.1. Civic education

As was among those who strongly initiated or proposed a program for transforming civic education. His idea came from his analysis about the realization of civic education and *kewiraan*, which was implemented in M schools and colleges/universities, but which failed to meet the ultimate goal (promoting democracy in Indonesia). Its failure, according to him, is demonstrated by three issues: i.e. learning materials, methodology, and split personality that occurred in society. With respect to learning materials, he saw that the learning materials of civic education and *kewiraan* did not constitute a discourse of democracy in which this issue has become global. In the previous civic and *kewiraan* education, a militarism perspective was significantly established and this perspective thwarted the development of democracy in society, especially on campuses.

The methodology used to teach civic and *kewiraan* education was adopted from a military institution (*Lemhamnas* = The Institute for National Defense) and in reality was more oriented to creating loyalty of citizen to the government (defending the regime or status quo). He said that Indonesian people found a gap or split personality between what should be and reality. In reality, campuses, including M campuses, demonstrated gaps between the idealism of democracy and reality. Such gaps appear in assigning chairs of schools that avail in a university or the president of university, which was indicated by

defending the status quo (undemocratic process). The same figure appeared in communities in which conflicts between the community and local government could not be disclosed. The local government wished to maintain its status quo by abusing the process of voting. By analyzing three aspects, M has to make a change for civic education with respect to three issues: learning materials, methodology, and the learning environment.

Civic education teaches students to be critical of problems that occur in a community. According to BC, civic education remains experimental, that is, we, M members, are not yet able to see its effectiveness. However, he is sure (*insha Allah*) that civic education has more values than the previous one (during the New Order of Suharto). All faculty members were provided with text books written by those writers who have the spirit of reformation. In addition, the civic education committee trained them in order to get feedback for its betterment. Civic education is designed to be integrated into other courses. By so doing, it is expected that learning materials and approaches will encourage students to be involved actively and to have life experiences. In the long run, the faculty members are expecting that their students will become independent individuals who appreciate their own identities. When they are involved in the political arena, they are expected to be independent politicians who are sensitive or responsive to the problems of their constituents. BC contends that solving political problems requires the involvement of various elements of society: NGO, mass media, research centers, campuses, executives, the legislative, judicative, and military. However, he finds that a person, when he or she has become a congressman or woman, tends to ignore his or her social and political contract with his or her constituents. People have

voted him or her into office for five years, and he or she has become indebted to society. So, he or she has to give a rate of return by struggling to speak out about the public interests through legislative products, i.e., public policies, which are biased for the public interests and control over the implementation of public policies. By so doing, any abuse of power can be prevented. The key actor says that nearly the majority of legislative leaders tend to ignore the mandates of public. The congressmen and women should become immersed in society so they can listen to what people say and need and establish a channel between the citizens and state.

Stages in reforming civic education

As explains that the team at the University of M of Yogyakarta reformed education through several stages. With respect to learning materials, the team invited those individuals who have a variety of disciplines and writing capacity as well as concerns with democracy. The team organized a serial discussion program about issues, which might have to be developed within the M colleges/universities. The team conducted a field study (a feasibility study), its targets being the State of Islamic Universities, the M universities, and schools in the cities of Medan, Jakarta, Yogja, Surabaya, and Makasar. The team was searching for research reports conducted in several countries of Asia in order to enrich teaching and learning materials. The study recommended eight themes that should be developed in the M universities. At the same time, the team made a convention that civic education should make up political education and education for democracy.

From the methodological points of view, the team kept firmly to the principle that democratic values have to be perpetuated to individuals (students) by employing participatory approaches. To get a holistic picture of participatory approaches, As spent his time doing the participatory study on a voluntary basis for one month in the Islamic State University (UIN) in Jakarta, with the emphasis on the application of civic education for a month. The Institute for Community and Civic Education Development (ICCE) of UIN has developed the curriculum of civic education. He found out the curriculum reform has less significant results in promoting the principles of democracy since the faculty members employed non-participatory approaches in the teaching-learning processes. Referring to research findings, finally the team recommended that participatory approaches had to be developed in the teaching-learning processes of civic education. In order to make a change, the team firstly introduced the participatory approaches to faculty members of M University of Yogyakarta who were trained by the Institute for National Defense (LEMHAMNAS)—The Ministry of Defense. Later, the team introduced a participatory approach containing participative learning, case studies, portfolios, and contextual learning, to 350 faculty members of M universities in seven cities.

M universities took several steps to socialize the ideas of democracy (civic education) as follows: first, the M universities have developed learning materials through curriculum reforms. Second, civic education was inserted into the program of in-service learning. About 75 % of students who would graduate had to take part in the service learning program (obligatory). From their observations, students who had done the in-service learning

program were not concerned with promoting the values of democracy to the public, because the university did not advocate this issue through its program in the previous times. The students were merely involved in a practical work, for instance building public infrastructure--rest rooms, renovation of sewer, and the like. The M university of Yogyakarta has provided its students who are going to do the in-service learning program, with the knowledge and skills that may help them to socialize the principles or values of democracy. In Malang, the University of M equipped its students, who were doing in service training programs with skills to reconcile NU and M members (to refine the relationships between NU and M), because the relationship was thwarted after the downfall of President Wahid in 2001. In some districts of East Java, both boards and members of M became the victims of anarchic actions and the psychological violation of supporters of Wahid⁸⁹. Third, the M university of Yogyakarta has infused the principles of democracy into the programs of the student board (student governance).

⁸⁹ After President Abd. Rahman Wahid was impeached by the parliament in which Amin Rais was the chair. Thus, Abd. Rahman Wahid was disposed from his presidency. In some districts of Java such as Banyuwangi, Bondowoso, Gresik, Pasuruan, Situbondo, Sidoarjo, and Tuban, the “NU *umma*” (Wahid’s supporters) got angry with Amin Rais and destroyed such M public facilities as mosques, schools, orphan care, and universities. Some of M public facilities were burned by them. In Pasuruan, Sidoarjo and Situbondo, the supporters of Wahid attacked M schools while students were taking exams and inciting them to psychological violence and traumatizing them. In Banyuwangi and Pekalongan (Central Java), Wahid’s supporters marked red crosses on the houses of M boards and members inciting psychological violence. Abd. Rahman Wahid’s supporters demonstrated anarchic action, which contradicted the era of *reformasi* and the democratic slogan advocated by Abd. Rahman Wahid. M became the victim of political harassment and the politics of violence that did not have a direct relationship with M (Naser, 2001).

Learning materials and teaching-learning approaches and the target

Civic education, stated by As, contains eight themes: civil society, good governance, family values (educating for democracy through families), “people economy”, national identity, the new world order of democracy, human rights, and social relation, including social responsibility. The objective of civic or citizenship education, according to M Council for Higher Education, Zamroni (2003: xi), is to provide students with principles and ethical values (characters) as the new ethic order so that Indonesian people can live in a democratic or pluralistic society. The new ethic of Indonesia, according to MM, entails the ability and commitment of all elements of Indonesian society to establish among themselves a sense of responsibility (care) of building the future of this nation and state, and mutual help and mutual understanding among themselves who have diverse backgrounds such as socio-cultural, political, and religious, so they can live in a pluralistic society. God’s consciousness should be established in the political sphere in order to prevent this nation from power and moral corruption. Political education should be led to develop awareness among all elements of Indonesian nation of upholding firmly values supporting the creation of democratic culture in the various spheres of life for the sake of prosperity for all Indonesian people and the nation’s betterment. (Mulkhan, 2004: 25). In the long run, through civic education, a democratic and civilized society of Indonesia can be created (vision).

The team published a book entitled “Civic Education and Bringing Democratic and Civilized Society into Reality” containing issues as follows:

- a) A Guideline with respect to Islamic lives for M members, i.e., the moral guide or conduct have the tenets of al-Qur'an and as-Sunnah in relation to human kind and God relationships and societal relationships (family, neighborhood, association and society at large, state) as the source.
- b) Civic education and a vision of civil society that constitutes several issues such as the significance (urgency) of civic education, civil society concepts, and the application, perpetuating civic values or civility;
- c) Overview on democracy consists of values or principles of democracy (freedom of speech, freedom of association or participation in public sphere, equality among societal members, gender equality), pluralism, state and society;
- d) good and democratic governance contains good governance, democratic government, presidential election, electoral system, system of political parties in Indonesia, coalition and opposition, role of non-political party organization, mass media, anti corruption movement and autonomy system in Indonesia;
- e) developing core values of democracy to families and community at large entails the rights and responsibilities of citizens, developing Islamic ethics to families and the community at large, preserving principles of gender equality to families and the community at large;
- f) National identity formation encompasses the definition of national identity, national plurality and integration, world ideologies such as Marxism, socialism and communism; liberalism or capitalism; nationalism; feminism; pluralism; postmodernism; Islam; and Pancasila;
- g) The new world order and globalization entails globalization of the economy and its dilemma; politics within the global era; cultural homogenization and reproduction in the global era, conflict and peace; Islam and pluralism, Islam and peace, Islam and perestroika, Islam, justice and societal empowerment, Islam and human dignity, Islam and science and technology, and Islam and individual ethos;
- h) "People economy" covers the concept of" people economy as economic system, "people economy" and business ethics of Indonesia, strengthening people economy, government policies on strengthening people economy, Islam and economic development, industrial relation and Islam, Islamic ethics and individual ethos development; and
- i) Human rights entail history of human rights, areas of human rights, individual rights (rights to live, religious rights, rights for justice, freedom of minds and opinion, the right to work, political rights, historical dimension human rights in Islam, Medina charter, Cairo declaration, human rights enforcement in Indonesia and the role of human rights in strengthening civil society (Ibnu Hamin, Istianah, Nasher, Bashori, Setiartiti, Azhar and Tahuleley, 2003)

INA argues that she focuses her teaching on the issues of human rights by employing various methods such as discussion, seminar, limited observation, and study of the

community at large. The civic values (civility) are, according to As, to be developed within his students by using methods in order to enhance the perpetuation of democratic attitudes in them. Therefore, the values of democracy, or civic values, should be developed by employing participatory approaches. Otherwise, a split personality will occur. Participatory approaches are characterized by student centered approaches; students have to become the source of teaching-learning activities, and dialogue has to be established in the teaching-learning processes. Each student is encouraged to do a study case by among other things, analyzing the literature and newspaper, and by direct observation (field studies). Each student has to reflect a case study and make a portfolio report. The portfolio report of a student shall be discussed in the classroom. Aside from that, the roles of playing, problem solving, and project works are applied in the teaching-learning processes.

Civic education does not only teach the issues about the relationships between state and citizens but also values congruent with democracy that have to be grown up in a community and the principles of new ethics such as tolerance, mutual understanding, respect for differences and the rights of others, trust and discipline. In other words, civic education is to establish 'civilized democracy', i.e., creating an individual or community who has good characters and commitment to promoting democracy (INA, Say, ST & ZQ).

The crucial point is concerning how to sustain civic education, since civic education is by a pilot project; or how are the civic values developed to the whole M members and the

community at large without depending upon a project? Civic education has to be a cultural movement and must be integrated into other programs of M⁹⁰.

5.4.2.2. Voter education

Voter education aims at promoting public participation in the formal politics, i.e. public participation in electoral voting. During the era of *reformasi*, Indonesia has intensified its program to promote the roles of civil society in promoting the process of democratization. This program was supported by the international superstructure agencies such as UNDP, the Ford Foundation and the like. For the short term, education for democracy was manifested through voter education in order to promote community participation in electoral voting. Like other civil societies, M was involved in voter education with the financial support from the Asia Foundation and UNDP.

There are some reasons, as stated by BC, En & Sun why M was involved in such a program. First, the M National Meeting per annum (*Tanwir*) recommended that M members (*umma*) be involved in realizing the national agenda (electoral voting). Second, the involvement of civil Islam is to create fair, quality electoral voting without any harassment.

⁹⁰ Contrary to previous key actors, BS did not agree with civic education (reformation perspective) since the realization of civic education may cause historical moments to disappear. He sees that civic education provides issues that are not integrated into other historical issues of Indonesia. He argues that without the roles of pak Dirman and Suharto Indonesia as an independent nation and state has disappeared. Therefore, civic education with a new perspective shall be accused twenty years later. The downfall of Suharto, according to him, is not because of reformation, but because of the intervention of foreign countries.

Aisyiah has mobilized 8100 voluntary workers who were organized in the national network, which was called JPPR. JPPR consists of 24 organizations including the Research Center of Aisyiah (LPPA) with the main task of manifesting voter education and monitoring, or control of electoral voting. Third, the 2004 electoral voting is different from the previous systems. Fourth, the community or public of Indonesia especially women lack information pertaining to the current system of electoral voting.

The tasks of Islamic civil associations, like M, according to BC, are to train and prepare those who are willing to work voluntarily. BC assumes that voter education has not been institutionally well established, since all sides were involved in this program for the project (the Asia Foundation) or for the sake of short term objective (electoral voting). Islamic civil society associations, NU and M, were involved in promoting community participation in the formal politics (electoral voting). Both M and NU seek to reach the ultimate goal of educating for democracy, i.e., to promote political awareness of the community at large, to dissolve patron-client relationships between the elite group and grassroots, and to prevent the elite group from practicing the abusing power for their own interests. It seems to him that M demonstrates its willingness to conceive of voter education from a comprehensive way, i.e., creating its cadres who are politically literate and aware of political development. The direct system in both presidential voting and DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah=congressman) has stimulated civil society associations to revitalize the potential values congruent with democracy, which used to support community but which were thwarted during the regime of the New Order in various spheres of life. That system

will stimulate the elite of M to develop its model of human resources development approaches and programs, which have to be more responsive to societal dynamics.

For M, voter education, according to RH, serves as a means to develop civic education to the general people of Indonesia, i.e., to be responsible citizens who are willing to take part in societal development. Also, voter education is to enable women to partake in a public sphere, i.e., making decisions for public interest. In addition, to promote awareness of politics among students of M universities, M universities equipped its students who would join in service training program with knowledge and skills needed to give guidance to the community at large with respect to electoral voting and control of their votes.

Voter education Training materials

According to En and Sun, voter education was to promote awareness of citizens of their rights to vote and control their votes. In a guide book, it was stated that voter education provides the community with a) the notion and mission of electoral voting, voters and voter education, and b) the 2004 electoral system that comprises electoral voting, congressmen and women, presidential election and the like, c) people participation or involvement in the control of electoral voting, d) Islam, women and the electoral system, and e) the role of critical participation in supporting free, fair election (LPPA, 2004; LPPA, 2004; JPPR, 2004). For the sake of this purpose, M, according to ST, mobilized (deployed) 70,000 volunteers to lead guidance with respect to the electoral system for all Indonesian voters, especially the beginners (youth). In addition, LP3 of M University of Yogyakarta has

provided a set of books pertaining to civic education for the students of high schools (both private and public schools), and issued a special edition about electoral voting through its Gerbang journal, which were distributed to those schools.

5.4.2.3. Education for political awareness among females (gender appreciation)

Education for gender appreciation was a program with aims at developing the awareness among females of their rights in public spheres such as politics. This program was to equip the female candidate of congress with issues, by which they have to fight for women's rights in the parliament at various levels: i.e., district, province and national (Sun & Nur). This program was manifested for several reasons. In Indonesia the issue of gender equality is subject to be problematic since people of Indonesia respond to this issue in a variety of perspectives. The tendency is that the majority of Indonesia rejects the ideas of gender equality for various reasons, as stated in the previous section. The regime of New Order acknowledged the idea of gender equality, but this regime put the issue on the shelf. Female participation in public spheres, i.e., politics, remains beyond expectation as does their representation in the parliament, as demonstrated by 13 % of the total number of parliament members in 1997. These congresswomen did not play a significant role in fighting for the rights of women as was expected, because the majority of them were assigned under the basis of the crony system. In the era of *reformasi*, the total number of congresswomen decreased, with the figure less than ten percent, but they were better quality than those who were to represent during the New Order.

Several issues, which have relationships with the rights of women, have still been put aside such as mother and child health care, women's labor force, women in the informal sector, harassment toward women, domestic harassment, migrant women labor, prostituous women and the like. In the parliament, there are some bills with respect to gender issues subject to be pending such as bill on women harassment, including domestic harassment, pornography, and the like (Nur). On the other hand, the candidate of congresswomen, according to (Sun), demonstrates a lack of knowledge about issues and mission, which they have to fight for whenever they become congresswomen. The tendency is that the majority of those congresswomen candidates (district level) does not know the issues with respect to gender equality and does not have an agenda to fight for when they become congresswomen. Therefore, education for gender appreciation was meant to provide those congresswomen with sensitive issues that they are to fight for in parliament. It was also an effort to raise awareness, among general women, of the sensitive issues, as stated earlier. By so doing, they would be aware of and responsive to any acts that humiliate the rights of women (Nur). To the general women, this program may enable them to establish a channel with their congresswomen (Sun).

How is awareness of gender equality (sensitivity) raised among women in general (public)?

Aisyiah, according to HPPA, Nur, End and Sun, has a number of religious forums, and the issues of gender equality (sensitivity) are introduced through religious forums by employing such various methods as sharing experience or ideas, dialogue, and discussion about the role of women religious leaders such as the companions of the Prophet. Those forums and methods are used to enable women to speak out about their rights or what has happened to women within their surroundings. Also *Aisyiah* manifests action programs affecting their lives such as a mother child health care program, and small-scale credit so as to make the program of gender sensitivity socialization complete. *Aisyiah* uses 'religious terms' in perpetuating the issues of gender sensitivity to the general women. Women are encouraged to take part in public spheres such as politics, civic associations, or at least a surrounding program which may affect or promote the betterment of the community. *Aisyiah* introduces the theological perspectives with respect to public interest (*maslahah 'ammah*). *Aisyiah* always reminds its members of the idea of KH Ahmad Dahlan, that doing domestic works should not prevent women from getting involved in the public sphere. Both domestic and public works are important for women. Through religious forums, *Aisyiah* advocates the ideas that both female and male have equal rights. Females have the equality of rights to better education, jobs, and the actualization of their potential.

Aisyiah uses mass media in socializing the issues of gender sensitivity through a political appreciation program for women. This program is to explore the perception (understandings) of beginner female voters via dialogue (talk show) for this group. *Aisyiah* established a joint program with private radio stations such as Radio Star FM, Radio

Swaragama FM (Yogyakarta), Radio Polaris FM, Radio Unimma FM, Radio Tidar FM (Magelang), Radio Andalus FM 91.8, RRI, Radio FM 891 (Malang), Radio Gemar Surya, Radio RDN (Ponorogo) to disseminate the issues of gender equality (gender sensitivity) and to build political efficacy and standing points among women (PP. Aisyiah, 2004). The radio talk show program constitutes the issues of politics and electoral voting (election), which were elaborated in the following issues, i.e., female beginner voters, the politics of beginner's voters, critical voters, electoral vote and gender sensitivity. The participants of radio talk show program are female students of M and non-M totaling as follows: 250 persons (Malang), 318 persons (Yogyakarta), 220 persons (Magelang) and 200 persons (Bandung) (LPPA, 2004).

5.4.2.4. Educating for anti-corruption

The anti-corruption movement serves as the follow-up of the M and NU commitment against corruption in Indonesia. Both M and NU consider corruption as acute social pathology in Indonesia (ST and Is). Corruption tends to be unchanged in Indonesia. Data from the International Transparency demonstrate that Indonesia is a country with high corruption. The LP3 of the M University of Yogyakarta proposed a program with emphasis on maximizing the role of religions to mobilize a massive movement against corruption. The LP3 of UMY, together with Yogyakarta Corruption Watch, set up a program involving a variety of religious groups to launch and fight against corruption. A Coalition among Religious Groups against Corruption was founded so that the religious groups could continue to promote a working cultural movement against corruption. The coalition members are

attempting to bring the tenets of each religion to light, and to establish these religious tenets as the foundation for the anti-corruption movement.

The coalition's proposal contains two main spheres: a) formal education, i.e., integrating the themes of anti-corruption into the religious or moral education for college or university students; b) informal education takes a form of trainings to provide youth activists for a variety of religious groups with skills and knowledge needed for advocating the anti-corruption movement via training programs for trainers (TOT). By so doing, they understand what, why, and how corruption can surface over daily life from the religious and judicial perspectives.

The coalition introduces the religious values enforcing anti-corruption to the public via a Friday sermon, mass and other religious events. Common values of religions constitute justice, accountability, responsibility, and trustfulness that have to be developed within the public (the community at large). The coalition contends that advocating religious values with respect to anti corruption may less be effective through those activities (sermons of Friday prayer or mass), since those activities involve one-way communication. Therefore, the coalition members are attempting to establish a close contact with strategic groups in society such as religious leaders, community leaders and the like to establish their commitment to develop a mass movement against corruption.

The coalition is approaching religious leaders for several reasons: first, religious leaders (clerics) advocate religious tenets with the emphasis upon (interpretation), theocentrism, i.e., less relationship to empirical situations that human beings experience.

The coalition members encourage those clerics to elaborate religious tenets in response to human problems. The concept of ritual works or devotion to God (*ibadah*) has put too much emphasis on the relationship with God. The clerics speak with less elaboration on the concepts of evil and *fasad* in relation to social relationships (*muammalah ma'a an naas*). *Fasad* refers to acting corruptly, corruption, violence, oppression or any acts that will devastate the life of a community at large. For example, abusing power to have exclusive control of, for instance, trading cloves in Indonesia (in the hand of family regime) devastated the life of a large number of Indonesian clove farmers who relied on it for their livelihood. It is advisable that clerics introduce the concept of evil, which corresponds to issues of humanity. Evil takes various dimensions, including *zulm*, referring to any acts like injustice and other kinds of human rights violations resulting from transgressing against another person's right. Second, in formal schooling religious education is manifested through transmitting more knowledge about a religion, rather than religious attitudes or religiosity (God's consciousness). The concept of *ibadah* (devotion to God) is more often interpreted (elaborated) into ritual activities rather than social aspects of religion. Or the "social values" of ritual activities are subject to the outreach of religious practices. Islam, for instance, advocates that ritual activities imply social values that each individual has to strive for. This coalition is attempting to impart such an understanding of *ibadah* through schooling. Introducing religious values with respect to anti corruption through schooling and public forums is expected to result in collective attitudes against corruption. Once such collective attitudes may have been established in the community at large, and the anti-corruption movement

will be strengthened and this movement will enhance law enforcement against corruption (LP3 of UMY, 2004).

Activities, materials and skills

The coalition members are doing trainings for various levels. The coalition provides training for trainers with respect to the anti-corruption movement. Each religious group will do the follow up, i.e., advocacy training against corruption. Such trainings will provide those activists of religious groups with knowledge and skills to launch an anti-corruption movement. The training materials contain two major issues: first, the judicial aspect of corruption includes what are corruption, the reasons for corruption, and the impact of corruption on various spheres of life. The second issue concerns how religions play a significant role in developing an anti-corruption movement, and how moral movement against corruption has to be built up. At the same time, the participants (youth activists) are provided with advocacy skills concerning (a) how they have to study public policies in relation to law enforcement over corruption cases, (b) what and how data have to be collected, (c) how corruption cases are to be exposed to the public, and (d) what efforts are needed to prevent corruption. The field work or study is implemented to give more nuances and skills pertaining to handling corruption cases. In the Sleman district, for example, the participants will be encouraged to do field investigation about money manipulation in one village. They have to do field observation, to make interviews with local leaders, including clerics and member of community. Later, they have to make an analysis with respect to the

causes and effects of corruption. They have to do field work for five days. The field work is expected to give life experience in investigating corruption cases.

It is not easy to uncover corruption cases because the information about corruption is usually sensitive or subject to be covered. Therefore, the coalition members are making cases with respect to public policies or devastating public interests a priority. The big scandal of corruption in Jogjakarta is JSC (Jorjakarta Showroom Center) and was discovered by NGOs of Jogjakarta. This corruption involved some congressmen and officials of the local government. Some of those involved in corruption have been brought into the court.

Follow up of training

Those activists who have been trained have to follow up action in each religious group, and have to prepare an action plan for the follow-up. They have to do advocacy training. Each religious group has 300 activists who will be the pioneers of the anti-corruption movement. The coalition selects 25 persons representing religious groups; 25 delegates will have to take advocacy training. These 25 persons will be involved in advocating anti-corruption in each religious group. To sustain this program, the coalition has established networks with NGOs, universities, and YCS.

The coalition will implement five time trainings involving 150 members of cadre for the anti-corruption movement. The training for trainer program with respect to corruption advocacy will be done for 25 participants. Each religious group has to do the follow-up of trainings. This program is finally led to strengthen civil society for the enhancement of the

democratization process. This program is also expected to promote community participation in the control of public policies, including the accountability of public officials (good governance). Control and participation of the community aim at creating equal relationships between society and the state (government) to promote balance of power.

6. CASE 2: NU's CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

In the last two decades, NU was more active than other Islamic civil society associations in promoting theological discourses on such contemporary issues as democracy, human rights, pluralism, gender equality and civil society. NU members interviewed claim that NU has become more focused on such contemporary issues, especially after the NU has restated its position as a social and Islamic civil association (*khittah* 1926) and the younger generation of NU has struggled to transform NU's previously more orthodox perspective toward the ideology of *ahlussunah waljamaah* (*aswaja*).⁹¹

The ideology of *aswaja* contains within it such principles as *tawassut* and '*itidaal* (moderation), *tawazun* (equilibrium), *tasamuh* (tolerance), and these enable NU members to be democratic; NU members appreciate the principle of democracy. Holding firmly to the

⁹¹ *Alussunah waljamaah* contains in itself a variety of notions. It is in opposition to Shi'i, which constitutes Mu'tazilla and Khawariz. Ahlussunah wajama'ah is identified as al-Ash'arinism. It refers to those who consistently follow the tenets of the Prophet Muhamamad and keep on defending its tents in various spheres of human life (Hasan, 2003: viii-ix). Ahlussunah waljamaah as the ideology (doctrine) of NU is defined as *al-i'tiqadi ilaa al-Ushu al Thasalathash* (meaning that NU theologically follows the ideas of imam Al-Asya'ri and al-Maturidy; committed to the practice of one of four schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence (*Fiqh*), i.e., Ash-Shafii'sm, Hanafi'ism, Malikiism, Hanblism; with two schools of sufims, i.e., Abu Hamdi al-Ghazally and Al-Junaidi al-Baghdady) (Lukman, 2004). However, the critical ulamas of NU have transformed the ideology of ahlussunah wal jama'ah into an inclusive notion. Agil suggests that ahlussunah *wal jama'ah* has to be defined as way of thinking in understanding the religious tenets (*manhajul fikri*) in relation to various aspects of human life. It contains in itself the principles of balance, moderation, neutrality (in the area of faith), harmony or societal cohesiveness and justice (Qomar, 2002).

Islamic jurisprudence school of thought (*mazhab fiqyiah*), according to MFM, NU gives more room for local culture to develop⁹². Such an attitude, this key informant claims, enables NU to be more moderate and open-minded than the modernist groups such as M and Persis who advocate the principle of *arruju ilaa al-Qur'an wa as-Sunnah* (returning directly to the Qur'an and Sunnah).

In the political arena during the New Order regime NU members felt alienated from the process of development. The political action of the New Order enabled NU to be more critical of the government's policy NU assumed deviated from the ideas of democracy and independence in relation to state. The "critical movement" has been initiated and advocated by the younger generations of NU who have been fighting for NU to gain a significant role in leading the nation. In order to achieve this objective, NU, according to the NU younger generation, has to transform itself from an orthodox understanding of the NU ideology of *ahlussunah waljama'ah* and *fiqh* tradition, which generated close-mindedness to societal dynamics or ideas coming from outside NU. Contending such a situation, the younger generations of NU have instigated both intellectual discourses, which were manifested

⁹² Aswaja and fiqh tradition is seen as an inner impetus (social capital) for NU members to become democratic. Social capital has various notions. Flap (2004:4-5) demonstrates several notions as follows: Social capital is relational resource, having ties to enable one to have access to their resources, to borrow them, so to speak. The notion of social capital ties in with the classic neo-Weberian core of sociology: people achieve their goals better if they have more resources—economic, political, and cultural—and institutions and other social conditions determine who has what kind of resources and how useful these are. The notion of social capital implies that people invest in each other because networks are instrumental. Social capital has three dimensions—norms and values, network, and consequences [voluntarily produced collective facilities and resources (Newton, 1997

through the reinterpretation of the ideology of “*ahlussunnah waljamaah*” and *fiqh* tradition, and action programs (community development) as the response to societal problems.

This chapter discusses NU members’ conceptualization of democracy, democratic society (includes individual freedom, gender equality, pluralism, and tolerance), citizenship, and educating for democracy. It also discusses NU members’ efforts or experiences, applying these concepts to their organization and programs.

6.1. Democracy

Similar to members of M or Muslims in general, NU members’ conceptions of democracy vary depending on their backgrounds (e.g., the range of their interaction, educational attainment, and other experiences). From interviewees’ conceptions of democracy can be categorized into either substantive or procedural democracy.

6.1.1. Substantive democracy

Twelve of 23 key informants emphasized the idea of substantive democracy. For example, TH says that based on a holistic understanding of Islam and democracy, NU members and Indonesian Muslims should support democracy because democratic practices are in line with the basic principles of Islam. However, he contends that Muslims in different societies will perceive differently the possibilities of constructing a democratic system, depending on their social context. For instance, TH believes that people in Saudi Arabia are less likely to see the possibility of democracy in Islam (*laa demoqratiya fil Islam*) because of the political conditions (a country headed by a monarchy) of that country.

He said we found some Muslim groups struggling to follow this way of thinking (appreciation of different points of view) both in the present and past time. From the history of Islam, we found an ironic example during the medieval ages (Abbasiah). Initially, the Mu'tazilla⁹³ school of thought gave more room (freedom of thought) to anybody. However, under the Caliph al-Makmun (d. 218h/833), the doctrines of Mu'tazilla were recognized as official and were imposed on the population by state acts. Those who were critical of the ruler's ideology might have been considered a *kafer* group (disbelievers) and punished. Imam Ibnu Hambal, for example, was imprisoned for a long time. This case demonstrates how ideas about democracy may be used (inappropriately) in an authoritarian manner if they become institutionalized as the only interpretation recognized by those in power (the state).

⁹³ Al-Mu'tazilla is the name of the great theological school that creates the speculative dogmatics of Islam. The Mu'taziliis advocate five principles or fundamental doctrines (*usuulu al-khamsah*): (a) *al-Tawhiid* (monetheism or uniqueness of God) denies all resemblance between Allah and his creatures; recognizes the divine attributes of God but deprives the real existence (the attributes are not entites added to the divine being; and denies the beatic vision); (b) *al-'adl* (God's justice) means that God is just; all He does aims at which is best for his creation (aslah). God does not desire evil and does not ordain it (*amar/irada*). All human activities result from a human being's free will. A human being has a *kudra* (potentness) and *an istitaa'a qabla al-fil* (having power to do something). (c) *al-Wa'd wa al-Wa'iid* (The promise and the threat) means that a human being will be rewarded for his good deeds and punished for his evil because a human being has free will. (d) *al-Manzila baina manzilatain* (the theory of an 'intermediate state') refers a Muslim committed to grave sin. A sinful Muslim cannot be closed either on 'believing (mu'min)' or on 'disbelieving (kafer)', but belongs to a separate category [intermediate rank or intermediate state], that of the *faasiq* [malefactor]. [e] *al-Amru bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahyu 'an al-munkar* (To command the good and forbid the evil) means that each believer has the obligation to command good deeds and prohibit from wrongdoing (evil) or to intervene in public affairs to uphold the law and oppose impiety. The Mu'tazila derived its name as "*ahlu al-'adl wa al-tawhiid* (the Partisans of Justice and Oneness) from two of five doctrines (Gimaret, 1990; Houtsma et al, 1987; Khadduri, 1984).

NU members (and other Muslims) have different points of view regarding the women role in public sphere such as political arena (political rights). The sacred text is very often used to counterattack the political rivalry. Some years ago, a group of clerics of *Dewan Fakar* (think tank) of P3 (United Development Party) of Indonesia issued a religious decree (fatwa) prohibiting females from holding leadership position (e.g., the presidency). TH argues that issuing *fatwa* conceals political motives of this group (making public opinion to reject any candidate female president). The prohibition of female to charge a leadership position is subject to debate among Islamic clerics.⁹⁴

Four key informants (M, MFM, MM and W) argue that democracy consists of freedoms of thought and expression, equality of rights (*musawah*) and justice (*'adalah*). Equality of rights includes social rights (such as quality education, and health care) and political rights. Justice includes the equal right to better education, economy, politics, and social freedoms. For Fatayat's informants (UM, MU, V and M), democracy is represented by equality of rights for every person including women (gender equality), or no discrimination,

⁹⁴ A democratic Muslim community, according to TH, has to demonstrate its willingness to appreciate different schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence, because this jurisprudence serves as a guide for manifesting the ideas of devotion to God and social relationships. He found out that a Muslim country enforces a policy on the application of one *mazhad fiqhiyah* (school of thought of Islamic jurisprudence): for example, the Hambali school of thought in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, Egypt (Al-Azhar University) teaches students with the subject of five Islamic schools of thought (*al-madzaahib khamsah*) to give more room for the *Shii'* school of thought. Saudi Arabia has prohibited any books that are in opposition to the ideology of the state. This key informant (TH) brought many books from Egypt pertaining to contemporary issues, such as democracy, while doing *umrah* performing a pilgrimage, usually during the non-*haji* season, and omitting some of ritual such as the visit of field of Arafah]; these books were censored and forbidden by the law of immigration. He said "to me the censorship does not have a connection with the mission of science or Islam development, but it does have a strong connection with political interests of the rulers

along with the rule of law. Also, democracy constitutes appreciation of plurality. Islam, according to these key informants, respects the rights of women, as stated in the Qur'an. Democracy, according to MA, connotes the sovereignty of people; this concept is derived from the concept of human being as the vicegerent on the earth (*khalifah fil ardl*). As a creature of God, a human being has a mandate from God to make the universe with all everything in order. A human being is granted rationality or intellect by God in order to develop his or her own potential as well as the universes.

6.1.2. Procedural democracy

Democracy is defined as a political system addressed by a slogan “from, for and by the people” (J and M). It has two faces, i.e., procedural and substantive. From procedural perspective, democracy concerns how government institutions (such as the justice system, courts, and police) function. Islam, according to (MFM), does not have a specific term for democracy, though Islam advocates the concept of *shura*, which provides a foundation for procedural democracy. That is, *Shura* contains basic principles on which democracy depends: 1) freedoms of individuals, including freedom of expression and thought; 2) respect for plurality of viewpoints; 3) equality of rights among members of an organization, community, or society; and 4) commitment by decision makers to follow and respect decisions (agreement). MFM also states that democracy implies justice⁹⁵ as stated in the *hadith* that “*Litakula kullu haqqin haqqahu* (every individual has to be granted individual rights).”

⁹⁵ There are several words used to indicate justice, but the most common in usage is the word *adl*. Several synonyms are the following: *qist*, *qasd*, *istiqaama*, *wasat*, *nasib*, *hissa*, *mizan*. *Adl*

How does procedural democracy work? It is, according to Ban, HH and Muh, demonstrated by participation of people (citizens) to control the state (public policy). Bur, HH, and MFM argue that the role zakat (religious alms giving, as one of the five pillars of Islam) can be maximized as a means of the public control over the state (government), i.e., public policies. NU establishes *shura* (deliberation and dialogue) as tradition for making decisions for both its and public interests as well as leadership recruitment through five yearly board-members meetings at various levels such as *muktamar* (national congress), *muswil* (provincial level), *musda* (district), *muscab* (sub-district level), and *musran* (unit of sub-district) as stated on its bylaw. In addition, NU has a *shura* (legislative) body with

is in opposition to '*jawr*' (injustice). There are several synonyms of *jawr* such as *zulm* (wrong doing), *tughyaan* (tyranny), and *mayl* (inclination), *inhiraaf* (deviation). Literally, the word *adl* is derived from the verb *adala*, which means: first, to straighten or to sit straight, to amend or modify; second, to run away, depart or deflect from one (wrong) to the other (right); third to be equal or equivalent, to be equal or match, or to equalize; fourth, to balance or counter-balance, to weigh, or to be in a state of equilibrium. The notion of *adl* as equality or equalizing is used in the sense of equating one thing to another. This meaning may be expressed either in qualitative or quantitative terms. The first refers to the abstract principle of equality which means equality before the law or of having equal rights, as implied in the Qur'anic dictum surah Al-hujurat 49: 10, that "the believers are indeed brothers." The second, stressing the principle of distributive justice, is perhaps best expressed in such terms as *nasib* and *qist* (share), *qistas* and *mizan* (scale), and *taqwim* (straightening). The notions of balance, temperance and moderation may be said to be implied in the words *ta'dil*, *qasd* and *wasat*. The first, which means to amend or to adjust, expresses the notion of balance; the second and the third, which literally mean the 'middle' or a place equidistant (or midway) between two extremes, may be taken to imply moderation and temperance. These notions of justice are perhaps more finely expressed in the principles of the golden mean. The believers are not only individually urged to act in accordance with this principle, but collectively called upon to be "a nation in the middle" (Qur'an surah al-Baqarah 2: 137; Ar-Rad 13:11) (Khadduri, 1984:6-7").

members of influential clerics, which has a significant power (influence) in the decision making process for organizational and public interest and in selecting leaders.

6.1.3. Democracy and Islam

With respect to compatibility of Islam with democracy, NU members are divided into three categories: accomodationist, rejectionist and in between.

6.1.3.1. Islam is compatible with democracy

All key informants (23 persons) support efforts toward democracy in NU such as voter education, deliberative democracy, gender equality, emancipatory Islam and the like. The leaders of NU such as TH and MFM argue that Islam is compatible with democracy, as stated earlier. Muslims, especially NU members, according to Z, have to look at two dimensions, i.e., the implementation of moral values and contextualization. Islam advocates democracy explicitly and implicitly: i.e., the shura concept. The Qur'an states "wa syawirhum fil amr (refers to command). Muslims need to elaborate the concept of shura into a detailed description, which includes the procedures and mechanism of democracy.

6.1.3.2. Democracy is incompatible with Islam

These key informants (HH, IR, J, M, W, and Z) confirm that NU has its members who reject the idea of the compatibility of Islam with democracy. The reasons are as follows. First democracy is not recognized by Muslims who have standing points against democracy (conservative or scholastic tradition) (from West). They literally hold firmly the ideas

(doctrines) of “*ahlus sunnah wal jamaah*.” Any ideas coming from outside the Sunni cleric works (jurisprudence) of the medieval ages should be rejected. Therefore, we have to ensure that democracy constitutes principles that will generate benefits (goodness) for the community at large.

Second, from the history of Islam, *musyawarah* (dialogue and deliberation) was not proportionately put into practice. For instance, the NU younger generation sees the *fiqh* product (Islamic jurisprudence) demonstrating more of a personal *ijtihad* than a collective *ijtihad*. The *fiqh* rulings were produced to give guidance for the ruling group (*sultan*) to implement its policies and programs in various spheres of life (subject to be authoritarianism), which is against democracy. Muslims, according to the NU younger generation, have not implemented the religious tenets, which are explicitly and implicitly congruent with democracy. Also Muslims have a problem with developing religious (theological) awareness at the empirical stage, i.e., God’s consciousness reflects a commitment to empirical issues (societal problems). Until now, the discussion of religious tenets has been dominated by the theocentric themes for the sake of God’s purpose, whereas the issues, which have a direct relationship with humanity, tend to be neglected. P3M, for instance, is attempting to develop the theocentric understandings by employing anthropological ways of looking at societal problems. This approach is not new nor is it imported, but it is explored from the *Mu’tazilla* school of thought. *Mu’tazilla* advocates the theocentric theology (*at-tawheed*) and justice theology (*al-‘adl*). The theology of justice refers to an understanding that humane justice reflects the justice of God and vice versa

(sociological and anthropological concept).⁹⁶ Ibnu Rusyd used to develop *fiqh* in response to societal dynamics such as the issue of women's leadership. However, his ideas disappeared because of hegemony and the authoritarianism of the rulers.

The third factor has a connection with the implication of the debacle of the Muslim sultanate (emperor) or after the death of Ibnu Rushd, in which the ruler gave little room to study the civilizations of other nations (Western civilization). Such a situation created psychologically inferior complex amidst Muslim society. Such a psychologically inferior complex is demonstrated by an attitude or points of view of claiming 'truth' derived from us (our religion) by rejecting the 'claim truth' of other religions. NU members, for instance, often take their points of view (standing points) as the absolute truth, and at the same time consider the views of M's members to be untrue. Such attitudes by Muslims, including NU members, demonstrate that Muslims are unable to culturally interact with Non-Muslim groups (Society). NU, according to Z, has to be more open (not exclusive) and become more aware that NU cannot be separated from society at large. Thus NU has to establish effective interaction with non-NU groups.

⁹⁶ See previous footnote on Mu'tazila. Khuddari (1984) argues that the Mu'tazila held that Divine Justice is an expression of God's Essence and that He can only do what is salutary (*al-aslah*) to a human being. God by nature can do no injustice. Human beings always endeavors to realize Divine Justice on Earth, but human beings can only do so by means of Reason—a level of justice which is an approximation to and a reflection of Divine Justice and is translated into human acts by a free will (*ikhtiyaar*) for which human beings are responsible. The Mu'tazila's doctrine of Rational Justice constitutes the following principles: (a) rationalism—that justice is determined by Reason, (b) voluntarism—that man's acts are the product of free will (*ikhtiyaar*), and (c) the principle of responsibility—that human beings would be ultimately be rewarded or punished in accordance with his or her choice (Khuddari, 1984: 42).

Fourth, empirically democracy is half-heartedly accepted as the ideology of states in developing societies. Such acceptance has a connection with the views expressed by those countries that advocate democracy such as America, which demonstrates a double standard (injustice) in the world orders (a foreign policy for the Middle East countries) in relation to developing countries, especially Muslim or Islamic countries. Such a double standard confirms the majority Muslim to believe that the project of democracy conceals hidden agenda.

6.1.3.3. Those who have an idea in between the previous groups

This key informant (J) confirms that NU has its members to be categorized into the third group. This group believes that democracy as a political system is the best choice for Indonesia as a nation to which democracy has not been developed. However, since democracy is coming from the West, it does avoid the dilemma (previously stated in the fourth point above). For the Indonesian people especially those who economically and socially are low, the idea of democracy is out of their reach. Therefore, the values of democracy should be elaborated into the local concepts or domesticated so that it could be better understood by the community at large (BE and J). NU, for instance, adopted the ideas of al-Ghazaly in order to introduce the ideas of democracy to both its members and the community at large (this will be discussed later).

6.2. Democratic Society

6.2.1. Conceptualization of democratic society

In general, all key informants define democratic society is wherein the values of democracy (as stated earlier) are functioning. However, different informants emphasized different values or element of democracy. First, some informants (J, MFM, and TH) argue that in democratic society members of society have equal rights (equality). Equality is derived from a fundamental value of Islam, saying that in the sight of God all human beings are equal. Equality implies the ideas of egalitarianism and anti-discrimination. Islam also advocates that individuals have different potential. Such differences in potential do not connote discrimination (negating the principle of equality). A *hadith* states that “All human beings are descended from Adam and Adam was created from the essence of soil. No Arab people are above or better than non-Arab people. It is only piety that makes people honorable one to another.” In democratic society, according to them, achievement has to be the basis for assement of every group or individual regardless of his or her background such as ethnicity, religion and the like. Everyone has to be treated equally and none should have a privileged position.

Second, some informants stressed freedom of expression in characterizing a democratic society. They explained that a democratic society is one in which every individual has room to have different points of view, and there is a willingness to respect the law and criticism (Ban, MM, M and Mu).

Third, other informants emphasized that in a democratic society justice has to be manifested in various sphere of life and every body has to have the right to life. Therefore exploitation among people should be eradicated from various spheres of life (V).

Fourth, another group of informants highlighted that in democractic society, citizens have chances to participate in decision-making in relation to public interests (HH, UM and V).

Fifth, other informants stressed that in a democratic society its members establish mutual understanding or cooperation while acknowledging differences (Ban & Mu).

Sixth, another group of informants emphasized that in democratic societies, citizens tolerate and respect diverse political ideologies and religions (KHJ & MA).

6.2.2. Description of charactristics of democratic society

The sub-section will describe some of several characteristics of democratic society stated earlier: individual freedom, people sovereignty, pluralism, tolerance, ciriticism, and gender equality. According to informants, these charactristics are subject to controversy among the NU members and the Muslim umma.

6.2.2.1. Individual freedom

The key informant (J) considers this issue to be problematic. Islam, according to him, advocates freedoms for individuals; however, Muslim society is often prejudiced against the issue of freedom, especially in relation to democracy. People are worried about individual freedoms since they assume that such will lead to anarchy, disorder and destability. The

regime of the New Order advocated the idea of freedom with responsibility. Muslims often say that Islam teaches freedom. However, they argue that freedom 'has to be limited (for instance by responsibility), which does not leave enough room for individuals to be independent and responsible human beings. In Muslim society, the concept of individual freedoms is always guided by the religious norms since Islam supposedly has more legal norms than other religions. The majority of key informants such as (Bur, M, MA, MFM, MM, Mu, KJH, and TH) agree with J who states that God's rule and the protection of rights of others will limit freedom of an individual. According to those key informants, Muslims are not allowed to use rational argument to contradict *wahyu* (revelation).

Even in practice, the idea of modernization of Islam, according to J, was often elaborated into closed mindedness (thwarting individual freedom). For instance, Abduh advocated the idea of modernization of Islam in terms of Islamic purification achieved by calling for a direct return to the pristine ways of scripture (*ar-rujuu' ilaa al-Qur'an wa as-Sunnah*), i.e., giving more room for individuals to do *ijtihad* by developing freedom of mind or thinking (rationality or *ra'y*). However, his idea was often reduced to perspectives based on *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence schools of thought) based perspectives (reductionism). *Fiqh* provides people with room for debate, but it does not provide sufficient freedom. The *Sunni fiqh* was developed from the tradition (interests) of the rulers (kings or *sultan*). When a regime released a *fatwa* (religious decree) pertaining to civil liberty, this *fatwa* concealed an agenda to limit the rights (freedoms) of individuals. *Fiqh* makes us doubtful (scared) when Muslims come across contemporary issues; i.e., Muslims are always embeded in the issues of

halal (permissible), *haram* (prohibited), right or wrong, sin or evil and *ajr* (reward from God), and paradise or hell. So Muslims always encounter a problem when they come across such contemporary issues as democracy, human rights, pluralism, gender equality and the like, because they do not have genuine freedom similar to those people from the West. By genuine freedom, according to him, people of the West become fully responsible human beings because they do not have rigid rules.

How is individual freedom practiced within NU? All informants claim that the Aswja ideology and *fiqh* tradition give more room for NU members to respect individual freedom (opinion and expression). NU shows its great appreciation to its clerics. Organizationally, NU establishes a *shura* body with its membership of influential clerics (a privileged position). In addition, anyone has individual freedom including criticizing clerics as long as he or she has paramount knowledge to the clerics. The NU younger generation members have transformed its orthodoxy, since they contend that patrimonialism might have thwarted democratic attitudes. Even some NU younger generation has been involved in liberal ideas (liberal Islam) and their ideas were rejected by the NU older generation through, for example, releasing a *fatwa* to consider the liberal group *kafer* (disbelievers) (HN).

6.2.2.2. People's (individual's) sovereignty

With respect to this issue, key informants (M, MM, MA and TH) refer to the concept of *khalifah fil al-ard* (vicegerent on the earth); a human being has temporary sovereignty

because only God has the absolute sovereignty. A human being is granted a mandate (*amanah*) by God to organize this universe, including human beings (theocracy).

In contrast to these key informants, J refers to the NU experience in the political arena during the New Order regime. According to him, popular sovereignty is defined as the restriction of the dominant role of the state (government) in the political arena by means that people have to make decisions for making changes (betterment). For the NU *umma*, popular sovereignty means to end the state repression of the people.⁹⁷

6.2.2.3. Pluralism

According to the *Fatayat Journal* (2003 and 2004), NU is rich in traditional assets and more responsive to diverse religiosity than the modernist group that advocates the spirit of Islamic purification based on a return to the original Qur'anic texts (*rujuu ilaa al-Qur'an wa as-Sunnah*). As J expressed it, the modernist group often elaborates the idea of modernization into the concept, which produces a simple-minded view, making individuals see the religious issues simplistically, in black and white, *haram* (prohibited) and *halal* (permitted), good and evil—no gray anywhere. In contrast, NU people, such as the

⁹⁷ Although not officially stated, NU felt alienated from the Indonesian state during this period in the following ways: a) NU was not involved in the process of development; b) the process of development was escalated, and those parties who were not ready or late to take part in the modernization process were left behind. From the perspective of many NU members, Suharto did not employ participatory development approach and the state development was oriented initially toward economic growth and stability and only later to a growth and equity model. Moreover, many NU members perceive that a large number of *umma* was being left behind.

founding fathers of NU (e.g. *hadhratus syeikh* Hasyim Asyari), tend to be tolerant of the attitudes and actions of diverse religious believers. An illustration of this is provided in the 1937 NU National Conference (Muktamar) speech by KH Hasyim Asy'ari:

... I was well informed that you were involved in sedition, mockery, and hostility toward one another. You were involved in quarrels ... Oh, clerics who were persistent to keep tightly an (Islamic jurisprudence) school of thought! Let's throw fanaticism about *fiqh* issues (*furuiyyah*) away, because all clerics have diverse ideas (opinion) about *the fiqh* issues and have many ideas or understandings (quoted in MHB, 2003:5).

All NU interviewees, except J, state that most NU members define pluralism as respect for diversity of God's creatures. Religious pluralism refers to the acknowledgement of rights of other believers (diversity as *das sain*). For J, pluralism constitutes a deeper notion than tolerance. It is defined not as only the recognition of the existence of other people but also encouraging a person to understand or recognize the concept of the religion of others. Genuinely, people have to become immersed into the concept of a religion, so that they have an understanding that the truth is universal meaning each religion has its own truth.

Such a genuine concept of (religious) pluralism for Muslims including NU members, according J, will be problematic because contextually pluralism assumes several conditions. First, pluralism assumes that truth is universal. It is problematic for Muslims that other religions have truth (truth claim).⁹⁸ The study of religions demonstrates that religions of the Eastern Asia (Oriental) tradition are more pluralistic than the religions of Western

⁹⁸ Some younger NU generation members advocate a radical perspective of pluralism saying that truth is not single (universal), which means every religion has its truth (truth claim) as stated by key informants (MM and M).

(Occidental) tradition. The religions of the Western tradition are singularistic or monotheistic, such as Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Therefore, in Eastern religions there is less conflict over religious tenets and social ethics than in the Western religions such as Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.

Second pluralism assumes that the differences between religions are not a matter of truth and falsehood, but of a different perception of the one truth (see Kuhle, 2003). When we acknowledge the truth of other religions, they cross the border of *aqidah* (being an idolater, disbeliever or apostate), and that issue is a serious one for Muslims. As an activist of ICRP (Indonesian Coalition for Religious Pluralism), J is much bothered with the effect of this opinion. The NU informants KHJ, MA, MFM, and TH and a chair of the NU *shura* body such as Siraj confirm that *aqidah* is the fundamental aspect of religion to which each religious group is not allowed to break. So, Muslims need not get immersed in syncretizing (heterodoxy) (see also Qomar, 2002; Siraj, 2004). Therefore, many Muslims, according to J, are still afraid of establishing dialogue with other religions in order to understand or recognize other religions or religions of other people. They keep a principle of safety, i.e., Muslims including NU are not to bother one to another⁹⁹.

⁹⁹ J argues that people had better address the issues of the social contract such as participation in discussing the bill of law with respect to Harmony among believers (RUKUB = *Rancangan Undang-undang Kerukunan Umat Beragama*, which was initiated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs) than getting involved in understanding the concept of religion of others. According to J, this bill will fence off the relationships among diverse believers. Therefore, we have to try any effort to develop a better understanding among people of Indonesia

In general, according to J, on the surface of daily life, NU members do not have a problem of pluralism. However, there are still many Muslims who reject the idea of pluralism especially those clerics teach Islam in pesantren and *majlis ta'lim* (community religious forums) and have less access to contemporary issues such as pluralism.¹⁰⁰

6.2.2.4. Tolerance

All key informants say that the NU ideology as stated earlier contains the principle of *tasamuh* (tolerance) which is important for the establishment of a pluralistic society. These key informants (KHj, M, MA, MM, and MFM) define tolerance allowing equal room to others to develop their own potential. In the area of religion, tolerance means giving the rights of other religious believers to exist. Exclusivism, according to MFM, is natural since each religious group has a personal preference for embracing a religion. But we need to make room for other believers to live. Therefore, it is not easy for a person to be inclusive while maintaining his or her own identity (acknowledging universalism of truth while defending 'my personal preference or pride'). To be inclusive person, he or she has, for instance, to live in a pluralistic society and interact with diverse groups.

¹⁰⁰ According to J, a person will become more pluralist whenever he or she has experiences of a "spiritual" (real) life. A person who lives in a pluralistic society will become more pluralist than one who lives in homogenous surroundings. Introducing the ideas of pluralism thorough panel discussion, seminar or publicatation per se will be less effective. J encouraged his students to establish a dialogue and asked every student to write a paper concerning the tradition of religions, i.e., a Muslim student has to write the tradition of Christainity, Hinduism, Budhism, or Con Fu Cionism. A Christian student has to write the tradition of Islam, Hinduism, or Budhism, and so forth. By so doing, they are ecourged to learn or ask his or her friends who have different religious background about the tradition of religion. His students might have done this work by feeling a state of being forced.

Tolerance has been workable in our society, stated by Ban. Although in general NU has been tolerant toward other religious believers (Bur and Ban), some NU members seem not to tolerate other religions because they engage in proselytization (*dakwah*). But this issue is less serious for NU members than for M or Persis' members because the mass bases of NU live in rural areas. According to Ban and W (see also Siraj, 2004), relationships between NU members and non-Muslims have become better due to the inputs of NU's younger generations. The NU members have to uphold a basic principle of Islam, *lakum diinukum waliya diin* (to you is your religion to me is my religion) and the acknowledgment of the existence of *ahlu al-kitaab* (people of the book), *Thabiin*, and *Majuz*; as to build up mutual relationship or cooperation with non-Muslims. NU has been involved in inter-religious coalition, and some of its members have been engaged in interfaith dialogue. Regarding social relationships, in general NU members tolerate. However, many NU members argue that the following activities "Going to church for dialogue and saying Merry Christmas" remain sensitive.

6.2.2.5. Gender equality

Similar to pluralism, gender equality is still a 'sensitive issue' for NU members and others in Indonesia (UM, MU and J). Islam, according to MFM, advocates gender equality with respect to doing good deeds (*amal saleh*). Islam does not make a distinction between males and females. As stated in the Qur'an "Whosoever does good deed, either males or females, Allah will reward him or her." However, he sees that one side (male) has a degree

over another side (female). He acknowledges that both males and females have different rights and responsibilities representing a division of role. This idea is held by the majority of NU members.

The NU National Conference (*Muktamar*) issued a decision to include women in the NU leadership, and such a decision, according to J, was established by a compromise between the rejectionist group and the proponents of gender equality. In reality, J adds that this decision was halfheartedly accepted by the NU members (both the NU younger and old generations). For J and fatayat informants the *fatwa* of some NU clerics indicates that NU has half-heartedly accepted gender equality. In NU activities, it is apparent that women are usually assigned much more frequently to the positions of treasury or secretary than to public relations. Women are hardly found out at the NU forums. Though NU has female autonomous organizations, Muslimat and Fatayat; the boards of NU *tanfidziyah* (executive) as well as *shuriah* are dominated by males to this day. Gender equality has been accepted much more as discourse (idea or elitist) than practice (still far away) (J).

Debatable issues

Though the NU National Conference issued a decision with respect to gender, NU members still debate several issues with respect to gender equality. The issues pertain to the concept of *qawwamuuna* and *darajat* (a male has a degree over a female), and the role of females in the public sphere or women's leadership.

Males' superiority to females (*Ar-rijaalu qawwamu 'ala an-nisa*)

MFM recognizes that the interpretation of scriptural text (the Qura'n and Sunnah) has been mostly dominated by male biased interests, and such interpretation has interfered with the rights of females. The cleric interpretation of the following verse from Qur'an is to legitimate the idea that males are superior to females (has degree over a female or a female is in the low position in various spheres of life) "Male has a degree over female (Qur'an Al-Nisa 4: 34). The clerics interpret *qawwamuna* as leader, and such interpretation does not sound good (see also Qamar, 2002: 207). *Ar-Rijal* (male) means have the responsibility to empower the female. If males do not go to work (care domestic works), they will be considered irresponsible. MFM said "I think women do not like such kinds of male" and "males do not like females who take charge of economic aspect of household". It is natural. According to MFM, females are not prohibited from engaging in a public sphere (like economy) as long as their engagement is not just for the sake of material (property). If getting material is the ultimate goal, he said, females will disgrace their own values, because women are vulnerably subject to economic exploitation. Women are engaged in a public sphere in order to promote or articulate their self-potential. Women are permitted to get a rate of return as a result of their engagement in a public sphere.

UM and M from Fatayat-NU argue that *ar-rijaalu qawwamuuna 'ala an-nisaa* as stated on the Qur'an has a connection with the household affairs. The male takes charge of the household, but he has to establish a dialogue with his wife in order to make decisions for his

family. Fatayat-NU sees that the male has a degree over female in terms of protection. “Male has a degree over female” does not mean that a male can act what he wishes (despotically) such as harassment of his wife. Therefore, Muslims have to see other verses of the Qur’an saying that *washaarihuu hunna bil ma’ruf, hunna libasul lakum wa antum libasul lahunna*. (... You must treat your wives with kindness and compassion and in a way that is conducive to the smooth running of the household and society at large...). *Ar-rijaalu qawwamuuna ala an-nisaa* (Men are the protector of their women ...) does not automatically mean that men are superior to females. There is *al* (or definite article or the in English) in the word *al-rijaalu* indicating certain males, not males in general (conditions). *Al-rijaal*, or the males, refers to those males who have fulfilled a condition or gotten a degree from Allah (*fadhala Allah*). Should a male who is not knowledgeable about religious affairs be responsible for that matter over his wife who is more knowledgeable than her husband? In a case, where a female is economically productive while her husband is unproductive, who among both sides has to take responsibility for the economic affairs in the household? In addition, Muslims have to understand another verse of the Qur’an such as ... *mawwadatan warahmah* (to establish harmony in a household) and to establish a connection with this verse. As the leader of a household, a male has to be responsible for creating a harmonious household.

UM and MU have a similar idea to Fatimah’s, a female NU activist, arguing that *qawwamu* implies several meanings such as ‘companion’, ‘guardian’ or ‘guarantor’ in terms of functional roles. *Qawwamu*, Fatimah adds, has to be defined as a commitment to, care of, protection of the rights and needs of a female. Equalizing *qawwamu* with the world

“*pemimpin* (a leader) in Bahasa Indonesia is not appropriate, since this verse was related to a household case that was complained to the Prophet; this verse was revealed in response to it. In addition there is the word *ba’dl* serving as “*muqayyad*” (explanation) indicating the criteria for being a leader. A leader, according to the Qur’an, has to have a degree over the masses such as intellect, leadership and the like. The phrase *ba’dluhun a’la ba’dl* refers to a degree, which refers to general human kind (could be either male or female). The classical commentary (interpretation) of the Qur’an demonstrates that the male has a degree over female physically and intellectually. The classical interpretation of the Qur’an was influenced by the socio-cultural setting at that time (patriarchal era). In fact, this interpretation contradicts the reality in the current situation where women are able to hold a role that was dominated by males (Fatimah, 2004: 15). In addition, Muslims, according MU, have to uphold the general principles, which are stated in the Qur’an, i.e., both male and female have equality of rights (Qur’an surah An-Nisa 4: 1), the degree of piety is a significant determining factor in the eye of God (Qur’an surah al-Hujurat 49:13); and the rights of an individual have to be protected/respected (Qur’an surah al-Isra 17:70) (see also Natsir & Abd. Kodir, 2004).

Women’s leadership

The issue attracted a heated debate, especially prior to the presidential election (July 4, 2004); a group of NU clerics who are politically affiliated with PKB (The Awakening Party) issued a fatwa about the prohibition of females from holding leadership (presidency).

With respect to women leadership, the NU members are divided into pro and con. KHJ is among the proponents of a cleric fatwa. He upholds firmly to the *hadith* “*la yuflihu qawmu walla amrahu imraatan* (the belief that a nation or society will not be prosperous whenever it hands public affairs over to a female) and the opinion of *fiqh* clerics who prohibit women from taking charge of leadership roles. For instance, *fiqh* has demonstrated that a female is not allowed to lead prayer.

Four key informants from Fatayat NU (UM, MU, V, and May) do not care for this debatable issue. Fatayat-NU contends very much that both sides, pro and con, have their own references and interpretations. According to them, whosoever wishes to be a leader shall meet certain criteria, Fatayat NU has identified a basis for the sacred text regarding the allowability for female to hold a leadership position. UM, MU, V and May argue that women deserve to hold the presidency as long as they are able to fulfill the criteria (conditions) such as capability, trustworthiness and leadership skills. In a community there is a woman who has a degree over community members (has attained high educational attainment such as DR); she is more eligible to be a leader of the community than others.

MFN says that a woman is allowed to hold a leadership position as long as her involvement is for promoting or articulating her potential. Trying to show his neutrality, MA argues that whoever advocated the idea that women should be allowed to be president is based on the Islamic tenets pertaining to a worldly affair (*muamalah ma'aa an-naas*). To the worldly affairs, Islam encourages its followers (male and female) to compete, in terms of good deeds (*fastabiqul khairah*). An NU leader such as Siraj (2004) adds that the NU *shuriah*

national meeting (Konbes = Special Congress), held in 19 March 1957 in Surabaya, issued a decree that women were allowed to engage in legislation. The 1961 NU National issued a decree that women were allowed to take charge of village leadership. The 1996 National Meeting of NU Clerics (Munas Alim Ulama NU) issued a decree permitting females to hold leadership in various spheres of life.

The sacred text (hadith), which is used to prohibit women for taking a leadership position, does not expose a word “*laa yahillu* (not permitted or prohibited) instead using the word *laa yuflihu*. *Laa yuflihu* derives from the word *falahaa*, *yuflihu*, referring to unsucces. So the scriptural text (*hadith*) does not tell us ‘prohibition’. The text of *hadith* serves to give more information (*khabariyah*) than prohibition (*nahyi*). From the point of *asbabul wurud* (the occasion of narration), *hadith* was to respond to the wish of the Emperor Kisra from Persia who would have handed his leadership over his daughter who was not mature or did not have leadership capability. It was in a connection with a Persia emperor whose responsibilities included legislative, executive, judicial, war and the like. In addition, the integrity of *rawi* (narrator) of this hadith, Abi Bakra’s integrity, is doubtful (unbelievable) (MFM, see also Fatimah, 2004: 7; Marcus-Nasir & Abd. Kodir, 2004; Siradj, 2004)).

MFM wonders whether both females and males have precisely similar capabilities as demonstrated, for instance, by the academic attainment of female students. He wondered

whether or not a female who has high IQ can be successful in the arena of politics. IQ can contribute to the successful leadership to only 30 %.¹⁰¹

6.2.2.6. Criticism and being critical

Being critical and having critical thinking constitute the characteristics of democratic society. For instance, TH defines criticism as the utilization of rationality ¹⁰²to determine truth. Whosoever is criticizing other people for fulfilling his or her interests by neglecting the rights of others, she or he might not have been critical.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ For him, this means that both sides, male and female, have different capability one from another. With reference to verses of the Qur'an *walil ar-rijaali alahinna darajaat* (males are superior to females), and *wala tatamanaw ma fadh-dhla Allah ba'dluhum 'alaa ba'ld* (Don't you imagine that God has granted an advantage to one group (males) over another group (females)), the key informant is questioning the idea that both males and females have a similar capability. Or is it true that psychologically, physically, and socially both males and females have precisely equal capabilities. Anyone can have such an opinion, but the history of human beings has not demonstrated yet that females have similar capabilities to males. Does a difference between males and females mean that one group is superior to the other? So, let's prove this statement, whether it is right or wrong. Is the statement of Qur'an "*ar-ijaalu qawwamu a' alaa an-nisai* (male has a degree (superior to) over female) needs to be subject to ideological, sociological, and empirical evidence in order to be proved.

¹⁰² A critical thinker has characteristics as follows: willingness to engage in and persist at a complex task (hard work), willingness to plan (he or she must become habitual approach that is applied in many different contexts), flexibility or open mindedness (she or he demonstrates a willingness to consider new options, try things in new way, and reconsider old problems), a willingness to self-correct (he or she has willingness to learn from errors instead of becoming defensive about them), being mindful (develop the habit of self-conscious concern for and evaluation of the thinking process), consensus-seeking (to find ways to compromise and to achieve agreement. Consensus seeking is not meant to imply conformity; rather it requires the ability to persuade others that a particular response is the right one in a particular situation) (Halpern, 2003: 196-199).

¹⁰³ The key informant is taking an example of dialogue between the Prophet and his companions as follows... The prophet said that "by the end of epoch, you will find something strange like this and like that?" The companions asked him "What shall we do whenever it happens?" " You have to do this." The companions asked again "Is there a possibility we can do it?" For this key informant (TH) ,

All key informants believe that the Qur'an encourages its believers to think critically. As vicegerent on the earth (*khalifah fil alardl*), a human being is granted intellect, or rationality, and other capacities so that he or she can be critical. In addition, NU members claim that NU has inner impetus (e.g., *fiqh* and *mujadalah*¹⁰⁴) to support the development of criticism among its members.

However, NU members tend to defer to clerics' authority with respect to knowledge,¹⁰⁵ and tend to have conservative understanding about the NU ideology and *fiqh* (the authority of jurisprudence in the medieval age). Such orientation might have generated an uncritical attitude.¹⁰⁶ The conservative understanding about the NU ideology and *fiqh* are not conducive to critical thinking. I am seeing that the NU's younger generation, according to HH, IR, Mu and W, has developed critical thinking of the NU *umma*. Their efforts

such questioning mirrors both consciousness or eagerness and efforts to seek the truth. The companions were very critical of the Prophet

¹⁰⁴ NU has established *mujadalah* (public debate) as tradition in pesantren to promote critical potential of santri (MFM & MA).

¹⁰⁵ Interruption or criticism against kiyai is considered as *suuul adab* (morally unethical). However, in other pesantrens kiyais are strongly encouraging santri to get much involved in dialogue (discussion) (J, HH and TH). These key informants (BE and MA) argue criticism and freedom of mind are allowed within the NU tradition, but members have to meet a certain condition, i.e. people have to own profound knowledge.

¹⁰⁶ Such an uncritical attitude, according to TH, is established for two reasons: first, clerics have strong charisma over NU members and they strongly value ulama. The tendency is for the NU *umma* to follow what clerics say because they assume that only the ideas of their clerics are the righteous (as dogma). Second, it assumed that they lack information so they are unable to get other alternative information (as comparison).

involve a reinterpretation of the scriptural understanding in response to societal dynamics¹⁰⁷ and the political awareness of the NU *umma*¹⁰⁸(see subsequent discussion).

6.3. Citizenship

With regard to this issue, I did not find special conception from key informants. All key informants refers to ideal society (the NU vision), i.e., democratic and just umma, who adhere the principles of NU ideology (Aswaja). All NU members interviewed agree that basic principles of Aswaja, such as *tawasuth*, *tasamauh*, *i'tidal* (justice) *amar ma'ruf* (enjoining good deed) and *nahyi munkar* (refraining wrong doing), which are stressed in the Qur'an, serve as the bases for defining what a good citizen is. *Tawasuth* and *i'tidal* demonstrate moderation with the emphasis on justice for all and refraining from adopting extremes (*tasarruf*) in views and actions (see also Lukman, 2004). *At-tawazun* demonstrates the attitude of 'in between position' (balancing) by which the NU umma has to struggle for their rights and commit to duties as citizens of the state. NU, according to M and MM, has a code of conduct which is used to lead the NU members in relation to the state. It is formulated within the concept of

¹⁰⁷ The progressive the NU *ulama* (clerics) have attempted to reconstruct the understanding of theological norms. They made a change of their perspectives from theo-centric to anthropological ways of thinking. Islamic concepts, which were put too much on a theo-locus, have to be interpreted and practiced in terms of anthropological dimensions. In Islam any ritual devotion to God (*hablun min Allah*) contains in itself social dimensions (*hablun min an-naas*). Muslims are strongly encouraged to strive any efforts to manifest the social dimension of ritual devotion into reality or life (Z and see also Lukman, 2004: 92-93).

¹⁰⁸ NU umma participates in the control of the implementation of public policy at local levels (village, sub-district and district). The NU members have to uphold the principles of serving the public interests (*mashalihu umma*) as a means for assessing the government policy and implementation (HH, MM and IR).

ukhuwah wathoniyah. According to the NU code of conduct, the NU members have to commit to rule of law and the unity of Indonesia, to be dedicated in their actions to serving public interests. Also all key informants say that NU has a bylaw to regulate the relationships between board and members, as well as leadership recruitment. Similar to M key informants, NU interviewees argue that people's involvement in NU is based on the spirits of voluntarism, competing for good deeds and social satisfaction.

6.4. Educating for democracy

For NU, educating for democracy concerns how NU transforms itself from the orthodox understanding of its ideology and *fiqh*, disseminate the ideas of moderate, inclusive and emancipatory Islam to the community at large, promotes political awareness among NU members and community at large in formal politics (electoral voting) and public policy at the local level, and develops such democratic values as freedom, justice, equality, justice, respect for plurality to both NU members and the community at large (Bur, HH, IR, J, IR, LNS, M, Muf, MU, UM, V, W, & Z). NU has attempted to do a variety of things in this regard, as will be discussed in the following sections.

6.4.1. Transforming ways of thinking of kiyais

This program has been initiated and organized by the NU's younger generation through autonomous bodies of NU such as Lakspesdam including fatayat and NU-NGO (P3M). NU's younger generation believes that the orthodox understanding about the ideology of *Aswaja* and being blindly obedient to the authority of classical work of clerics of

the medieval ages has generated close-mindedness of the NU members. NU has to transform the ways of thinking of orthodoxy (the ideology of *ahlus Sunnah* and *fiqh*) to be more open (rational) before it introduces the idea of democracy to the community at large, as stated earlier.

Why does NU need to transform itself from orthodoxy? NU has established *fiqh* as tradition and NU members argue that *fiqh* is derived (developed) from the Qur'an and *Hadith*. *Fiqh* which is usually introduced to the NU *umma* is conventional and emphasizes issues about personal affairs (*ahwaalu sakhshiyah*) and ritual devotion than societal issues such as human rights, gender equality, and the like. The majority of NU members identify classical works (*kitab kuning*) as an ideal type of personality; such perceptions make NU members closed to any different perspective. Also NU's younger generation contends that Islam contains some tenets that can be interpreted as being in opposition to the ideas of democracy. For instance, verses in relation to *jihad*, individual freedom and exclusivism. Moreover, the *kiyai* (clerics) plays a more significant role than rationality and reasonable argument in making decisions. Such a role has drawn *kiyais* into authoritarianism, since the followers are fond of extolling their *kiyais* and become blindly obedient to *kiyais*. *Kiyais* are like kings of "pesantren kingdom", the followers (santris) consider the speech of *kiyais* as "regulation or law", which binds them (BE, HH, IR, J, M, MM, TH, W and Z and see also Qomar, 2002: 88).

PPWK, according to MM, M, HH and W, is to provide the younger generations of *kiyai muda* who are willing to take on leadership roles using methodological and ideological

nuances in order to make them responsive or open to contemporary issues. This program provides *kiyai muda* with notions or understandings about the pluralist theology and *shariah*, social analysis (theories), and other contemporary issues.

According to IR, this program serves as the elaboration of three missions of NU in relation to the development of Indonesian society: i.e., *ukhuwah islamiyah* (relationship among Muslim), *ukhuwah bashariah* (NU in relation to all human beings), and *ukhuwah wathnoniyah* (NU in relation to the state), after it has re-established its position for a return to the spirit of 1926, the year of NU's formation as a social and religious body, implying that NU might soon shed its political character and function (W and see also Vasil, 1997). Each mission has a connection with issues in relation to the state, politics and human rights. *Ukhuwah wataniyah* is related to the concept of politics of a nation-state that includes the issue of gender of equality and mission of democracy. These issues are not well known among the majority of Indonesian Muslims and some Muslims consider the discussion of such issues un-Islamic (secular) (IR). So this program is to deconstruct the ways of thinking of the younger generations of NU kiyai and by so doing they get familiar with the issues of democracy, human rights, and genders, and they are provided with social analysis (tool) in order to make them open-minded (HH).

6.4.1.1. Approach and Activities.

To transform orthodoxy within the NU *umma*, the autonomous organizational bodies of NU (BANNU) have organized activities with the focus on respect for plurality, tolerance,

gender equality. Lakpesdam-NU of Jakarta province developed such democratic values as tolerance, respect for pluralism (respect for the rights of other believers or non-Muslims), and the like to *da'is* (proselytizers) who have *umma* basis—i.e., those who lead religious forums (Majlis Ta'lim and Majlis Dzikir). Lakpesdam-Jakarta organized a workshop forum (*saresehan*) attended by various believers to identify and set up an approach or program in promoting democratic principles especially tolerance, mutual respect, and respect for plurality to diverse believers. Through this workshop, diverse believers were encouraged to identify and set up alternative approaches or program in order to promote mutually harmonious relationship among diverse believers. At the same time, Lakpesdam-Jakarta organized a similar program for Muslim clerics (*da'i*) of various groups (moderate and fundamentalist) to introduce the issue of Islam in relation to such contemporary issues as tolerance, mutual understanding, and respect for plurality (religious pluralism), gender equality and democracy. Through this program, Lakpesdam-Jakarta sought to reduce the tensions between moderate and 'radical/fundamentalist' Muslims. In turn, those *da'is* are expected to disseminate ideas regarding contemporary issues to the Muslim community at large.

Lakpesdam-NU of Jakarta selected *da'is* for several reasons. First, since *da'is* interact daily with *umma*; *da'is* might play a more effective role in disseminating the ideas of democracy to the public than other groups in a community. Second, *da'is* know how to introduce new ideas to the public by using their own language. This program is to transform

their ways of thinking (perspectives) toward understanding religious tenets in relation to societal problems (J).

Fatayah-NU, according to MU, advocates the rights of equality between males and females. Fatayat-NU introduces such female rights as reproduction, access to education, sexual enjoyment, pregnancy, baby delivery, and breast feeding. Fatayat-NU contends that the NU *umma* think of *fiqh* as a sacred book, the cleric ideas as dogma. Such a point of view demonstrates obstinacy. Fatayat-NU is of the opinion that a female as a human being is granted (by God) the freedom of mind or expression, which includes the rights to reinterpret the scriptural text, including interpretations that reflect male biased interests. Fatayat-NU has organized several activities. For instance, it has facilitated discussion about the scriptural text pertaining to gender issues, including the occasion of revelation (*asbaabu an-nuzul*), grammar and patterns, as well as semantics. Fatayat-NU invites the board members of Muslimah NU (Female Body of NU) and gender specialists from outside NU.

In addition, Fatayat-NU has criticized a classical book “*Uquud al-Lujjain*’ written by Nawawi (cleric). The book discusses “a model of wife-husband relationships” that demonstrates male bias interest¹⁰⁹ Fatayat-NU has also organized the materials of serial discussion into a book, published and distributed it to the Fatayat-NU board of various

¹⁰⁹ This book is usually studied by *santris* (pesantren students) during Ramadan month. Some examples of the writer’s interpretation with respect to husband-wife relationships (male biased interests) are (a) a husband considers his wife as slavery, (b) a wife is not allowed to manage her own property without any permission from her husband, (c) a wife is not allowed to give a meal to another person without permission from her husband, (d) a wife who leaves home without permission from her husband will be cursed by an angel (Nawawi, .n.a: 17, 21).

levels, i.e. provincial, district, sub-district, of all Indonesian provinces. Moreover, Fatayat-NU organizes a dialogue with the NU clerics (ulama) and *daiah* (female proselytizers) about the gender issues such as role of women in family and public sphere, reproduction right, abortion¹¹⁰ and health (family health program = LKK) and women rights protection (legal aid).

An NGO, which is ideologically affiliated with NU, P3M (Center for Pesantren and Community Development) in cooperation with Lakpesdam-NU organized a series of discussion about Islam and contemporary issues for NU activists from autonomous bodies such as students (PMII), Fatayat, Ansor (NU Youth Body). It also conducted workshops to introduce to pesantren (*kiyai*s=clerics) the ideas of “emancipatory Islam and transformative Islam” along with the ideas of civil society and democracy. W and Bur explain several reasons for choosing pesantren. First, pesantren is the target group of P3M. Second, the majority of pesantren communities are unfamiliar with such contemporary ideas as democracy and human rights because those issues are not written in Arabic (*kitab kuning* = classical books). Therefore, P3M has developed discussion program to criticize the issues of

¹¹⁰ Fatayat-NU has promoted discussion about abortion for several reasons. First, MUI (Muslim Clerics Concil) and NU clerics argue that abortion is prohibited (*haram*) and that their opinion relies too much on the classical books. Second, Indonesia is not an Islamic state, so we don't have a legal authority to prohibit people from practicing abortion because the 'secular' law does not prohibit abortion. Third, data indicate that 2.3 million females have died because of having had an abortion. Some women practice 'traditional abortion' (drinking herbal medicine) in order to prevent pregnancy. Essentially traditional abortion is similar to medical abortion (seeking the service of medical doctor). Fourth, Fatayat-NU suggests that al-Qur'an strongly prohibits killing human beings. Do we have to consider that embryo (fetus) of 0-1 month age has a soul (life)? Fatayat-NU argues that abortion is a fact and we, Muslims, have to have a perspective that helps females. Otherwise, there will be many more abortion cases (victims). Conversely, all clerics insist that allowing abortion means to legalize prostitution (pre marital sexual intercourse).

Islam and contemporary issues such as poverty, human right, democracy, gender equality and the like using socio-philosophical analysis (critical perspectives). Then P3M introduced via workshops such contemporary issues to members of the younger generations of *kiyais* (who will take charge of pesantren leadership from the old generations of *kiyais*). To make these issues easy for those *kiyais* to understand, P3M uses such terms as *al-musawah* (equality), *al-'itidal* (justice), and *hurriyah* (freedom), with which they are more familiar than they are with other terms such as individual sovereignty, freedom, and gender equality. In addition, P3M organized trainings with respect to “participatory or emancipatory Islam”. These trainings concern how Islamic tenets (the scriptural text) can be interpreted and elaborated in relation to societal realities (societal problems) such as gender sensitivity, poor liberation, protection of labor rights, response to human rights violation and the like.

P3M, according to W, introduced training materials about, for example, Islam in relation to democracy, Islam and citizens (*umma*), Islam and human rights. Those issues are elaborated into the concepts used in the Islamic discourses in pesantren. For instance, P3M takes the concepts of Al-Ghazaly stated in his book entitled *usuulu al-khamsah*¹¹¹ and the principle of Islamic jurisprudence (e.g., *kaidah fiqh 'tasarraful imam 'ala maa ra'ya bil masalahah* (a leader has to uphold firmly the principle “for public interests” in running his policies and program) to introduce principles of democracy.

¹¹¹ *Usuulu al-khamsah* (five principles), the work of al-Ghazaly contains freedom of beliefs or religions (*hifzu ad-din*) from enforced conversion, freedom of self protection (*hifdzu an-naf*) from violation, the protection of family and next generation (*hifzu an-nasl*), protection of property (*hifzu al-maal*), and the protection of profession and intellect (*hifzu al-aql*).

6.4.2. Disseminating the idea of Moderate Islam the community at large

This program concerns how NU promotes the idea of moderate Islam to the community at large. This program is a means to communicate about issue as democracy, gender equality, pluralism, and tolerance as they relate Islam; the target participants are members of the rejectionist group. To disseminate such contemporary issues as democracy, human rights, Islam and democracy, pluralist Islam, Islam and the anti-harassment movement, and the anti-corruption movement to the community at large, Lakpesdam-NU uses various communication channels. Lakpesdam-NU cooperates with private radio stations to broadcast statements and debates on these contemporary issues. Second, Lakpesdam-NU has taken initiatives for establishing “discussion forums” on several campuses such as UI (universitas Indonesia = University of Indonesia), ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung = Bandung Institute of Technology), IPB (Institut Pertanian Bogor or Bogor Institute for Agriculture) and UMMI (Universitas Muslim Makasar Indonesia = Muslim University of Makasar, Indonesia).¹¹²

For Lakpesdam-NU, the “Islamist/fundamentalist group” misinforms the community at large. Because the majority of Muslims in Indonesia, according to HH, IR and W, do not consider Islam compatible with democracy. Lakpesdam-NU and P3M have been struggling to establish a theological basis for advocating ideas related to democracy. As J explains, that

¹¹² These campuses are chosen for several reasons. First, these campuses are assumed to produce “radical Muslims”. Second, external organizations of Muslim students such as HMI (Muslim Students Association of Indonesia), IMM (The Association of Muhammadiyah Students) and PMII (Muslim Indonesian Movement= NU autonomous organization) pay less attention to the issues of Islamic radicalism or fundamentalism, which has grown up fast in those campuses (MM, M and HH).

Lakpesdam-NU of Jakarta province organized a training, which involved FPI (Forum Pembelaan Islam= Forum for Islam Defense)—Islamic fundamentalists of Indonesia. The objective of this program is to normalize the relationships between the Islamic fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist Muslim groups. This forum has encouraged both sides to communicate with each other, though they cannot be unified.

6.4.3. Deliberative democracy: Education for Democracy¹¹³

This program has been run by Lakpesdam-central office for three periods during December 2000 until April 2005. This pilot project is financially supported by the Ford Foundation within the scheme of civil society and democratization program in Indonesia. The goal of this program is to develop participants' knowledge about procedural democracy and to raise awareness of the extent to which public policy corresponds to public interests. Lakpesdam-NU is of the opinion that democracy will work (be functional) whenever community members becomes aware of their rights, takes part in making decision, and aggregates their rights (MM & M). While the New Order regime of Suharto disconnected community participation from the process of development, in the era of reformation

¹¹³ James (2004: 52) advocates the idea of plural deliberation, saying that it is a framework for assessing the legitimacy of the democratic process and institutions through which members of diverse and constructed collective identities reach collective decisions. Central to this framework is a critical process that induces participants to reflect upon and potentially to revise their preferences, interests, opinions, perspectives, and worldviews. Collective decisions may include the choice of broad constitutional frameworks and specific policies or candidates. Legitimacy is central within plural deliberation. Legitimacy derives from a complex assessment of four elements: the scope of deliberation, the relationship between understanding and criticism, the link between deliberation and decision-making, and conditions governing the deliberative and aggregative fairness of institutions and processes.

Lakpesdam-NU encourages the community members to take part in developing policies that serve the public interest. Lakpesdam-NU assumes that citizen forums, representing various community groups, are important to explore and develop community participation and identify the public interests.

6.4.1.2. Objective: knowledge or skill developed within public

This program is to develop political awareness among community members of government, especially local government, policies. It provides community members with knowledge about such public policies and promotes community participation in shaping policy and local government management (e.g., at the village level). To achieve this objective, Lakpesdam-NU organizes workshops for community facilitators, who are informed about public policy and provided with skills on how to negotiate, to advocate, and to respond to a case or moment/public dialogue (political organizing). The participants are also guided in how to facilitate community involvement in identifying problems, formulating objectives, making decisions, reaching agreement within a group or with another party (becoming aware of), organizing members of community into small groups, and monitoring these groups. The program is also designed to increase community members' awareness of their rights (expression, assembly and negotiation with the government) as well as to enhance their understanding about procedural democracy, i.e., elections and the ideal and actual functions of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

6.4.1.3. Coverage areas, approach, and citizen forums

Lakpesdam-NU (Center) selected three districts; each district covers 12 sub-districts and 50 villages. In the first phase of this program (December 2000 until April 2002), Lakpesdam-NU organized workshops on P4D (Perencanaan Partisipatif Penyusunan Program Pembangunan Desa = Participatory Planning for Rural Development Program) involving community representatives from 50 villages, including village chairs. Having participated in the P4D workshop, participants from each village were expected to follow up on two main agendas: 1) a proposal for rural development program and 2) a plan for establishing a community or citizen forum (FW = Forum Warga) for each village.

In developing these workshops, Lakpesdam-NU employs a participatory approach, emphasizing informal discussion and small group meetings, which involve members of a group either in solving a problem or in planning a follow-up program. Once a citizen forum has been established, the facilitator's role is to organize a public dialogue that involves local government officials such as village chairs, sub-district chairs, and district personnel. A facilitator promotes dialogue between the parties, i.e. community and local government officials, to reach an understanding and commitment about a community-based development program and its implementation. At the district level, public dialogue is held at least once a year, while at the village level, a public dialogue can be held at any time when the community wishes to do so.

Through FW (Citizen Forum), the community at large is involved in informal meetings, individual consultations, and group discussions. The community at large is informed about issues, such as the urgency of community participation, the process of making public policies, the role of social institutions including mass associations, and community representation. To communicate the development agenda of a community with local government and the legislative branch, an ad-hoc committee is created within every citizen forum. This committee is responsible for pushing the local government to adopt/enact the community's program and to support its implementation.

In the second phase of this program, Lakpesdam-NU (Center) organized three main elements: facilitators, citizen's forums, and the citizen forum media forum. The task of a facilitator, who is a member of the local community, is to facilitate members of citizen forums of five villages. Lakpesdam-NU provides facilitators with knowledge and skills related to the technology of participation (TOP) and community empowerment. Each facilitator is strongly recommended to establish a network with local organizations and conduct joint training or advocacy activities with other community organizers and NGOs.

Through a citizen forum, each facilitator is supposed to involve the community in assessing community problems, developing proposals for solving these problems, and establishing communication and other links with relevant agencies. Also, facilitators assist community members to understand the implementation of public policies at local level, and help them to fight for a program proposed by the community. For example, in the districts of Jepara, Wonosobo and Cilacap, facilitators together with the community analyzed the

shortcomings of a local development program and developed a new/different program based on community needs. Later, they organized a dialogue with local government officials so that this new/different program would be implemented¹¹⁴.

Media such as the Citizen Forum journal serves two functions: a) disseminating information pertaining to public policy and (budget) development programs of government, especially local government, to the community at large and b) communicating the needs or aspirations of the community to the local government. The Journal of Citizen Forum for Bekasi district for instance is distributed to 23 sub-districts and 182 villages (Sul and Mu).

In addition, Lakpesdam-NU Bekasi has organized a program to strengthen the position of the community in relation to the local government. This program is to provide such strategic groups as clerics and community leaders, with knowledge about public policies and skills for analyzing local government budgets (APBD). In addition to clarifying community's needs, this program helps community leaders to influence the development of public policy and its implementation at the district level.

6.4.2. Voter education

Voter education, focusing on a key element of procedural democracy, aims at promoting people's participation in elections. Through voter education, Lakpesdam-NU of the Bekasi district seeks to promote the political rights of the community at large (Muf, Yul

¹¹⁴ Lakpesdam-NU Bekasi is going to develop a dialogue between citizen forums, the local government, and the media. There is a gap between the interests of the local government and the community's needs. The local government tends to be closed to the ideas coming from below. At the same time, the community at large has less access to information about the development program, especially the budget

and Sul). Those people who were involved in voter education should be neutral in relation to political choice (e.g., selecting a particular presidential candidate). However, some of them were also involved in the campaigning for a candidate, such as Amin Rais for president or Hasyim Muzaddi for vice president (Muf).

In 2004 Fatayat-NU used a voter education program to mobilize 12,000.0 volunteers to monitor voting in 297 districts in 12 provinces. These volunteers taught the community at large how to exercise their rights to vote, to monitor ballot, and to understand whether the candidate congress members fight for the rights and aspiration of women. In addition, Fatayat-NU established centers for election consultation (*Posko*) in 10 locations of Java in order to promote voters' participation in election. Fatayat-NU reported that 120 people visited to each *posko*.

An NU-NGO, P3M, organized workshops about voting for volunteers, to develop their capacity to analyze the Indonesian Constitution and the *UU Pemilu* (Electoral Voting Law)¹¹⁵. With the help of voter education, P3M wanted to encourage community leaders, including *kiyai*, to promote participation in voting and to become involved in district-level

¹¹⁵ According to Muh, UU Pemilu is to cope with problems that arose in the previous electoral system, but this law demonstrates its weaknesses. It was stated that open and proportionate electoral voting is to bridge the gap between the interests of the community and political parties. In practice, political parties have the predominant right to decide who will be on the list of parliament candidates. The scoring system gives room for the political elites to establish the crony system in the political process. For instance, A is a board member of a political party at the district level, while B is a board member of the same political party at the sub-district level. A will have more room to be a parliamentary representative/member at the district level or provincial level than B because A gets a range of score higher than B, though B has closer contacts with his constituents (mass basis). Such a system demonstrates the crony system by which community representation shall be thwarted.

policy-making process. P3M informed participants about the electoral system, and the voting law. P3M encouraged participants to consider crucial issues of community representation¹¹⁶, addressed in Charter 82 of this law. The 2004 electoral system provides people room to evaluate the track records of each candidate of parliament.

6.4.3. Education for anti-Corruption Movement

In 2002, the International Transparency Agency published its research report describing how in some Islamic or Muslim countries as having high levels of political corruption, while secular states such as Singapore and Switzerland are less likely to witness corruption,¹¹⁷ Indonesia has demonstrated a paradoxical feature. Indonesia, a Muslim country where 87 % of the population is Muslim, has ranged in the position between 1 to 3 of countries with high corruption rates.¹¹⁸ Although not denying this fact, P3M is seeking to

¹¹⁶ According to Muh, about 70 to 80 % of parliament candidates (DPR Pusat) live in Jakarta, but they had to be representatives of the districts where they were born. It is estimated that 80 % of parliament members have at best only limited with their constituents, because of this situation.

¹¹⁷ Corruption can be defined as the abuse of trust in the interest of private gain. It is the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power with the motive at gaining some advantage more or less directly personal. Corruption can be described as stealing through deception in a situation which betrays a trust (Alatas, 1990). Corruption may occur in various institutions such as executive, legislative, judicative, media, civil society and business. Corruption by public officials takes the form of behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role by favoring private interests (e.g. family or friends) for pecuniary or status gains or by violating rule against exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This include such behaviors as bribery (use of reward to prevent the judgement of a person in a position of trust), nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reasons of ascriptive rather than merit-based criteria), and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding use) (Heidenheimer, 2002). See also Waren (2004).

¹¹⁸ Harris (2003: 199-200) classifies high corruption and low corruption countries. High corruption countries are those where corruption is "normal" behavior. Such behavior may manifest itself in different ways. In its pure forms, it is likely to entail: all other branches of government being subordinated to an all powerful and unaccountable executive; a banking system which funds the

make religious tenets functional and, according to W, has proposed an anti-corruption movement based on the *pesantren* community.¹¹⁹ However, there are several reasons why corruption might occur in Muslim majority countries: 1) “*ar-rasyi wal murtasyi*” states that a person who is involved in a lawsuit is prohibited (*haram*) from bribing the judge and 2) many literalists among Muslims say they have difficulty finding scriptural texts as *hujjah* (proof) for the prohibition (*haram*) of corruption, although the Qur’an includes words – ‘*rishwah*,’ *sariq*,’ *bathil*, and *fasaad* that connote corruption, or acting corruptly. As stated on the surah An-Nisa 3: 29 and 30 “Oh ye who believe, consume not your property between your selves unlawfully ...” “Whosoever seeks to acquire property by way of transgression and injustice, We shall cast him into the Fire...”

6.4.3.1. Stage and activities

The anti-corruption movement (a coalition of diverse religious groups) published a guidebook for proselytizers of Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. This guidebook can be used to disseminate the idea of anti-corruption to the community at large. Aside from

executive’s predatory conduct; a series of variably coordinated but symbiotic clientelistic and patronal networks sometimes passing as manifestation of traditional culture; a general assumption that to obtain a service one must make a payment; a non-democratic or ineffectively democratic political system; a heavily controlled press; low GDP; poor literacy standard; high military and low social expenditure; and heavy IMF debtor status. A low-corruption country is one where: the structures of government are basically robust and accountable; one would not seriously contemplate trying to bribe a judge and police officer; constitutional safeguard against abuse exists; whistle-blowing is practical option; when instances of corruption emerge, the miscreant is disciplined or prosecuted, an inquiry is held and system glitches rectified. In other words, the system correct and return to a functioning state.

¹¹⁹ Those who are involved in secular NGOs want to see how religions like Islam respond to the problem of corruption. Muslims often advocate *hadith*, saying that “*ar-rasyi wal murtasyi fin naal*” or “*la’natullaahi alal rasyi wal murtasyi*” (those who are bribing and bribed shall be cursed by God).

a guidebook, P3M will publish an anthology entitled “Kiyai dalam kontrol public dalam menghadapi korupsi (Clerics and their Roles in Control of Public Policy and Anti-corruption Movement).” In May 2004, P3M organized a national workshop, attended by *kiayis* from 14 districts of Central Java, East Java, West Java, Banten, and Lampung, to discuss and formulate a theological and *fiqh* foundation for a stance against corruption. This program, i.e., education for anti-corruption, is derived from the concept of emancipatory Islam, in which the scriptural text is used as an incentive for launching an anti-corruption movement. Through education for anti-corruption, *kiyais* might have to also be committed to an anti-injustice movement. To follow up this program, each participant (*kiayi*) has an agenda to establish a forum in his community, which serves to discuss and control public policy in his district.

6.4.3.2. Issue of investigation techniques

According to my informants, there are several techniques to make sure that corruption investigations are conducted properly, and these are the focus of some of the educational programs discussed above. *Kiyais* are taught techniques for analyzing district budgets. Thus, they may be able to detect, for example, that the administrative budget represents 60 % of the total, while 40 % of total is allotted for societal development. Or they may be able to discover that a governor has received Rp 300 millions per annum for a coffee budget, which is equivalent to Rp 400.000.0 – Rp 500.000.0/day for coffee. These skills were provided to those participants who would become community organizers (CO). Several steps

have to be taken by each community organizer: fact findings, organizing data into legal documents, and disseminating information about corruption to the public (such as community leaders). The team encourages community leaders to scrutinize, study, and analyze data as well as to advocate¹²⁰ (W, Ban, and Mu).

¹²⁰ A mayor received a budget amount of Rp 200,000.0/day for his breakfast. The budget for the mayor household has reached hundreds upon hundreds million rupias fper year. Therefore, this program is expected to generate the skill and awareness needed to control the budget at the district level

7. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The previous two chapters have discussed separately M and NU in relation to the role of each in the process of democratization, their members' perceptions and experiences in democracy, as well as their experiences in developing education for democracy in Indonesia. This chapter will compare M and NU members' concepts and experiences with respect to democracy, democratic society, citizenship, and education for democracy. Each Islamic civil society association has its basic values or ideology, which serve as a guide (essential) for each association and its *umma* to realize its mission within society. Therefore, a discussion of the ideology of each organization will be included in this chapter.

7.1. The ideology underpinning M and NU

Both M and NU are affiliated with the ideology of Sunni (orthodox), but M members prefer to say that their organization follows the *tajdid* movement advocating *ijtihad* and calling for a return to the pristine ways of scripture rather than following the Sunni tradition per se (Naser, 2000; Saleh 2001: 97). Aside from upholding three characteristic above, M, as a *tajdid* movement, reformulates the Islamic doctrines by adopting modern perspectives or thoughts. In this way, M seeks to eradicate feudal attitude, promote civil values such as a willingness to help others; and translate the scriptural text as stated earlier into praxis¹²¹ in

¹²¹ These praxis works serve as the manifestation of the Islamic tenet, *amar ma'ruf* (enjoining good deed) (Naser, 2001).

various fields of works such as education, health system, cooperative, small-scale credit, bank, orphan care, and the like.

According to Wahid (2000), M's call for a direct return to the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* allows the organization to develop the understanding of scriptural text into praxis along with societal dynamics (problems), without spending too much time in continuous debates about the classical works, *kitab kuning*, (the ideas of the Islamic clerics in the medieval age). By being actively involved in various spheres of life M's membership is able to translate and elaborate the *maqashidu samaa* (God's will) into reality (humane lives or humane problems). Such conditions enable M to develop a new and dynamic intellectual tradition and to make a clear distinction between two dimensions of religion (Islam), i.e., values system and praxis (*hablun min an-naas*). Also these conditions enable M to introduce a new model of understanding the Qur'an according to themes or issues, which are related to societal dynamics (*tafsiru maudlu'i*—taking the Qur'an and as-Sunnah as the primary sources and employing *ijtihad* to the maximum). By so doing, M can distinguish religious understanding and the scriptural text clearly (Wahid 2000). The religious understanding is relative, which means that the interpretation of the scriptural text has a connection with the social, cultural and psychological setting of *mufassir* (the exoteric commentator of the Qur'an). The scriptural text is merely the absolute one.

However, M was often trapped into conservatism and rigidity with respect to the religious ideology (Puritanism), and reductionism, especially in translating the *tajdid* concept into *fiqh* issues (*furuiyah*). The M *umma* often get involved more in the on going debates

about *furuiyah* (such as *qunut*) or heterodoxy (like *tahlilan*) with the NU *umma* (J; also see Azra, 1997; Mulkhan, 2000; Saleh, 2001). Its involvement in that matter enables M members to have one-sided stance which will thwart its effort to create democratic attitude. Amin and the M young generation look into M itself and suggest that M have to energize the spirit of *tajdid* and *ijtihad* into both thought and praxis works more responsive to societal dynamics of Indonesian society at the present and future times. Otherwise, M *tajdid* would be counted for the past history. A new vision of M, which contains five formulae advocated by Rais (see Chapter 4), is supposed to develop and boost the spirit of *tajdid* responsively and diligently.

In contrast, NU insists that its membership have to be affiliated with the ideology of *ahlus Sunnah wal jamaah* or *aswaja* (Saleh, 201: 97; Lukman, 2004; Wahid, 1986). NU members believe that the *aswaja* and *fiqh* tradition gives room (inner impetus) to respect differences or plurality, individual freedom, and local culture amidst the religious teaching. Aside from that, NU establishes *fiqh* as both a tradition and guide in making decisions for its organization and public interests (*masalihu umma*). NU claims that *fiqh* and appreciation of local culture will give more room for people who have different religious beliefs to coexist. These points, which serve as an asset for NU to promote democratic society in Indonesia, enable the NU *umma* to be more open-minded and appreciative of the plurality than the modernist group (J & MFM). NU's involvement in the Islamic classical works, *kitab kuning*, (clerics of the medieval age) enables especially the NU members to develop Islamic thought through intensely analytical studies. By so doing, NU can develop open-mindedness among NU members (criticism and critical thinking).

This ideal is not fully realized. As noted in Chapter 6, some key informants, as stated earlier, argue that the *Sunni fiqh* was derived from the tradition of the ruling group (the interests of elite and very personal) and focused more on the concept of piety from the perspective of personal interest (*masalatu sha'shiyah*) rather than addressing human problems (such as justice, and social inequality). *Fiqh* was the product of personal *ijtihad*, which according to the NU's younger generation is subject to authoritarianism. The NU *umma* take *fiqh* not only as a reference but also exemplary model of behavior/attitude. The tradition of *sami'na wa atha'na* (obedient without reserve especially to its clerics), according to a key informant (BE), is accepted by most NU members. Freedom of expression and criticism against their clerics are permitted as long as a person has profound knowledge. The NU *umma* exaggeratedly respect its clerics and such appreciation has enabled its members to make a cult of its clerics, and the NU members closed-minded. These mentioned factors may have thwarted the development of democracy. The NU younger generation members have attempted to transform the orthodox understanding of *aswaja* and *fiqh* through various programs since NU restated its spirit of *khittah* 1926 in 1984 (IR, J, RR & Z). The educational attainment of the NU younger generation in both secular and religious disciplines has enabled them to be critical of and to generate criticism and critical stance in relation to the state (see also Ida, 2004). The NU younger generation has successfully transformed NU itself, and such internal transformation has enabled NU to generate critical thoughts about Islam in relation to contemporary issues or societal problems.

7.2. Democracy

M and NU informants express similar conceptions of democracy as a social and political system. Both M and NU see democracy as including two dimensions: procedural and substantive. The former concerns how a democratic institution such as *trias politica*, which includes people's participation in formal politics such as electoral voting, works effectively. M and NU members argue that the manifestation of democracy has to be framed within the creating prosperity for all citizens regardless of their backgrounds. Everyone has to be fairly treated to access, for example, better education, better job, better health services and the like. The substantive democracy, according to M and NU's interviewees, has to do with imparting such core values of democracy as respect for differences or plurality, rights of individuals, freedom, justice, open-mindedness, tolerance, criticism, independence, *amanah* and other civil values to the community at large, including in Indonesia. Pertaining to this point, the M and NU's interviewees agree that Indonesia has to develop substantive democracy because Indonesia has already realized a degree of procedural democracy such as electoral voting and reforming state institutions. Indonesia needs to develop democratic culture to its general population because Indonesia is a multiethnic state whose population identify with diverse religions. Such diversity could stimulate a conflict if the population is not well prepared to live in pluralistic society.

With respect to Islam and democracy, there are several issues such as the compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with (Western concepts of) democracy. Both M and

NU members believe that the Qur'an contains tenets such as *'adalah* (justice), *anti-dzulm* (against injustice, corrupting act or oppression), *musawwat* (equality) and *shura* that are equivalent to Western ideas of democracy. Both M and NU *argue* that concept of *shura* (understood as consultation, deliberation and dialogue, council and experts giving advice to a ruling group) needs to be elaborated into a system or mechanism. Moreover, M and NU members argue that *shura* assumes certain conditions such as equal rights, egalitarianism, rights of freedoms, and respect for differences, justice, and commitment to obey agreement (law) among those people who make decisions.

The membership of both M and NU reflects diverse viewpoints: *accommodationists*, rejectionist and in between. Some NU and M members say that Islam contains in itself tenets congruent with (Western notions of) democracy such as *shura*, justice (*musawat*), anti-*dzulm* (anti-injustice) and the like. They say that Islam has tradition with respect to organizing society (*baiah*) and a model of pluralistic society led by the Prophet Muhammad, *al-mujtama al-madinah* (Medina society) bounded by the Medina charter, and this term is now used to designate the Islamic concept of civil society. In contrast, other M and NU members reject the idea of compatibility of Islam with (Western conceptions of) democracy because Islam does not recognize popular sovereignty¹²² (theocracy); the concept of freedom is limited by the rule of God; and the classical work (*kitab kuning*) does not contain in itself the idea of

¹²² Human beings (*khalifah fi al-adl*) have temporary mandate to take world in order. The concept of *khalifah fi al-adl* consists of two dimensions (e.g. religious and non-religious leadership responsibilities).

democracy.¹²³ A third group within M and NU believes that Islam contains values congruent with democracy, but that Islamic ideas of democracy differ from those of Western democracy. The goal of democracy of the West is to achieve merely material happiness, which differs from Islamic concept (e.g. material and spiritual happiness; the present world and hereafter). Moreover, Muslims have to place *wahyu* or revelation (the scriptural text) as the primary authority, so that individual freedom must not contradict the *wahyu*; and have to be responsible of their acts including leadership before the public in the present world and before God in the hereafter.

¹²³ Ramadan (2004: 24-30) distinguishes six trends with respect to Islamic schools of thought and Islamic movement: (a) Scholastic traditionalism—Muslims strictly follow medieval schools of thought of Islamic jurisprudence (the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali, Zaidy, and Ja'fari); (b) Salafi literalism—Muslims are disallowed to follow both medieval Islamic jurisprudence (*taqlid*), and reject the reinterpretation of the sacred text since the Text cannot be subject to interpretation (no *ijtihad*), like Wahabi; (c) Political Salafi literalism—Muslims reduce Islam to a political ideology (advocating and struggling Islamic state), such as Hizb at-Taharir; (d) Salafi reformis—Muslims reject medieval schools of thought of Islamic jurisprudence as binding but reinterpreting the original Islamic sources (*ijtihad*); (e) Sufism—an apolitical, oriented toward the spiritual life and mystical experiences; and (f) Liberal rationalist reformism—Non-practicing, 'cultural Muslims' seek total assimilation of Islam with Western civilization (a complete adaptation to the Western way of life). Esack (2000) advocates the idea of Islamic theology of liberation. *Tawheed*, according to him, contains in itself faith in God, which also has to be manifested to promote justice and to liberate those who are oppressed and powerless [poor] from social-economic and political injustice, corrupting acts, and any kinds of oppression. Based on Ramadan's, this group belongs to scholastic traditionalists.

Some M and NU members have half-heartedly accepted democracy. People who are reluctant to Western democracy adhere to conservatism or the salafi group.¹²⁴ The tendency is that former group affiliates with NU who uphold the ideology of *ahlussunnah wal jamaah* and *fiqh* as an orthodoxy. The second group is found in the M members, who tend to be literalist. The younger generation of NU (liberal group) argues that many Muslims are reluctant to the ideas of Western democracy because of the historical problem of Muslim world in the past (the debacle of the Muslim emperor, in which the ruler gave little room to study the civilization of other nations).

Both NU and M key informants see that the development of democracy in the Indonesian Muslim society may be thwarted by the political stance of the political elites of developed countries who advocate democracy. Indonesian Muslims doubt whether the

¹²⁴ *Salafiyya* is the name given to those who follow the ideas and practices of the righteous ancestors (*al-salaf al-salih*). The “*salafi*” approach rejects later traditions and schools of thought, calling for a return to the Qur’an and the Sunna as the authentic basis for Muslims life. The *salafi* approach emphasizes the application of *ijtihad* (independent informed judgement) and rejects *taqlid* (adherence to established precedents and conformity with existing traditional interpretations and institutions). “The righteous ancestors,” or *salaf*, are usually considered to be the first three generations of Muslims, including the immediate companions of the Prophet. Because the closeness to these “salaf” to Muhammad, later Muslims regarded the former’s transmissions of the Prophet’s traditions, their informed practice as believers, as having special authority. The goal of the movement is to make Islam a dynamic force in the contemporary world. In the modern context, this involved an emphasis on the compatibility of reasons with modern science. It also entailed a call for moral social reform. However, by the end of the 20th century, the term *salafiyya* also came to be applied to an extremist movement that advocated violent *jihad* against existing regimes and social orders, both Muslim and non-Muslim, and that did not adhere to a rigid and literalist understanding of the Qur’an and Sunna. *Tawheed* was the basis for showing the compatibility of Islam with modern science and revelation with modern reason. Consistent with the earlier *salafiyya*, Abduh advocated the informed, independent analysis of the Qur’an and Sunna (Voll, 2004).

project of spreading Western democracy is designed to improve the quality of life humanity. There is a double standard employed by the political elites from developed countries toward developing countries, especially Islamic or Muslim countries. For instance, the political elites have exaggeratedly advocated the issues of human right violation of Muslim countries, but they do not do so intensely (whenever the cases are linked with their own countries). For instance, the cases of Abu Ghraib and Afghanistan's prisoners demonstrated both human rights violation and the abuse of the project of Western democracy.

NU and M members who were interviewed agree that democracy is not monolithic but has multiple dimensions. Any nation or society has its own values such as respect for others, tolerance, cooperation, care and the like (universal norms) congruent with the principles of Western democracy. For them, the principles of the Western democracy must be linked with the Islamic terms and in turn these Islamic terms have to be framed in terms with which the general population of Indonesia is familiar. NU younger generation, for instance, has attempted to develop the ideas of Ghazaly (*usulu al-khamsah*) as the five basic human needs that should be protected: (a) the protection of self (*hifzu al-nafs*) from violation, (b) the protection of religion (*hifzu ad-dien*) from enforced conversion, (c) the protection of family and the next generation (*hifzu an-nasl*), (d) the protection of personal property (*hifzu al-maal*), and (e) the protection of professions and intellect (*hifzu al-aql*). These five rights can be achieved by freedom, equality, *shura* and justice. Contextualization (*dipribumikan*), according to NU leaders (e.g. Gus Dur), is an attempt to consider local needs in making decisions about Islamic law based on the principle in Islamic legal theory (*usul*

fiqh) saying that *al-‘aadat muhakkam* (local custom can be law) (see also Mujiburrahman, 1999: 342

7.3. Democratic society

In general, both M and NU members define democratic society as a society where such democratic values as freedom or individual sovereignty, respect for plurality or differences, and the rights of minorities including women, justice, equality, and open-mindedness are established within various spheres of life. In democratic societies those values serve as a guide to establish relationships among people, between the ruler (state) and citizens. In democratic society anyone is fairly treated. M informants argue that the relationships between the state and *umma* should be established in balance, meaning the state has to respect the rights of citizens on one hand, and citizens have to take part in and control the state policy implementation on the other hand. M members interviewed generally advocate the concepts of pluralistic society, participatory society, and open society¹²⁵ and they focus on people’s participation and commitment to issues rising at the

¹²⁵ I did not find detailed information on whether or not this concept has a connection with the idea of Popper. Open society, according to Popper, is a society based on the ideas of not merely tolerating dissenting opinions but respecting them. Free speech, in an open society, should be an instrument for discovering errors. Open society is identified with scientific society. Popper thought that the public character of science and its institution imparts a mental discipline upon an individual scientist that preserves the objectivity of science and its tradition of critical discussion (Notturo, 1999). Openness permits a critical attitude toward choice and even toward the social framework those constraints choices. To think with a critical attitude is to capture and institutionalize in methodological rules of science, since the

local, national, and global levels as to develop human civilization. An informant of M advocates the concept of open society as a rational society where its members respect and uphold mandates (*amanah*), and the sovereignty of people.

7.3.1. Individual freedom and sovereignty

From the previous discussion, it is apparent that M and NU have similar ideas about freedom and (individual) sovereignty. They argue that Islam grants freedom and sovereignty for an individual since God grants human beings rationality or intellect by which human beings can use to think, and to discover the secrets (benefits) of the universe. In Islam freedom and sovereignty, according to the key informants of M and NU, are limited or bounded by the norms of God (*shariah*). Freedom does not mean that everyone does what he or she wishes (liberal ways of looking). Freedom is a right of an individual but his or her right is bounded by the respect or protection the right of others.¹²⁶

Some NU younger generation argues that Islam does not have a concept of genuine freedom as Western society does. *Fiqh*, according to some NU younger generation members, acknowledges freedom of the individual; such individual freedom is limited by the concept of respect for or protection of the rights of others at the same time. In general, both M and NU informants agree that the concept of individual sovereignty has to be connected with the

adoption and institutionalization of the rational attitude designates the initial stage of science (Jarvie, 1999).

¹²⁶ Stowasser (1994: 35) confirms that in Islam freedom is that “the human realizes that his or her freedom is not freedom of beasts, but that true freedom is possible within the law....”.

concept of vicegerency (*khalifah fil ardli*) on the earth. God has absolute sovereignty (see the concept of theodemocracy) and a human being is granted temporary sovereignty with which a human being has to be responsible for his or her acts or mandate of God before Him in the hereafter. All young generation members, according to J, argue that the issue of popular sovereignty cannot be separated from NU experiences during the New Order regime (the state-NU relationship). For NU, popular sovereignty means that the state (regime) shall not impose the restriction of the rights of citizens in the political arena.

7.3.2. Pluralism and tolerance

Both M and NU members argue that the Qur'an contains norms or tenets with respect to the relationships among diverse believers such as no compulsion to convert Islam, *ta'aruf* (social relationship), and *mujadalah*. In addition, Islam has a tradition in organizing society (*bai'ah*), and exemplary pluralistic society (*mujtama' al Madina*). NU believes that the ideology of *ahlus Sunnah wal jamaah* makes up such principles as *tawasuth*, *tasamuh*, and *'itidal*, which serve as a guide to lead a pluralistic society. Both M and NU members refer to pluralism connoting the recognition of other religions or giving other believers room to coexist and the prohibition against anyone from expelling the believers of other religions. M members establish *amar ma'ruf* stated in the Qur'an as the basic principle for societal arrangement and has elaborated into the "basic principles of M concerning social relationships". NU elaborates *amar ma'ruf* into *muamalah bil ma'ruf*, *muasharah bil ma'ruf* and *mukasabah bil al-ma'ruf*.

The M and NU younger generations and members, who attained higher educational attainment from Western countries such as the USA, England, and Canada, advocate the ideas of (religious) pluralism. Some M and NU young generations advocate a radical concept or idea of religious pluralism, i.e. they recognize that other religions such as Christianity, Judaism, and Confucianism have truth.¹²⁷

With respect to (religious) pluralism, Indonesian Muslims are divided into three categories: rejectionist (*Islamists*), accomodationists (liberalists/pluralists), and in between. The three categories are apparent in M and two groups (rejectionists and accomodationists) exist in NU. The third group disagrees with the liberalists (pluralists) who advocate the idea that every religion has truth because each religion has different settings, *shariah*, and *aqidah* from one to another. Also this group does not agree with the Islamists (rejectionists), saying that anything coming from outside Islam (West) has to be rejected. Islam teaches its *umma* to establish good relationships with other *umma* (non-Muslims).

With respect to tolerance, both M and NU members have similar conceptions. Tolerance implies mutual understanding, cooperation, recognition of the rights of others, and prohibition of harassment and violating the rights of others. Both M and NU say that Islam advocates tolerance. The Qur'an recognizes the *ahlu al-kitab* (people of the book= Christians,

¹²⁷ In general, both M and NU *umma* reject the Hick's idea of (religious) pluralism. The old generation of both NU and M insists that those who advocate the ideas of religious pluralism genuinely have deviated from the basic tenets of Islam (break through the *aqidah* territory). Both M and NU *umma* admit religious pluralism in terms of the *non-aqidah* area (*muamalah ma'a an-naas*).

Jews and Majuzi). Even several M and NU people have expanded the notion of *ahlu al-kitab* to other religions such as Sabeans, Zoroastrians or Magians, Confucianism, and Buddhism, aside from Christians and Jews. But this idea was rejected by a majority of the *umma* of each. Both NU and M argue that cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims is admitted along with the dimensions of *hablun min annaas*. Both M and NU argue that Islam regards freedom of thoughts, conscience, and religion as an inviolable human rights which God gave man through the exercise of power of choice (i.e. the ability to believe or disbelieve) (see also Muhibbuddin, 2004). M and NU have prohibited the *umma* of each from the reviling of idol, because reviling can generate ill-feeling. It also can drive non-Muslims away from the religion (of Islam) and instill in them hostility and annoyance.¹²⁸

What is prohibited is tolerance which means supporting the belief of other religious believers at the expense of Islamic belief (*aqidah*). Pertaining to the issues saying “Merry Christmas” or “going to Church for social relation,” M and NU *umma* have different points of view. They are divided into two groups: rejectionists (Islamists) and accomodationists (liberalists). Accomodationists (liberalists) say that these activities are out of reach with *aqidah*. So we are not prohibited from doing these activities because they belong to *muamalah ma’a an-naas* (social relationship). In addition, Islam teaches its believer that any act will rest on intention. Verily, God knows what occurs in our hearts¹²⁹. In contrast, Islamists argue such activities are designated to *ibadah* and *aqidah* dimensions. So a Muslim is

¹²⁸ It is stated in several verses of the Qur’an.

¹²⁹ In one hadith, it was stated that any acts or activity rests on the intention....

prohibited from doing these activities. The NU *umma* believe that '*alim (kiyai)* has profound knowledge of *shariah* and can distinguish the areas of *aqidah* and *muamalah*.

7.3.3. Gender equality

Both M and NU members believe that Islam contains in itself tenets with respect to the appreciation of women. M and NU have female organizational bodies such as *Aishiyah* and *Nashiatul Aishiyah* (M), *Fatayat* and *Muslimat* (NU), giving more room for women to articulate their aspirations. M released its decision to involve females in *Majlis Tarjih* (Fatwa Council) earlier than NU (in 1971), but its realization was questionable. M formally and first introduced the idea of giving equal chances for both females and males to compete to gain M leadership in the 1995 *Muktamar* (Congress) in Banda Aceh, but the majority of participants rejected that idea. Finally, the 2000 M *Muktamar* in Jakarta approved a decree (by law) that a female has an equal chance to a male to take charge of M leadership. NU did the same work after its National Congress (*Muktamar*) in 1999.

NU has been more vocal than M in advocating the idea of gender equality. The younger generation of both NU and M feel that both parties find it easy to deliver the idea of gender equality on the paper. However, it is how the idea is upheld in practice that matters. The younger generation of NU says that there is no female taking a leadership role in NU. Some key informants of M say that there are some women taking leadership positions but not in the 13 leadership position (top leadership). Informants from NU and M confirm that gender equality is a sensitive or controversial subject because it is seen as coming from West. With respect to this point, both members and board of M and NU are divided into groups:

rejectionists and accomodationists. Those who reject the idea of gender equality of M and NU have similar ideas as stated by Stowasser (evoking the medieval theme of women's innate physical and mental deficiency). The younger generations of NU and MU advocate the idea in opposition to conservatism, as stated earlier. The conservative group insists that gender equality is coming from the West, i.e., rooted in Western secular ideology, and believes that those who advocate the issues of gender equality wish to set themselves free from the religious norms. The proponents of gender equality, according to Islamists, have deviated from the religious norms, being the agent of West, secularists and the like.

The rejectionists and accomodationists within both M and NU are involved in continuous debates about several issues such as *qawwaamu* and *darajat* (males are superior to females), the role of women in testimony (eye witness), and females in public spheres such as taking leadership, heritage, reproduction rights and sexual enjoyment (the two later issues are advocated by the NU-Fatayat). Reinterpretation of the belief of medieval age religious scholars remains a sensitive subject among the old generation of NU and M. The rejectionists (traditionalists) believe that the sacred text is subject to dogmatic interpretation, which has to be taken for granted. On the other hand, the accomodationists (modernists) assume that the sacred text contains verses that allow anyone, who has paramount knowledge of the Qur'an (*ulumul al-qur'an*) and knowledge of Islam (*ulumu al-Islam*), to interpret the verses of the sacred text. According to gender proponents, those verses above, which invite ceaseless debate among Muslims, allow us to scrutinize the sacred texts from various dimensions, i.e. occasion of revelation (*asbaabu an-nuzul*) and occasion of narration (*hadith*),

linguistics, logics (*mantiq*) and other disciplines. For accommodationists, the cleric *fatwa* about prohibiting women to charge leadership, and *qawwamu* and *darajat* (males are superior to females) are designated as the interpretation of clerics (of the medieval age), which was affected by socio-cultural settings (the era of patriarchy).

7.3.4. Criticism & being critical

This issue likely has a connection with two main points: critical thinking of and using critical perspectives, especially in relation to understanding Islam and the contemporary issues (stated earlier). The establishment of M and NU has a connection with its mission: i.e. to make the *umma* of each become critical of societal issues. Both M and NU believe that God has granted human beings rationale, intelligence or intellect as *fitrah* (an innate God given sense of right and wrong or human pristine nature) from God in order that human beings can gain the benefits of God's creation (the world) and promote God-consciousness. From the broad sense, both M and NU members conceive of being critical as the use of rationale or intellect as to understand issues and in the pursuit of solution.

With respect to criticism, M and NU members claim that each has "social capital" for the promotion of the *umma* potentials. M members claims that *ijtihad*, *arruju ila al-Qur'an wa as-sunnah* (calling for a return to the pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad), and (the spirits of) *tajdid* give more room for the M members to be critical. At the same time NU argues that the ideology of *ahlus Sunnah wa al-jamaah* and the *fiqh* tradition give more room for the NU *umma* to be critical and appreciative of

plurality. However, the “social capital” is often challenged by the attitude or acts of the *umma* of each.

For NU, exaggerated respect for the clerics and the religious scholar’s works of the medieval age has created fanaticism and closed-mindedness among the NU *umma*. Therefore, the younger generation of NU argues that criticism and being critical have a connection with transformation of the orthodox understanding toward the ideology of *ahlusunnah wal jamaah* and *fiqh*, as well as the promotion of political awareness of the NU members and the community at large. The former serves as a prerequisite for NU in order to enable NU members to deal with such contemporary issues as democracy, human rights, gender equality, pluralism, and tolerance to the community at large. The “cultural NU” and younger generation has intensely criticized the conservation of classical works, through the adoption of critical perspectives (social and philosophical theories), and making other classical works advocating societal issues and empowerment as the counterattack references. The “cultural NU” and young generation advocate an idea that *ibadah* (any religious devotion to God) has to reflect any effort to social transformation. By so doing, the “cultural NU” and younger generation can transform the wisdoms of *fiqh* to be more responsive to societal dynamics, and reconstruct the political approaches and ideas of Islam (*ahlussunna wal jamaah*) within the political constellation of Indonesia (IR, HH; also see Hakim, 2004; Misrawi, 2001; Prasetyo & Munhanif, 2002: 199-200).

NU has attempted to promote political awareness among the NU *umma* and the community at large to strengthen the Indonesian civil society movement through which

civil rights are protected (see Hakim, 2002; Prasetyo & Munhanif, 2002: 208). At the local level such as the village, sub-district and district, NU is involved in raising political awareness of members through intermediate groups as *kiyai* and local leaders who facilitate members to articulate their aspiration, and to control the implementation of public policy at the local levels. To achieve the objective, NU has been doing a pilot project about the development of “citizen forum” in several districts (Lakpesdam, 2004).

M members acknowledged that their organization has succeeded in eradicating feudal mentality and constructing a democratic attitude and others (discussed in chapter 4). The “social capital” of M is often challenged by reductionism (such as *tajdid* is often translated into *furuiyah* issues which draw the M *umma* to be involved in ceaseless debate with the NU *umma*). M is less aggressive in responding to the idea of democratization and civil society (ZQ; and see also Mulkhan, 1996) than NU, in which paternalism and patrimonialism¹³⁰ has been established (see Billah, 2004). People were impressed that M was not so critical of development cases such as the eviction of powerless people from their rights (lands) as the Kedung Ombo dam project and Talang Mas elite housing project in Semarang (YS and ZQ) during the era of New Order (the days of the New Order establishment until 1992).

However, in 1993, M demonstrated a critical stance toward the regime of New Order Suharto pertaining to sensitive issues such as successional leadership, corruption, and nepotism. Amin advocates *social tawheed* and “high politics,” which generated a new spirit

¹³⁰ Patrimonialism has been strongly established as a result from the social institutionalization of Pesantren (Billah, 2004: 383).

for the M younger generation to develop criticism and critical thought. M, according to Amin and other members of M's young generation, has to energize the spirits of *tajdid* and *ijtihad* in response to societal dynamics at the present and future. M has to be vocal to advocate the fate of powerless and poor. In the days of its establishment, the founding father of M strove to elaborate the spirits of *ijtihad* and *tajdid* into a social and cultural praxis movement which protects the rights or fate of the powerless and poor (oppressed and alienated group). However, their *tajdid* (social and cultural movement) was often reduced into the ceaseless debate about heterodoxy and heresy and issues of *fiqh* such as *haram* (prohibition), and *halal* (permissible) rather than social movement (Mulkhan, 2000; Rais, 1998, 2000). The M younger generation would return to the spirit of its movement (civil society movement or *ar-ruju ilaa mujtama al-madani*) which was established by its founding fathers. Also the young generation of M has intensely developed critical perspectives pertaining to Islam and contemporary issues. They have adopted social and philosophical theories and ideas of social movement to develop the study of Islam (Islamic thought) in relation to contemporary issues. In developing critical perspectives, the younger generations of M and NU have to face ceaseless criticism and accusation as deviating from the Islamic norms from their own colleagues in each association.

7.4. Citizenship

Both M and NU members refer to citizenship in relation to the ideal community (vision or social ideals) that they want to achieve. M advocated (e.g. in its bylaws) the

concept of *al-mujtama al-fadhilah* (excellent society) stated on the M's bylaw, which was promulgated in the 41st Congress (Muktamar) of Surakarta, to designate the concept of 'genuinely Islamic society' (the M social ideal or vision). In response to the New Order's policy (*asas tunggal* = Pancasila as the sole principle of all social and political organization), M revised its vision into the formulae *masyarakat yang adil dan sejahtera yang diridai Allah* (just and prosperous society which God blesses).

The NU concept of citizens is framed within its vision of the ideal society and was stated at its 30th Congress (*Muktamar*) held in Kediri in 1999. Therein, NU identifies as its goal "to establish a just and democratic society in adherence to the ideology of *ahlussunnah wal jamaah*."

Both M and NU members emphasize loyalty to the state (not to the regime), which means having a commitment to follow the rule of law (for the enhancement of democracy), being critical of problems rising at the community at large, participating in the development of society for the creation of prosperity and control of public policies and services. Both M and NU have a bylaw on the concept of rights and responsibilities of their members and boards. However, the rule of the game with respect to membership is manifested on the basis of the spirit of voluntarism, sincerity (*ikhlas*), competition for doing good deeds (*fastabiqul khairat*), and getting social benefits (social satisfaction) more than economic motive or values.

7.5. Educating for Democracy

M and NU members have a similar view about educating for democracy in terms of political education, which aims at raising political awareness of the *umma* of each organization and the community at large. Both NU and M organizations are involved in developing political awareness, in terms of people's participation in formal politics, such as electoral voting, and people's awareness of societal problems rising at the local and national levels. Both NU and M organizations advocate gender awareness to the members of each and the community at large serving as education for democracy.

Aside from similarities, NU and M have their own emphasis pertaining to the concept of educating for democracy. NU has attempted to contextualize the democratic values such as freedom, respect for plurality, and equality into the Islamic concepts. NU has implemented a PPWK program (discussed in the chapter 6), which aims to transform itself from the orthodox understanding toward the ideology of *ahlus Sunnah wal jamaah* and *fiqh* tradition. NU provides the younger clerics who will charge the leadership in pesantren with social theories and social philosophies as well as social movement. This is to equip the younger clerics with an understanding of Islam in relation to the contemporary issues such as democracy, gender equality, pluralism and tolerance. This program, according to NU, serves as a prerequisite for NU before it has to introduce the contemporary issues to the community at large.

On the other hand, M has initiated to transform civic education, because M believes that civic education was subject to support the status quo of the New Order regime (abuse), with aims at introducing the ideas of democracy and civil values (civility) as response to the process of democratization and civil society promotion to the students of its universities (formal schooling). By so doing, M wishes that the students or scholars are able to disseminate values of democracy and civil values (including civility) to the community at large through locally existing forums (spill over effect).

M and NU have been encouraging their own members and the community at large to take part in the political process (procedural democracy) such as electoral voting and direct presidential election in 2004 through voter education. Through voter education, M and NU wished to promote the awareness of the whole *umma* to control their own vote. The M and NU ensured the whole members that their votes would politically affect public policy. Both M and NU were also involved in promoting education for anti-corruption movement. This program aims at raising people's awareness that corruption is social pathology which deteriorates human life. Through this program, NU and M have attempted to lay a theological basis (the Islamic theology) in order to launch the members' consciousness based anti-corruption movement. Voter education and education for the anti-corruption movement are elaborated on from the democratization and civil society package program for Indonesia.

On the other hand, NU has been engaged in promoting the ideas of "inclusive Islam" and "emancipatory Islam" to the academic society (campuses), which are supposed to

produce “Islamic radicalism.” This program designates NU commitment to develop moderate Islam in Indonesia. To obtain this objective, NU has intensely developed discussion about Islam and contemporary issues such as democracy, pluralism, gender equality, tolerance, and the like through promoting forums in those campuses and talk shows on the private radio stations. Also NU is involved in promoting ‘political awareness’ to the community at large at the local levels (village, sub-district and district) through advocacy and the establishment of “citizen forums” which serves to raise people’s critical awareness of public policy and public service at the local levels.

M through *Aishiah* has been intensely involved in promoting gender awareness among the candidate legislative people (females) on the gender equality issues, especially the political rights of women such as political representation in legislature. This program was to equip female congressional candidates with gender equality issues with respect to the rights of females in domestic and public spheres and efforts to fight for the female’s rights through legislature. This program was done through a serial discussion program (talk show).

NU via Fatayat-NU made an efforts to criticize the orthodox opinions from the classical works of the clerics in the medieval age (*kitab kuning* such as *uqudu al-lujain*), especially in the issues of wife-husband relationship in the family (biased male interests), female reproduction rights, and female rights for sexual enjoyment and abortion. Fatayat NU argues that the cleric ideas of medieval age were valid for that time, which was different from the current and future situation. Therefore, the cleric ideas (*fiqh*) need to be reinterpreted along with societal dynamics (the present and future conditions). Fatayat NU

advocates critical ideas (gender equality) through serial discussion, publication, and dialogue with the NU clerics.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

8.1. Summary

The central question addressed in this study is “How are the conceptualization and operationalization of education for democratic citizenship similar to or different within and across the two Islamic civil society associations in Indonesia?” The study explored the ideas and practices (experiences) of two large Islamic civil society associations: Muhammadiyah (M) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), pertaining to four issues: democracy, democratic society, citizenship and educating for democracy.

Because the target groups of this study are Islamic civil society associations, this study was based on theoretical framework from the Islamic tradition (perspective). *Shura*, according to Muslim scholars, has a meaning that is comparable to and compatible with democracy. *Shura* implies a system of government’ and the new Islamic political or “Islamic democracy,” which encompasses democratic ideas and institution in keeping with the following values or norms: First, *shura* is based on the principles of the sovereignty of God and supremacy of *Shari’ah*. Second, the supreme and higher power in the Islamic state is the Divine Texts—the *Qur’an* and the *Sunnah*—and people as second. Third, the people of the Earth derive their authority from God’s authority according to the concept of *istikhlās* (vicegerency) (al-Sulami, 2003; Maududi, 1997; Moten, 1996; Mousalli, 1999).

Though Muslim scholars have diverse perspectives in the way they view civil society, they agree that the *umma* concept embodies the original concept of civil society in Islam. Also *umma* implies the Islamic concept about citizenship. *Umma* means the brotherhood of faithful society across various boundaries such as geographical areas, ethnicity, and social and economic status (Kelsay, 2002; Kurdi, 1984). *Umma* is based on the following principles: a) solidarity, cohesion among members, across territorial borders, and heterogeneity (classes, and ethnicities); b) bound with similar faith (*Tawhid* or the Unity); c) polity, which is based on the *Tawhid* that God is the ultimate sovereignty, and subject to the rules and norms of the *Shariah*; and d) common affairs are undertaken in mutual consultation and discussion (*shura*) among members of *Umma*, and decisions are arrived at through *ijmak* (consensus among people and/or scholars) (Moten, 1996).

Because Muslim scholars have not yet formally outlined the concept of education for democracy, in order to frame this study, the ideas of western scholars were employed. Education for democracy is defined as the process of imparting a set of core values of democracy or democratic attitudes such as respect for reasonable differences, different viewpoints, and human dignity, respect for minority rights, a caring attitude toward others, justice, equality, participation, freedom as requirements of citizens in order to create a democratic society (Bank, 1997; Calcendo, 2000; Christopher, 1989; CIVNET, 2000; Hoge, 2002; Kaltsounit, 1990; Meyer, 1990; Schwarzmantel, 2003) or to maintain a democratic community or society (Dynneson, 2001); teaching how to use the concept of a democratic

government (Patrick, 2000: 20); and making effective citizens or politically literate (Conley, 1993; Pring, 1999).

I carried out qualitative study which an ethnographic methodological approach to explore the ideas and practices of M and NU with respect to the above issues. To obtain the relevant information, I conducted “limited” observation through my involvement in several activities (e.g. a workshop on redesigning a manual for training for trainers about “Islam and anti-corruption,” a coordinating meeting of M boards of district level from all Java and Bali provinces, and one day seminar about Islamic proselytization) in M. In NU, I was only able to be involved in one day panel discussion about “NU and the 1926 spirits in relation to political constellation.” I interviewed 23 informants for each Islamic civil society association by employing open-ended questions. I collected documents such as articles, journals and books pertaining to M and NU from libraries of M, NU and PPIM-UIN to complement data I gathered through observation and interviews. I organized all data that were collected by using the procedure of ethnographic data analysis as described by LeCompte & Schensul (1999) with adjustment.

This study explored several findings, which are linked with the following themes: ideology underpinning, democratization including political involvement, democracy, democratic society, citizenship and education for democracy.

First, ideologically both M and NU are affiliated with the Sunni ideology. NU adheres strictly and exclusively to the Sunni ideology but M does not. M would rather say that it is

tajdid movement, which advocates the spirits of *ijtihad* and calls for a return to the pristine ways of scripture.

Second, politically M and NU was involved in initiating the establishment of a confederated Islamic political party (Masyumi) in the days of Indonesian independence. Both NU and M differ in their political involvement. NU did become or involve in political Party until 1984, but M has never become a political party. NU upholds the ideology of *Aswaja* as the basis of its political culture. M takes in some principles stated in the Qur'an such as *amar ma'ruf nahyi munkar* (enjoining good deed and forbidding wrongdoing), *mauizah hasanah* (wisdom and good counsel), and *mujadalah bil ihsan* (debate with the other side in the presence of a neutral outlooker) as the basis of its political culture (see Chapter 4). M and NU had politically different experiences (treatment) regarding the relationship to the regimes of two orders (the Old and New Orders).

Third, both M and NU claim that the basic values or ideology that are upheld by each association have a significant role in creating democratic atmosphere within both the members of each and the community at large (inner impetus or social capital). However, NU was counterbalanced by paternalism and patrimonialism, which encouraged NU to maximize its efforts to put its social capital into practice. At the same time, the spirits of *tajdid* and *ijtihad*, serving as M social capital, was challenged by reductionism and "elite biases" bringing *tajdid* into stagnancy and making M members politically uncritical of the New Order regime. The progressive leaders and younger generations within M and NU have

attempted to transform the tenacity or status quo within each organization to respond to societal dynamics (see Chapter 4).

Fourth, within M and NU organizations, members argue Islam has tenets, such as *shura* and *adl* (justice), congruent with democratic ideas, but their responses to the Western conceptions of democracy vary. Accommodationists in both organizations state that Islamic tenets are congruent with the Western ideas of democracy, while rejectionists express that Islam has concept of happiness as the goal of democracy, sovereignty, and freedom differ from Western concepts of democracy. M and NU's members define democratic society as a society wherein its members uphold such democratic values as individual freedom, respect for plurality or differences, tolerance, equality, and justice in various spheres of lives. M advocates the ideas of pluralistic, participative, and open society. Moreover, although most informants from M and NU subscribe to democratic values, such as individual freedom, respect for differences or plurality, tolerance, open-mindedness, and criticism; some see the notions of individual sovereignty, accepting of other religious groups' beliefs, and gender equality as problematic for Muslims in Indonesia. Adopting these values in certain ways, they argue, can be seen to contravene core/fundamental Islamic beliefs.

Fifth, both M and NU members refer to the ideal community (vision or social ideals) (see Chapters 5 and 6). Within both M and NU organizations, members agree that citizens have to be committed to the state (not to the regime). Commitment to the state can be manifested in various dimensions such as respect for the rule of law, criticism of societal problems, control of public policy and services implementation, and the like. In general, M

and NU have bylaws to regulate the relationships between board and members, and leadership recruitment. However, people join either NU or M as they are more commonly motivated by spirits of voluntarism, sincerity and *fastabiqul khairat* (hasting to do good deeds) (social motive rather than economic motive).

Seventh M and NU work to educate their members and the community at large by promoting democratic or civil values, political awareness, and participation. Both organizations have developed voter education and education for anti-corruption programs. In addition, NU organizes programs to transform orthodox understandings about the *fiqh* tradition and *aswaja* ideology, “citizen forums” to influence the provision of public services, and workshops to disseminate ideas of “inclusive, emancipatory or moderate Islam.” M’s programs focus on developing gender sensitivity among officials, candidates, and community members as well as on developing civil values for the students of its schools and colleges through civic education.

8.2. Implication and Recommendation

My field study was originally planned for at least six months. Since the US immigration policy or rule¹³¹ did not permit the international students to be away from America more than four months, my advisor and I had to make adjustment (only four

¹³¹ I discussed my plan of field study that it was originally set up at least for six months (at minimum). However after I made consultation with the Office for International Students (OIS), an advisor strongly advised me to hold strickly the immigration regulation (have to be out of the America no more than four months). Otherwise, I had, according to an advisor, to reapply for I 20.

months). During my field study, adjustment was also made because of two important national events,¹³² which involved all Indonesian. So I could not fully implement the principles of ethnographic study such as an iterative process. For example, I only was able to interview every key informant for once, so I was unable to dig up data more in depth from key informants.

Such limits might have affected the implementation of methodological principles and results of the study. Considering such limits, I am attempting to employ the findings of this study to the maximum in relation to the future of education for democracy in Indonesia (perspective, methodology or policy implementation).

8.2.1. Perspective


Chapter 5 highlighted that in 1990s studies pertaining to M and NU in relation to contemporary issues such as politics, Islamic thought or movement and Islamic education was commonly colored or dominated by the “traditionality–modernity” perspective. Writers, for example Azra (1997), Fealy (2003) and (Hefner, 2003), argue that the “traditionality–modernity” perspective is assumed to be insufficient to figure out NU and M’s feature in current situation, since both of them have developed along with societal dynamics. For example, NU eagerly embraced the ideals of Indonesian nationalism (Hefner, 2003); and established economic cooperation with the non-Muslims manifested through, for example,

¹³² In 2004, there were two important events: electoral voting on 4 April and direct campaigning for both vice and president election. Some key informants were involved in adhoc committees for electoral voting and presidential election at the local level.). Some others were involved in PANWASLU (the Control body for electoral voting

the establishment of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) NU-Summa (Azra, 1997). M, which claims to be adaptive and accommodative to modern institutions, is conservative (revivalist) with respect to the religious ideology (Puritanism) (Azra, 1997: 225).

This study produced evidence that within M and NU organizations members have various perspectives in response to Western ideas of democracy including sovereignty, tolerance, and gender equality (stated on Chapters 5 and 6). For instance, M and NU have accommodationists (including liberalist), and rejectionists (scholastic traditionalist, literalist or textualists). Some M and NU's members especially the younger generation promoted and advocated critical perspectives, which include the idea of Islamic theology of liberation, to study Islam in relation to the contemporary issues. Therefore, a "traditionality-modernity" perspective is not sufficient enough to figure out viewpoints of M and NU's members with respect to contemporary issues. An alternative perspective is needed for the sake of this purpose. The ideas of six paradigms of Ramadan (2004) and Islamic theology of liberation of Esack (2000), for example, can be used altogether for the study of M and NU in relation to contemporary issues. I believe that integrating Esack's idea into Ramadan may result in a new paradigm that may help those who want to study NU and M in the future (the description of each paradigm can be seen from footnote 123 in Chapter 7).

Figure 1 Paradigms of Islam in relation to contemporary issues (Islamic movement)
(Adapted from Ramadan and Esack)



8.2.2. Policy Issues

Aside from diverse perspectives within M and NU's members, the study noted two significant efforts, which were carried out by M and NU, in response to societal dynamics (democracy): 1) M and NU have transformed orthodoxy and *tajdid* stagnancy within themselves; and 2) they were involved in promoting the Western ideas of democracy to the community at large through projects; for example, disseminating the ideas of moderate Islam and gender sensitivity, voter education, deliberative democracy, and education for anti-corruption movement. Being involved in such projects, both M and NU have first hand experiences in promoting political awareness in the community at large (procedural and substantial democracy).

From this study, I drew several issues or principles can be drawn as the basis for policy or program implementation as follows:

The first issue is reducing tension within M and NU's members and the community at large who have diverse perspectives or stance (for example conservative, literalists, moderate/reformist) in response to democracy including gender equality, (religious) pluralisms and tolerance. In fact, such various groups present within M and NU organizations. Any party who wants to promote the Western ideas to the Indonesian Muslim society has to understand such a reality. M and NU have to continue their roles in promoting a dialogue among their members and other Islamic groups. Dialogue does not only serve as a means to communicate the Western ideas of these contemporary issues with Islam

but also to reach better mutual understanding among those groups within both M and NU as well as the Muslim community at large who have diverse perspectives.

The second issue is linking the contemporary issues such as (procedural and substantive) democracy, gender equality, pluralism and tolerance with the Islamic tenets and Muslim intellectual heritage. This, I believe, has to do with the promotion of approaches and materials for education for democracy. Shura, as stated earlier, connotes a system of government' and the new Islamic political or "Islamic democracy. Usually Muslims, who learn the ideas of shura and gender issue, make *fiqh siyasah* (Islamic jurisprudence on politics) and *fiqh an-Nisaa* (Islamic jurisprudence about women issues) reference. The ideas of tolerance, respect for differences, care, and mutual understanding are congruent with Islamic tenets regarding to ethics in relation to the worldly affairs (*hablun min annas*) such as relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nowadays, the younger generation of Muslims (including NU and M) has developed intensely the Islamic theology in relation to, for example, justice, land ownership, water resources, environment and other issues which were not discovered in the classical works. To develop education for democracy within the Muslims community, any party has to see at least three dimensions: *fiqh*, theology and ethics. For those who have concerns with curriculum development, these three aspects have to be integrated into a curriculum and its implementation.

The third issue is posing problems. This issue particularly has a connection with disseminating the ideas of democracy to the community at large (non-formal schooling system). From the field it was apparent that introducing the ideas of democracy through life

experiences, such as by the involvement of people who have diverse backgrounds in discussing serious and sensitive issues such as religious pluralism, tolerance and the like will be more effective than organizing a seminar or workshop. The more that people with diverse backgrounds interact the sooner they can be open-minded and establish mutual understanding. Therefore, in promoting democratic and civil values to the community at the large any party, including M and NU, are more encouraged to develop such approaches (forums). To the Muslims society, Islamic civil society associations such as NU and M have to develop participatory approaches, and to play a role as catalyst to promote democratic and civil values to the community at large.

The fourth issue is the sustenance for a program of educating for democracy. This sustenance (sustainability) is easy to be delivered on the paper, but it will be a matter to be upheld in reality. Since democracy itself cannot be separated from other issues such as economy, and day to day issues (people cannot be separated from daily basic needs such as meals), therefore the introduction of democracy, which includes educating for democracy, has to be integrated into programs which can guarantee people's basic needs. M and NU have to integrate their programs on democracy and educating for democracy into the practical deeds (*amal usaha*) of each. Regarding this point, cooperation among agencies (civil society associations, government agencies and other development agencies) including participants has to be set up. These agencies should set up program and models of implementation to keep education for democracy working effectively, including integration into *amal usaha* or practical deeds (what model of integration will be aptly applied to NU and MU?).

The fifth issue is maximising M and NU first hand experiences in promoting political awareness in the community at large (procedural democracy). To make their experiences more useful for the academic community at large, NU and M, for instance, would better formulate: a) criteria of quality of democratic life and b) a method or a tool for the assessment of educating for democracy in term of public awareness of problems which rise in a community, public policies and the like. Regarding the point (a), for instance, M and NU have to formulate several issues, for example, an effective rule of law, democratic policy decision making, the electoral system, public institutions' treatment of the public, local government, political parties' internal affairs, civil society, citizens' participation in public policy making, public opinion; and civic culture, which have to be linked with the principles of Islam and local culture. Pertaining to the point (b), both NU and M would better develop the idea of "citizen audit" as (a) a system for monitoring and assessing the strength and weaknesses of democratic life with citizens' participation in its different steps of implementation; (b) a new practice of political deliberation or public affairs; (c) an exploration of people's day-to-day experience of living in a democracy using the notion of quality of democracy; and (d) a tool for societal criticism and improvement (see for instance Cullell (2004)).

APPENDIX A: List of Terms (Glossary)

Al-‘aadat muhakkam	A local custom can be law
Ahlu al-kitab	Christian and Jews. Liberal NU and M have extended this concept to Confucianism, Thabiin, Zoroaster, and Buddhism
Ahlu al-‘adli wa at-Tawhed	The people of justice and divine oneness
Amal saleh	Good deed
Ahlussunna wal jamaah or aswaja	The Sunni ideology
Al-u’tiqaa al-usuulu al-thalathah	The basic principles of NU, i.e. theologically affiliated with the ideas of imam Al-Ashari and al-Maturidy; committed to the practice of one of four schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence (<i>fiqh</i>), i.e., Shaifii’sm, Hanafiism, Malikiism and Hanbalism; affiliated with two schools of Sufism, i.e., Abu Hamid al-Ghazaly and Al-Junaidy al-Baghdady
Asbabu an-nuzul	The occasion or the causes of revelation (with respect to the Qur’an)
Al-khuruuj min al-khilafah mutahak	To deviate from the general or standardized rules
Al-mujtama’ al-fadllah	The excellent society
Al-mutagayyar	Flexible elements
Ar-rijaalu qawwamu ala an-nisa	A verse used by the exoteric Qur’anic commentators of the medieval age with respect to the prohibition of women to charge leadership in public sphere.

Ar-rujuu ila al-mujtama al-madani	Civil social movement
Ar-rujuu' ila al-Qur'an wa as-sunnah	Calling for a return to the pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad
Asbaabu al-wurud	The occasion of narration of <i>hadith</i>
Aishiah	Female Autonomous Body of Muhammadiyah
APBD	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (local government budgets)
BMI	Bank Muamalat Indonesia (Indonesian Muamalat or Islamic Bank)
Berdikari	To be independent of outside assistance and investment
BPD	Badan Perwakilan Desa (village council)
Bhineka Tunggal Ika	Diversity in unity (Indonesian motto)
Da'iah	Female proselytizers/clerics
Darajah	Literally means a degree. This word is stated on a verse of the Qur'an which was used by the exoteric Qur'anic commentators (in medieval age) that male has a degree over a female and/or a male is the leader of a female (women's innate physical and mental deficiency)
Ewuh pakewuh tradition	Less critical of and feeling uneasy to criticize the state or regime.
Fastabiqu al-khairaat	Hasting (competing) to do good deed

Fatayat-NU	Youth Female Autonomous Body of NU
Fiqh	technical rules of law, positive 'black' prescription (Islamic jurisprudence)
Fitrah	Innate potential or an innate, God-given sense of right and wrong
Forum Warga	Citizen Forum
FORDEM	Forum for democracy
FPI	Forum Pembelaan Islam or Forum for Islam Defense (Indonesian Islamic fundamentalists)
GBHN	Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (the state policy on the national development)
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Group)
Hujja	proof
HW	<i>Hizbul Wathan</i> (boy scout of M)
Ibadah	Observing devotion to God
ICCE	Institute for Community and Civic Education Development (an autonomous body of the UIN)
Ikatan Pencak Silat Pagar Nusa	Pagar Nusa Traditional Defense (association of NU youth traditional defense)
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
ICRP	Indonesian Coalition for Religious Pluralism
Ijtihad	The intellectual efforts of trained Islamic scholars to arrive at legal rulings on matters not covered in

	the sacred book
INPRES	the presidential assistance
Istihsan	General interests of the community
Jamaah	number of Muslim group [similar to <i>umma</i>]
Jam'iyya Ahli Thariq al-Mu'tabarah an-Nahdliyya	The Association of NU Spiritualism/Sufism
Jamiyyah al-Qurra wa Huffadz	the association of those who memorize and understand the Qur'an
JIMM	Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah or M intellectual Network (an NGO establish by M young generation who advocate critical perspectives in relation to the studies of Islam and contemporary issues)
Khalifah fi al-ardl	The concept of Vicegerent on the earth
Khiaru umma	ideal society (best society) where its members enjoin good and forbid wrongdoing or evil (<i>amar ma'ruf</i> and <i>nahyi munkar</i>)
Kitab kuning	the rulings or wisdoms of the Islamic clerics of the medieval age
Kittah 1926	<i>Khitah 1926</i> : the spirit of 1926, the year of NU's function as a social and religious body implying that NU might soon shed its political character and function.
Lakpesdam-NU	The NU Center for Human Resource Study and Development
LP3	Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Pendidikan or Center for Educational Research and Development of Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah

	University
LEMHANNAS	Lembaga Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional (the Institute for National Defense)
Litsus	The New Order regime policy with respect to screening legislature candidates from especially non-ruling political parties
Madzhab Fiqhiyya	The wisdoms of Sunni clerics in the medieval age or the four traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence
MPR	Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
MPKSDI	Majlis Pembinaan Kader and Sumber Daya Insani (Council for Cadre and Human Resource Development of Muhammadiyah)
MTDK	Majlis Tabligh and Dakwah Khusus (Council for Proselytization and Special Islamic Calls)
Majlis Tarjih Maqasidu as-samaa	Fatwa Council of Muhammadiyah God's will
Masaalihu umma	Public interests
Masyumi	Majlis Syuro Muslim Indonesia or Confederated Muslim Party
Mufassir	The exoteric commentator of the Qur'an

Mu'tazilla	The name of the great theological school that creates the speculative dogmatism of Islam.
Mufakat	Consensus
Muslimat-NU NASAKOM	Women Autonomous Body of NU Trilogy power of Indonesia (Nationalist, Religious and Communism)
Pancasila	Five principles (the Indonesian state ideology).
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasisonal or [National Mandate Party (founded by Amin Rais).
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesia Democratic Party).
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation Awakening Party (the NU party).
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).
PMII	Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (NU Student Movement)
PPBK/PPWK	Program Pengembangan Berfikir Kritis /Program pengembangan Wacana Kiyai [program for promoting critical nuances of <i>kiyais</i> or clerics].
P4D	Perencanaan Partisipatif Penyusunan Program Pembangunan Desa (Participatory Planning for Rural Development Program).
PPP	Partai Persatuan pembangunan (United Development Party)
P3M	Pusat Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat or Center for Pesantren and Community

	Development (an NGO established by NU and non-NU activists and affiliated with the NU ideology).
PPIM	Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat or Center for the Study of Islam and Society [an autonomous research body of the Islamic State University in Jakarta or UIN].
P4	Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (A Guide on Appreciation and Application of the State Ideology)
PRRI	Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (The Revolutionary Government of Indonesian Republic)
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party)
Pesantren	Traditional religious boarding schools
RMI	<i>Rabitah Ma'hadil Islamiyah</i> (the association of pesantren)
Rawi	Narrator
RUKUB	Rancangan Undang-undang Kerukunan Umat Beragama (the bill of law with respect to Harmony among believers)
Salafi	The name given to those who follow the ideas and practices of the righteous ancestors (<i>al-salaf al-salih</i>)
Salafi literalists	Who reject both medieval jurisprudence and reinterpretation of the original Islamic sources

Sami'na wa atha'na	Obedient to the high authority such as cleric and leader without reserve
SDSB	Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah (a national lottery)
Selametan	Sacrificial meals
Shura	designates democracy in Islam or political Islam
Tajdid	A mode of reform that does not depend upon a concept of "progress" for their validity
Tanwir	the M National Meeting "per annum" (Assessment forum)
Taqlid	the adherence to the opinions of the preceding generations of the Muslim clerics of medieval age
Tapak Suci Putera Muhammadiyah	Traditional Defense of M youth
Tasarruf al-imaan alaa al-raiyya manuut bii al-masalaha	Public interests serve main points (criteria) to assess the state policy and implementation
The Qur'an and as-Sunnah	The sacred text
Ukhuwah bashariah	NU in relation to all human beings
Ukhuwah bashariah	NU in relation to the state
Ukhuwah wathnoniyah	NU in relation to the state
Ulumul al-qur'an	the knowledge of the Qur'an
Usulu al-khamsah	The five basic human needs (<i>daruriyaat</i>) (see al-Ghazaly)

Usul fiqh

Islamic legal theory

Wawasan Nusantara

National outlook

APPENDIX B: Interview Guide

Key informant/actor code: Interview date:
Position : Time: to
Affiliation: NU/Muhammadiyah Place of interview:

Note: Describe the actual settings for interviews.

I. Organizational issue

1. What do you see the mission and objectives of your association?
2. What are the approaches and programs developed to achieve the mission and objectives of your association?
3. How do the tenets of Islam influence programs of your association?
4. Has your association developed its mission, objectives and programs in response to particular societal dynamics? If yes, what factors does your association consider in developing its missions and programs?
5. In your association, how are decisions made in designing, planning and implementing programs?
6. How would you describe the roles your association plays in developing members of the community in such spheres as education, economics, and religion?
7. How does your association evaluate its programs?

II. Democracy

1. How do you (personally) define democracy? Do you think others in yours associations would define democracy in the same way or differently?
2. What do you think of the key characteristics of a democratic society and of a democratic state? Do you consider (the following): (a) popular sovereignty, (b) freedoms [freedom of speech or expression, freedom of religion, freedom from fear and danger, freedom from want, freedom of association], (c) respect for differences or plurality/ dignity of others, (d) critical and (e) equality, as a key characteristic of democracy? Why or why not?
3. As you think about democracy, do you see aspects that are compatible or incompatible with basic principles or tenets of Islam?

4. To what extent and in what ways do you view Indonesia to be a democracy?
5. Previously, you describe how various kinds of decisions are made in your association.
To what extent and in what ways do such decision-making processes resemble your conception of democracy?

II. Citizenship and Democratic Citizens

1. When you hear word 'citizenship,' what do you think? How do you define or conceptualize citizenship? Do you think that others in your association would define citizenship in the same way or differently?
2. What do you view to be the rights, responsibilities, and roles of citizens?
3. Do you think that loyalty and commitment to state characterize a responsible citizen? How do you define loyalty and commitment to state? What are other characteristics of a responsible citizen? What are the rights of citizens?
4. Please describe the rights, responsibilities, and roles of members of your association?
5. To what extent and in what ways do such roles resemble your ideal conception of citizenship?

III. Education for democratic citizenship

1. In your view, how should one organize education to develop people's capacity and commitment to be citizens for democracy?
2. Do you think that others in your association would agree or disagree with you?
3. What kinds of programs does your association have to develop citizens for democratic society? What knowledge, attitudes, and skills are taught/transmitted in such programs? What are the sources of content for such programs? How are such educational programs organized? What kinds of activities are included in such programs? Who are involved as participants in such programs? Who are involved in planning and implementing such programs?

For each program, please tell me:

	Trainings/workshops/programs		
a. How many times/year is this program organized?			
b. How many participants? Who are the participants?			
c. Content/material			
d. Methods/approaches employed			
e. Where are programs held?			

4. What resources does (ideas, contacts, networks, facilities, good teachers, etc.) your association have that facilities such educational programs designed to develop democratic citizens?
5. What challenges does your association experience in developing education for democratic citizenship to your members and to a larger community?
6. What are your suggestions to improve your association's program for education for democracy for people, especially Muslim in Indonesia?

APPENDIX C: Approval Letter from Muhammadiyah



مجلس الإدارة المركزية للجمعية المحمدية
PIMPINAN PUSAT MUHAMMADIYAH
(Central Board of Muhammadiyah)

Jakarta Office :
Jl. Menteng Raya No. 62 Jakarta 10340
Telp. (021) 3903021-22, 331363
Fax. (021) 3903024

e.mail : PPMuh@indosat.net.id

Yogyakarta Office :
Jl. Cik Ditiro No. 23 Yogyakarta 55225
Telp. (0274) 553132
Fax. (0274) 553137

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Dear Mr Fuad Fachruddin
Ph.D student of School of Education,
University of Pittsburgh.

Assalaamu alaykum,
Subject: field study approval

With regard to your request about your field study in our organization, we welcome to you. We believe that your study has relation to the development of civil society and democratization in Indonesia, to which Muhammadiyah has been intensely involved. We have organized several programs such as civic education, education for gender awareness, voter education and education for anti-corruption movement. The University of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta has initiated to transform civic education for colleges to be more responsive to democratization and reformation. It has also led education for anti-corruption movement. Our autonomous organization such as Nasyiatul Ai'syiah, Nashiatul Aisyiah, IMM were involved in voter education and education for gender awareness. We had rather advise you to focus your study in Yogyakarta. Make sure that you have to contact our colleagues in Yogyakarta if you want to interview with our colleagues and to observe our program in the field. We will make sure you that any political process happens in Indonesia such as campaigning for electoral voting and presidency will not make you a problem, but will let you get familiar with political situation or the process of democratization to date. We think your study will, *insha Allah*, contribute to the development of our programs. Please give us a copy of your dissertation whenever you have done.


Good luck with your study and may God bless you.

Wassalam,

Jakarta, February 9th 2004




Central Board of Muhammadiyah


Drs. B. Hajriyanto Y. Thohari, MA
Vice Secretary

- CC.:
1. Department of Policy Studies, School of Education University of Pittsburgh
 2. RB University of Pittsburgh

APPENDIX D: Letter from the President of Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta

25/01/2005 13:34 0274-387646 SEKRETARIAT-UMY PAGE 01

 UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA

Kampus Terpadu : Jl. Lingkar Barat, Tamantirto, Kasihan, Yogyakarta 55183
Telp. (0274) 387656 (hunting) Fax. (0274) 387646

Nomor: 724 /B.1-VIII/I/2005 25 Januari 2005
Lamp. : -0-
Hal : **Permohonan Surat Keterangan**

Yth. Ketua
Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah
Di -
JAKARTA

السَّلَامُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ وَبَرَكَاتُهُ



Rektor Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta dengan ini menyampaikan bahwa :

N a m a : Fuad Faeruddin

adalah mahasiswa S-3 di Pittsburg University Amerika yang pada tahun 2004 telah melakukan penelitian tentang Muhammadiyah kepada para tokoh Muhammadiyah di berbagai tingkatan kepemimpinan. Selanjutnya mohon dapat diterbitkan surat keterangan telah melakukan penelitian dari Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah.

Demikian kami sampaikan, atas perhatiannya diucapkan terima kasih.

وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ وَبَرَكَاتُهُ



Fuad Faeruddin Bashori
NIP. 413 010

APPENDIX E: Approval Letter from LAKPESDAM-NU



LAKPESDAM

LEMBAGA KAJIAN DAN PENGEMBANGAN SUMBERDAYA MANUSIA
Institutes for Human Resources Studies and Development

No. 011/UM-MMK-NI/VI/2004

Dear Mr. Fuad Fachruddin
Ph.D student of School of Education
University of Pittsburgh

Subject : **Field study approval**

Assalamu'alaikum,

With regard to your request about your field study in our organization, we welcome to you. We think topic has a close connection with our program on the development of civil society and democratization in Indonesia. We have organized several program such as political education (deliberative democracy), Program Penguatan Wacana Kiai (transforming ways of thinking of clerics), dissemination of critical perspective on Islam (inclusive Islam) to the community at large, voter education, and education for anti-corruption movement. Please contact our colleagues here in the Lakpesdam-NU Pusat, Lakpesdam-NU Jakarta and Lakpesdam-NU Bekasi district to get schedule time for interview with them. Make sure that you have to contact us if you want to observe our program in the field. We advise you to contact our colleagues in P3M (an NGO affiliated with NU) since this NGO has also intensely organized critical studies on Islam and contemporary issues such as democracy, pluralism, gender equality, emancipatory and inclusive Islam; voter education, and education for anti-corruption movement. We convince you that any political process happens in Indonesia such as campaigning for electoral voting and presidency will not make you a problem, but give you more nuances as to understand the process of democratization in Indonesia. We think your study will, Insya Allah, share with to develop our program (political education). Please give us a copy of your dissertation whenever you have done.

Good luck with your study and may God bless you.

Wassalam,
Jakarta, June 2004

Masykur Maskub
Director



Cc :

1. Department of Policy Studies, School of Education University of Pittsburgh
2. IRB University of Pittsburgh

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